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ABSTRACT
Organizational Practices Leading to a Positive Safety Culture: A Delphi Approach
By
Andy M. Cwalina

A positive safety culture has been shown to contribute to a firm’s ability to avoid
or reduce the occurrence of occupational accidents and injuries. In American workplaces
alone 3,582 people died and 5.1 million people were disabled in 2009 and the cost to
corporate America was $169 billion and an additional productivity loss of 95 million
work days. The economic cost to each American household is about $1,200. Firms that
establish and maintain a positive safety culture are able to achieve a competitive
advantage in the market.
While much research exists showing the relationship between safety culture and
accident reduction, less guidance is found on how companies might achieve such
improvement through cultural change. Attempts have been made to determine the factor
structure of safety culture, that is, the identification of the antecedents of a positive safety
culture. However, to date no general consensus has emerged among researchers about
the exact elements of the factor structure. Research methodologies have been blamed for
biasing the research results and thereby causing the lack of consensus. This dissertation
uses a different methodology, the Delphi method combined with Hofstede’s well-known
onion model of organizational culture, to determine those organizational practices that
lead to a positive safety culture.
Delphi is a mixed methodology that begins with an exploratory approach
followed by the more traditional quantitative method. The exploratory front-end was
deemed appropriate given that prior traditional survey instruments most likely introduced
researcher bias through a myopic view of safety culture. Delphi also differs by utilizing
purposeful sampling versus random sampling which provides a high level of expertise to
inform the research.
After four rounds of inquiry with a panel of experts, a consensus was reached on
18 organizational practices that lead to a positive safety culture. This research adds to the
understanding of safety culture, provides useful information for both practitioners and
academic researchers, and offers launch points for extensions of the research.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction to the Chapter
Occupational fatalities across the globe number 350,000 annually and the
International Labor Organization estimates that 300,000 of those fatalities could be
prevented by well-managed safety programs (ILO, 2011). Such programs include the
establishment and maintenance of an organizational culture that values accident and
injury avoidance, i.e., a positive safety culture. The importance of safety culture could
not be more apparent than by the accident investigation of British Petroleum’s (BP)
Texas City refinery explosion in 2005. Fifteen people were killed and 180 people injured
in that accident. The Chemical Safety Board’s Manager of Investigations noted that
while “BP had a low recordable injury rate by OSHA reporting standards; their safety
culture was in shambles” (Johnson, 2010, p. 39). OSHA fined BP $21 million for the
accident. However, BP’s failure to correct those safety culture issues in a timely manner
resulted in an additional $87 million fine in 2009, just one year before the Deep Water
Horizon drilling rig accident killed 11 people and is costing billions of dollars. Firms that
possess a positive safety culture are able to avoid costs associated with workers
compensation, litigation, and productivity loss resulting in a competitive advantage in the
market (Rechenthin, 2004). Reason (1998) argues that a positive safety culture can,
indeed, be engineered by adjusting those interacting elements that drive accident
avoidance. Understanding the nature of those “interacting elements” and how they
influence safety culture is the essence of this study.
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Statement of the Problem
The management of safety culture requires an understanding of the specific
underlying elements of that subculture, i.e. the “factor structure” of safety culture. This
factor structure includes the breakdown of the manifestations of shared beliefs, values,
and attitudes that are the antecedents to safety culture. Research to that end began in
earnest in the late 1970’s and the literature contains a plethora of studies aimed at
identifying the factor structure of safety culture. However, the results taken as a whole
present a wide variation in the factor structure (Clarke, 2000). In his review of the
prominent literature, Guldenmund (2000) concluded that no general consensus of safety
culture factor structure exists and that this variance is due primarily to context and
methodology. Context-driven variances generally refer to the environment under which
the research was conducted, for example, whether the sample was drawn from the
construction worker population versus from a manufacturing population. Methodology
refers to the research procedures or instruments used. To address the problem, this
dissertation author uses an alternative methodology, namely the Delphi methodology, and
Hofstede’s onion model to determine factors that contribute to a positive safety culture.
Background of the Problem
The term “safety culture” gained notoriety in 1986 from the investigation of the
Chernobyl disaster. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determined that a
faulty safety culture was the root cause of the accident (Glendon & Stanton, 2000).
Further interest in the concept emerged from formal investigations of subsequent major
accidents (e.g., Zeebrugge ferry capsizing, Piper Alpha accident, Clapham Junction
disaster, Bhopal disaster) in which organizational and social factors were found to be key

3
contributors to the accidents and a deficient safety culture was frequently used as an allencompassing explanation of such causal factors (Clarke, 2000). Additionally, regulatory
agencies like the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the United
States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have issued directives
and guidelines (HSE, 1997; OSHA, 2003) encouraging the development of a “positive
safety culture” to reduce the incidence of workplace accidents and injuries.
In the 1940’s, Heinrich (1941) posited the idea that social and organizational
factors influence safe behaviors. His model of accident causation asserted that human
error, the root of all accidents, was the result of our ancestry and social environment
(cultural factors). In later studies, researchers reported a range of factors from two
(Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991) to as many as 46 factors (Lee, 1998) as the underlying
determinants of safety culture. In short, researchers have demonstrated that no clear
consensus has been found for a complete factor structure. However, evidence suggests
that organizational practices defined under the umbrella of safety culture appear to
influence safety behaviors.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to identify those organizational practices
(independent variables) that lead to the establishment and maintenance of a positive
safety culture (dependent variable). This study differs from the previous research by
using a mixed-methodology, namely the Delphi technique. Reid (1988) describes the
Delphi technique as a systematic collection and aggregation of informed judgments from
a panel of experts on specific issues within a specific field. As previously discussed,
numerous quantitative studies (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Bottani, Monica, &

4
Vignali, 2009; Brown & Holmes, 1986; Gillen, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro, 2002;
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; Lee, 1998; Lee & Harrison, 2000; McFadden, Henagan &
Gowen, 2009; and Zohar 2000, 2002a, 2002b) have been conducted to determine the
dimensions that make up safety culture and their relationships to safety performance.
However, Clarke (2000) notes: “There remains no universal agreement on the definition
of safety culture … and little theoretical underpinning for much of the empirical work”
(p. 65). Cooper (2000) suggests that much of the empirical confusion is indicative of a
need to examine the safety culture construct under a wider range of context.
By their design, the investigators who conducted the majority of these previous
studies examined the applicable relationships of a pre-determined set of safety culture
dimensions. In contrast, the Delphi methodology in this dissertation study contains an
element of exploratory research on the front-end which opens the study to previously
unreported insights and thus eliminates the bias from a priori knowledge. A broader
context is more readily accommodated by using a Delphi approach. For example, the
panel of experts can be configured with professionals from a broader range of industries,
thereby removing industry-specific bias that has been shown to influence the results
(Smith, Chen, Ho, & Huang, 2006).
Inaki, Landin, and Fa (2006) noted in their studies on quality management (QM)
that empirical research using quantitative methods based on surveys produced results
distorted by organizational position bias of the informants. Managers were expected to
conform to the “party line” with regard to QM. Again, a purposefully configured panel
of experts, combined with the iterative rounds in the Delphi protocol, can minimize this
position bias. In short, the use of a Delphi methodology for this dissertation study
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provides an opportunity to make a unique research contribution to understanding the
safety culture.
Justification of the Study
Occupational fatalities across the globe are estimated to be 350,000 annually and,
according to the International Labor Organization, 300,000 of those fatalities could have
been prevented by well-managed safety programs (ILO, 2011). In American workplaces
alone 3,582 people died and 5.1 million people were disabled in 2009 (NSC, 2011). The
National Safety Council estimates these accidents cost corporate America $169 billion
and an additional productivity loss of 95 million work days (NSC, 2011). The economic
cost is about $1,200 to each American household (NSC, 2011). Clearly, firms that
establish and maintain a positive safety culture that supports the reduction or elimination
of occupational accidents and injuries are able to achieve a competitive advantage in the
market (Rechenthin, 2004). Clarke (1999) points out that “while some research evidence
suggests that a positive safety culture will improve safety performance, there is less
guidance on how companies might achieve such improvement through cultural change”
(p. 186). Reason (1998) argues that a positive safety culture can, indeed, be engineered:
Achieving a safe culture does not have to be akin to a religious conversion – as it
is sometimes represented. There is nothing mystical about it. It can be acquired
through the day-to-day application of practical down-to-earth measures. Nor is
safety culture a single entity. It is made up of a number of interacting elements,
or ways of doing, thinking, and managing, that have enhanced resistance to
operational dangers as their natural by-product. (p. 305)
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Understanding the nature of those “interacting elements” and how they influence safety
culture is the essence of this dissertation.
Applicable Theoretical Model
Hofstede’s (2001) “onion” model of cultural manifestations will be used as the
theoretical lens in this study to examine the practices that support a positive safety
culture. Hofstede’s model, which is based upon the works of mid-twentieth century
anthropologists and sociologists, posits that shared values are at the core of
organizational cultures. Hofstede further notes that values are not directly observable but
rather manifest themselves outwardly through the organization’s practices, namely
rituals, symbols, and heroes. He likens these practices to individual layers of an onion,
concentrically wrapped around values at the core. Figure 1 depicts the onion model
graphically, where rituals, symbols, and heroes are the practices that manifest the core
values of the organization.

As the onion model is applied in this dissertation study, the

core organizational culture is safety culture and the surrounding layers are the
manifestations, or practices, that are identified in this study.
Research Questions
The statement of the problem noted that occupational accidents can be reduced by
the establishment of a positive safety culture and that certain organizational practices are
related to the establishment of safety culture. Therefore, the following questions are
pertinent to addressing the problem stated for this dissertation;
Question #1: What practices are used by the members of organizations to
establish or maintain a positive safety culture within those organizations?

7
Question #2: Does consensus exist among a panel of safety experts for the set, or
subset, of the practices discovered by the first research question?
Definition of Terms
Organizational culture: “A pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a
group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members
as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein,
2010, p. 18).
Subculture: The fraction of the organizational culture that is defined by a specific
assumption or specific set of assumptions aimed at solving a specific problem of
adaptation and integration (Schein, 2009, 2010).
Safety Culture: “The shared attitudes, values, beliefs, and practices of people at
work concerning not only the magnitude of the risks that they encounter but also the
necessity, practicality, and effectiveness of preventive measures” (Booth, 1996, p. 313).
Safety Program: The systematic set of physical and organizational controls used
to intervene in the accident causation process and to break the causation chain (Bottani,
Monica & Vignali, 2009).
Delphi Method: A process to achieve a consensus opinion among knowledgeable
respondents through repetitive and iterative inquiries (Dressel, Consoli, Kim, &
Atkinson, 2007). These knowledgeable respondents comprise the “panel of experts” that
is queried on three or more separate instances. Each inquiry reiterates the results of the
previous inquiry such that a subsequent response of the panel converges on consensus
results.

8
Practices: Following Hofstede (2001), practices are subdivided into: symbols,
heroes, and rituals. Symbols are the words, gestures, pictures, and objects that carry the
meanings of the culture and are recognized only by those who share the culture. Heroes
are persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who outwardly possess the characteristics
that are highly prized by those who share the culture. Rituals are the collective activities
that are technically unnecessary for achievement of the organization’s goals, but are
considered socially essential by those who share the culture.
Onion Model: Hofstede’s (2001) pictorial representation of culture’s observable
manifestations. At the core of culture are the shared values with the organizational
practices, namely the rituals, heroes, and symbols that surround the core values like the
layers of an onion. Figure 1 illustrates Hofstede’s (2001) Onion Model.
Delimitations
The following areas and discussion of each defines the boundaries of the research
included in this dissertation.
Work Setting Risk. Panel experts were selected from organizations that have been
deemed to have sufficient risk to warrant a formalized occupational safety program
specified by the firm. Accidents can, however, occur in any work setting, but certain
work contexts make formalized safety programs impractical or unreasonable. For
example, telecommuters, sales representatives, and similar remote workers may not
interact sufficiently with their corporate peers to establish a safety culture, or at least a
shared set of values regarding safety.
Similarly, many jobs do not inherently entail enough risk to warrant a formalized
safety program. Data processors are subjected to much less risk and sustain far fewer
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injuries than construction workers. Consequently, data processors are frequently not
included in rigorous safety programs. Therefore, job settings with low safety risk are not
specifically included in this study.
Industry differentiation. Hazards differ according to industry type. In this
dissertation study, no attempt was made to drill down and delineate industry specific
practices. For example, prior safety culture research demonstrated that the practice of
hazard training is an antecedent to positive safety culture (Fang et al., 2006; FaringtonDarby et al., 2005; Silva et al, 2004). However, the content and frequency of the training
can differ significantly according to the uniqueness of the job hazards. In this
dissertation study, I address the broader category of training and exclude job or industry
specifics. Other organizational practices identified by this research are similarly limited
to the same broader categories.
Background of Delphi Panel Experts. Panel members originate from four groups
of people: (a) principal corporate officers, i.e., CEO, COO, presidents, and equivalent, (b)
safety professionals, (c) auditors or inspectors, and (d) external consultants. These
groups were selected because they most likely possess a wide cross-sectional view of the
organization. Positions with narrower views, such as shop floor operators or trades
specialists, have been excluded. Consequently, job specifics within the firm are not
examined.
Assumptions
The concepts of safety climate and safety culture are assumed to be
interchangeable when the ultimate outcome is accident avoidance. While the literature
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does contain arguments for separateness, an equal number of precedent cases exist within
the same literature for interchangeability.
Chapter I Conclusion
Management practitioners can improve organizational safety performance
(accident and injury reduction) by instilling and maintaining a positive safety culture.
Researchers have demonstrated that the foundational elements of safety culture (the
antecedents) vary widely depending on the context and methodology of the study.
Hofstede’s (2001) Onion Model provides a theoretical base from which organizational
practices can be viewed as the manifestations of safety culture and serve as the proxy to
measure its existence. Also, in this dissertation, the Delphi technique was used as a
methodological alternative to traditional survey instruments organizational and contextual
bias is minimized. These biases are thought to be major contributors to the lack of
consensus of the factor structure in prior published research.
Organization of the Remainder of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter II, a review
of the literature is provided that examines the Hofstede Onion Model, accident
prevention, safety culture and its factor structure, and the Delphi methodology; in
Chapter III the Delphi research methodology, the expert panel, the rounds of inquiry, and
the research design are discussed; Chapter IV provides a summary presentation of the
data and an analysis thereof; and Chapter V provides a discussion of the results,
conclusions, implications for practitioners, limitations, and extensions for further
research.
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Figure 1: Hofstede’s (2001) Onion Model showing the manifestations of culture as they
are related to core values. Adapted from Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values,
Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations (p. 11), by G. Hofstede, 2001,
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Copyright 2001 by Geert Hofstede.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction to the Chapter
The objective of this chapter is to examine the existing research on organizational
culture, safety culture, the practical application of safety culture to avoid injuries and
accidents, the measurements of safety culture, and the Delphi methodology. Five streams
of literature are reviewed: (a) the literature that leads to the selection of Hofstede’s onion
model of culture as the theoretical basis for this study and the onion model broken down
into the elements that manifest culture; (b) the body of literature that supports the
existence of an organizational subculture commonly called safety culture; (c) the body of
literature supporting the positive correlation between safety culture and safety
performance; (d) the body of literature that contains the analyses of the social and
organizational elements that comprise the structure of safety culture and the lack of
consensus on that structure; and (e) the final literature stream in which research
methodologies are compared, and more specifically, the application of the Delphi
technique.
Culture and Hofstede’s Onion Model
The survival of mankind thus far has, to a large extent, depended on the ability of
individual people to act together as a social unit or organization. Social scientists
Meyerson and Martin (1987) place those abilities, and their underlying elements, under
the umbrella of the culture of an organization. They called it “the social or normative glue
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that holds together a potentially diverse group of organizational members” (p. 623).
Organizational culture research has a long history with researchers producing a number
of definitions for culture. Some prominent examples include Deal and Kennedy (1982)
who used the definition as norms, values, and beliefs of the group. Moran and Volkwein
(1992) defined culture as an “ideational system focused on the patterns of meaning
represented through values, norms, formal knowledge, beliefs, and expressive forms” (p.
33). O’Reilly and Chatman (1996), whose definition of culture is consistent with Kotter
and Heskett (1992) and with Rousseau (1990), conceptualize it as a “system of shared
values (that define what is important) and norms that define appropriate attitudes and
behaviors for organizational members (how to feel and behave)” (p. 160). Schein’s
(1990) definition states that culture is “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the
group has learned as it solved problems of external adaptation and internal integration,
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (p.
111). These more frequently cited definitions, and the many others in the literature, share
some common threads. The most common is that “values” are at the core of culture, and
they are “shared” by the members. Even Schein (2009), who did not include values in his
initial definition, points out later in his writings that values are derived from the tacit
assumptions used in his definition of culture.
Hofstede’s (2001) onion model of culture has the concept of values at its core,
with three observable manifestations of culture (symbols, heroes, and rituals) surrounding
values like layers of an onion (see Figure 1). Symbols are “words, gestures, pictures, and
objects that carry complex meanings recognized uniquely by the members of the culture”
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(Hofstede, 2001, p. 11). Heroes are “persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who are
highly prized by the members of the culture and serve as behavioral models” (Hofstede,
2001, p. 11). Rituals are the “collective activities which may not be technically essential
to the desired goals but are considered socially essential by the members of the culture”
(Hofstede, 2001, p. 11). Hofstede (2001) subsumes these three observable
manifestations under the term “practices.” He posits that at the core of culture, values are
invisible until they are observed through overt practices.
Safety culture researchers have made extensive use of the Hofstede onion model.
In their analysis of the development of safety culture, McDonald and Ryan (1992) noted
that employees do not act in a vacuum but exercise the practices of the safety culture to
which they belong. In his work on organizational adoption of lessons learned from
serious accidents, Reason (1998) suggests that Hofstede’s onion model best illustrates
how a safety culture can be engineered via regimented practices aimed at goal behavior.
Mearns, Flin, Gordon, and Fleming (1998) studied safety cultures of off-shore oil rigs
and used the practices described by the Hofstede onion model as variables that
differentiated strategic versus tactical management of safety culture. They concluded that
senior management (strategists) was more involved with “symbols” and “rituals” while
the work force (the tacticians) placed more importance on their immediate supervisors,
the “heroes.” Cooper (2000) posited a model for future safety culture research using
Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory that relied heavily on the layered approach,
frequently citing Hofstede’s onion model. In his analysis of making changes
(strengthening) to safety culture, DeJoy (2005) points to Hofstede’s onion model to
illustrate how the manifestations of culture are the most accessible structural elements
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that can be adjusted for the purpose of modifying the safety culture. Finally,
Guldenmund (2000) analyzed 20 years of safety culture research literature to conclude
that a broad consensus existed among the authors about using Hofstede’s multi-layered
concentric model of safety culture to justify safety culture’s influences and consequences.
Safety Culture
History
A brief literature review of the evolutionary history of occupational safety is
appropriate as a prelude to the discussion of safety culture. Allen and Ritzel (1996) point
out that in the Pentateuch (the initial five books of the Western Bible), written between
1500 BC and 1400 BC, Moses directed the establishment of three separate cities of
refuge. This action suggested an attempt to avoid fatalities and improve survival by
providing “redundancy,” a common modern engineering approach to hazardous
consequence mitigation. Gaius Plinius Secundus, a.k.a. Pliny the Elder, a philosopher
and student of rhetoric, precautioned miners in about 50 AD to wear a veil over their
faces to guard against breathing airborne dust (Allen & Ritzel, 1996). While curiously
interesting, this early evidence of concern for worker safety is at best anecdotal and more
likely reflects a purpose other than a business-oriented motivation for occupational
safety.
Interest in the welfare of workers was seeded in the 1700’s by the Industrial
Revolution which brought about a new class of industrial workers who were being
uprooted from their agrarian lifestyles. The supply of labor for this new labor-intensive
environment was either short or sporadic due to the changing nature of employment
(Wren, 2005). These workers had difficulty leaving the farm to work in crowded,
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monotonous, and demanding factory environments. They frequently worked only the
days needed to earn just enough pay to get them through the week, then remained absent
until the next week or until the family needed more money. Factory owners found
themselves continuously scrambling for productive labor. Those entrepreneurs who
struggled to assemble a stable and reliable work force certainly did not want to lose them
to job-related injuries. After arriving in the USA, E. I. du Pont recognized this need and
posted safety rules at his gunpowder mills on the Brandywine River in Delaware. He
cautioned employees that adherence to the rules was a condition of employment (DuPont,
1952). In Europe, Frederick the Great of Prussia, King Louis XVI, and Napoleon all
established safety rules and inspections systems for miners (Allen & Ritzel, 1996)
especially after the deployment of the Newcomen steam pump that significantly
increased mine output (Wren, 2005). These were examples of individualized
entrepreneurial efforts to promulgate workplace safety. The first significant institutional
effort occurred in England in 1833 during the period of rapid industrialization, when the
first laws governing industrial safety were passed. In the United States, after the
conclusion of the civil war, Massachusetts passed laws in 1867 governing factory
inspections and in 1877 required mechanical guards on rotating machinery (Hale &
Hovden 1998).
These examples of the beginnings of occupational safety concern initiated what
Hale and Hovden (1998) describe as distinct “eras” of management approaches to the
problem. The beginning of each era is attributed to a specific hallmark in business or the
social and behavioral sciences, but none of these eras has a clear endpoint. Nevertheless,
the priorities in management thought clearly changes from one era to the next.
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The engineered safeguards era began in the late 1800’s as several states passed
laws regarding occupational safety. The prevailing management thought during this era
was that accidents were unpreventable and that safety emphasis would be placed on
mitigating the consequences and compensation for the widows (Eastman, 1911). The
engineered safeguards approach employed devices designed by engineers to keep
workers out of harm’s way. Typical devices included mechanical guards, energy relief
devices (e.g., fuses, pressure-relief valves, and rupture discs), physical barriers (e.g.,
walls, banisters, and handrails), and personal protective equipment (e.g., air masks, safety
glasses, ear plugs, dead man controls, and limit switches). These devices were intended
to either separate the worker from dangerous energy and conditions or make it more
difficult for the workers to put themselves into hazardous situations.
Meehan (1995) notes that engineered safeguards were an inevitable first approach
during the 1800’s when the rapid pace of industrialization and mechanization frequently
overwhelmed the ill-prepared workers. They were already having difficulty with
transitioning to the overcrowded factory environment and could only cope with a passive
approach to safety.
Eastman (1911) notes that not all factories were equipped with engineered
safeguards during this era. She points out that, while many laws required firms to
provide a safe workplace, enforcement of these laws was minimal. Further, no
requirements were in place for investigating accidents and reporting or maintaining safety
statistics or data for performance evaluation. Eastman (1911) cites an example in 1909
where seven New York firms were prosecuted for violating accident prevention laws, but
only two of those firms were fined a total of $35. While the institution of engineering
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safeguards improved safety performance, the inability or unwillingness to establish the
approach set the stage for transitioning to a new era that demanded changes in
organizational cultures.
The safety culture era was ushered in with the publication of Heinrich’s (1931)
book, Industrial Accident Prevention. It was based on the analysis of thousands of
accidents and the application of general management principles (Heinrich, 1941). He
concluded that most accidents were preventable, which was in stark contrast to the
management thought of the previous era. Heinrich viewed safety through a social
organization paradigm in contrast to a technical view. It is this paradigmatic shift that
demarcates the transition between eras. Engineered safeguards continued to be invented,
engineered, and deployed, even to the present day. However, managements’ thoughts
were redirected toward the human side of accident prevention.
Heinrich (1941) posited the “domino model” for accident causation. He
suggested that a series of connected evolutions/events, like dominos pushing one over
after the other, led to a fatality or serious injury. He asserted that an injury or fatality, the
fifth domino, is caused by an accident, the fourth domino, which in turn is caused by an
unsafe act or unsafe condition, the third domino. He further asserts that the commission
of an unsafe act, or setup of an unsafe condition, is the result of human error, the second
domino, and that human error is caused by our ancestral culture or social environment,
the first domino. Heinrich (1941) proposed that management thought should be focused
on intervening between the first, second, and third dominos rather than between the
fourth and fifth as was done in the previous era. This new focus ultimately brought about
the concept of safety culture.
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This new approach had a historic dark side. Because occupational safety
legislation was weak and resided at the state level, an injured worker was required to sue
the employer to establish fault and obtain compensation (Allen & Ritzel, 1996).
However, upon close examination of the domino model, one might conclude that
accidents are completely attributable to the worker’s beliefs, attitudes, and actions and
that management bears no causal responsibility for accidents or injuries. In the early
development of this model, it was not uncommon for management to take this approach
(Brown, Prussia, & Willis, 2003; Peters, 1986) and shirk accountability for injuries.
Unions attempted to reverse this logic by including safety in their bargaining portfolio
(Della-Giustina & Della-Giustina, 1992). However, the union approach backfired when
some legal circles deemed that safety was perhaps the unions’ responsibility (DellaGiustina & Della-Giustina, 1992; Hodson & Spigener, 1997). Had this paradigm been
allowed to continue, management practices may never have evolved to a point where
management takes ownership of the safety culture and plays a significant role in
occupational safety. It took until the late 1900’s with the passage of the Occupation
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) at the federal level to dispel this employer-worker
controversy (Safety, 2007).

The Culture
Safety culture is best understood as a subset of the more general concept of
organizational culture (Mohamed, 2003). The definition of organizational culture varies
widely depending on the field of study from which it historically evolved. For example,
researchers studying the disciplines of psychology, sociology, and social anthropology all
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provide theoretical, epistemological, and methodological approaches to culture with
differing ontologies.

According to Ashkanasy, Wilderom, and Peterson (2000) culture

is reflected by three different ontologies: (a) structural realism is where an organization
exists as a structure and culture is a property of that structure; (b) social construction
emphasizes the regularity of events, of which a subset of events is grouped together into a
culture; and (c) linguistic conveniences is where organizational attributes, including
culture, serves heuristic purposes of helping members think and reason. In his seminal
work on organizational culture, Schein (1990) simplifies this second ontology of social
construction as “the way we do things around here,” i.e. the organizational practices. In
this dissertation study, the author applies the second ontology for which the regularity of
events can be equated with established organizational practice and, more specifically,
those organizational practices linked to establishing and reinforcing a positive safety
culture.
The goal of a positive safety culture is the elimination of accidents (Clarke, 2006).
Accident causation attributed to the socio-technical elements of culture was explored as
early as the mid-twentieth century. However, the term safety culture was most notably
popularized in the 1980’s by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA)
investigation of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Ukraine. The
often-cited IAEA definition of safety culture is “that assembly of characteristics and
attitudes in organizations and individuals which establish that, as an overriding priority,
safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance” (Cooper, 2000, p.
113). The Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) working
in parallel to the IAEA defines safety culture as “the product of individual and group
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values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and behaviors that determine the
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety
management” (HSC, 1993, p. 23). Outside the realm of the nuclear industry, Clarke
(2000) notes that “safety culture might simply be understood as putting safety first.
However, this core assumption will be revealed in the way that organizational tasks are
carried out” (p. 75).
Prior to the definitions set forth by the IAEA, behavioral safety studies driven by
socio-technical elements came under the nomenclature of either safety climate or safety
culture. Since the middle of the twentieth century, researchers have carried on a vigorous
debate in the literature about whether safety climate and safety culture are distinctly
different concepts. These debates derive motivation from a similar ongoing debate in the
sociology literature regarding organizational climate and organizational culture.
Where the literature contains discussion about safety climate and safety culture
separately, it is clear the two concepts are strongly related. Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, and
Thomas (1998), in their discussion of safety climate and culture, conclude that “[safety]
climate can be viewed as a temporal state measure of [safety] culture” (p. 256). In fact,
Cox and Flin (1998) state that for the outcome of safe behavior, the two concepts are
indistinguishable. More recently, Choudry, Fang, and Mohamed (2007) tested a model
that accounts for safety climate and safety culture as simply two elements in the same
model such that measurements of either produce the same outcome. Arboleda, Morrow,
Crum, and Shelley (2003) and Back and Woolfson (1999) used the two terms
interchangeably, while Bottani, Monica, and Vignali (2009), Cadieux, Roy, and Desmaris
(2006), and Cardar and Ragan (2003) replaced the interchanged term with “safety
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system” or “occupational health and safety”. In keeping with the more contemporary
scholars from the literature, no distinction between safety climate and safety culture is
made in this dissertation study.
Safety Culture and Accident Prevention
According to Schein (1990), organizational culture produces a specific way the
organization perceives, thinks, feels, and behaves about safety. According to Heinrich
(1941), unsafe behavior is the antecedent to accidents. It follows then that a good safety
culture that promotes safe behaviors will result in fewer accidents. Research has
demonstrated that organizational safety culture has a significant positive relationship with
accident involvement across a range of industrial settings, such as chemical and nuclear
(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; Lee, 1998, Lee & Harrison, 2000), manufacturing (Brown &
Holmes, 1986; Zohar 2000, 2002a, 2002b), construction (Gillen, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, &
Vaccaro, 2002), the health care industry (McFadden, Henagan & Gowen, 2009), and the
service industry (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002). Most recently, Bottani, Monica,
and Vignali (2009) showed a clear difference in accident prevention results between
adopters and non-adopters of safety management efforts. Clarke (2006) summed up this
research in a meta-analytic review of 35 published studies. He found support for the
contention that improving safety climate/culture will have a significant effect in the
enhancement of employee safety performance, accident prevention, and a reduction in
occupational accidents and injuries.
The Factor Structure of Safety Culture
The concept of safety culture, or the idea that social and organizational factors
influence safe behaviors, was first posited by Heinrich (1941) with his “domino” model
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of accident causation. In his study of social and organizational factors that contribute to
safety performance, Cohen (1977) found seven elements: management commitment,
management-worker interaction, workforce stability, industrial relations, housekeeping,
training, and conventional safety practices. Zohar (1980) tested a similar model and
found eight key factors to relate safety performance: management attitudes, training,
effects of safe conduct on promotion, effects of safe conduct on social status, level of
risk, work pace, status of safety officer, and status of safety committee. However, Brown
and Holmes (1986) questioned the psychometric validity and generalizability of Zohar’s
(1980) results because the research had not undergone the recommended replication and
because it had been confined to an Israeli sample. After expanding the sample context
and accounting for post-traumatic (accident involved) and pre-traumatic (no accident
involvement), Brown and Holmes (1986) used confirmatory factor analyses to find
support for only three of the eight dimensions in Zohar’s (1980) model.
Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) attempted to repeat the work of Brown and
Holmes (1986) using a sample of construction workers, but found support for only two of
the three dimensions found by Brown and Holmes (1986). They attribute the difference
mainly to methodological issues, i.e., use of weighted least squares versus maximum
likelihood. Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) made no discussion of differences that might
be attributable to sample contexts. Diaz and Cabrera (1997) used Zohar’s (1980)
approach with a study group of Spanish airport workers and found six factors versus
Zohar’s (1980) eight. Diaz and Cabrera (1997) further noted that the significance of the
six factors varied depending on the specific job at the airports (e.g., fuel handlers versus
ramp workers). They noted that attitudes toward safety procedure compliance differed
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with job situational factors (e.g., work hours, age, and risk). Mearns, Flin, Fleming, and
Gordon (1998) studied the safety culture factor structure of workers on off-shore oil
platforms and found nine factors of significance. However, they found a wide variety of
factors across specific job contexts and suggested that different jobs may be responsible
for varying “safety subcultures.” Certain jobs supported only four significant factors
while others supported all nine. Examples of differences in job context included parent
employer, supervisory status, length of service, type of work (caterer versus deck-hand)
to name a few. Hayes, Perander, Smecko, and Trask (1998) argued that the reason for
these variations of factor structure was that only a limited component of the work safety
domain was sampled. Researchers later employed wider ranges of context and still
reported a large variance in factor structures (Fang, Chen, & Wong, 2006; FernandezMuniz, Montes-Peon, & Vazquez-Ordas, 2007; Silva, Lima, & Baptista, 2004;
Wahlstrom, 2001).
These examples of researchers reporting a wide variation in the factor structure of
the safety culture led Clarke (2000) and Cooper (2000) to conclude no general consensus
exists about the factor structure of safety culture. They did, however, observe some
difficulties with the methodology that contribute to the lack of consensus. Specifically,
Cooper (2000) noted that the continued use of quantitative survey instruments that are
nearly alike may be a key contributor to the consensus problem. Cooper (2000) discusses
the concept of reciprocal determinism for Social Learning Theory and posits that learned
behaviors get modified over time as each employee increases self-efficacy. Hence, the
learned safety behaviors (the organizational practices aimed at safety) get modified over
time and especially on an individual basis. Therefore, researchers making exclusive use
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of surveys might only be testing their a priori assumptions about safety behaviors on a
sample that is still modifying those behaviors. Contributing to the same line of reasoning,
Cox and Flin (1998) noted that the survey instruments being used by most quantitative
research on safety culture are based on Zohar’s (1980) original safety climate survey with
only modifications for specific contexts. Thus, not only has the use of a quantitative
survey instrument biased the respondents toward the a priori knowledge of the researcher,
the a priori knowledge may have been fixed in time by continually building the
instrument upon the Zohar (1980) questionnaire. The result is that prior researchers’ a
priori assumptions built into the survey instruments for factor structure may contain a
series of gaps in the substantive knowledge about the antecedents of safety culture.
Clarke (1999) implied this gap issue when she reported that “intergroup biases” caused
by differing perceptions of the safety values under different working conditions within
the same firm were responsible for the variation among different research studies.
Clarke (2000) later suggested that qualitative methods, rather than survey methodology,
might have been useful for resolving intergroup bias, but because of the time and cost
involved, the methodology was ignored.
In this dissertation, the Delphi mixed-methodology is used with an initial
qualitative inquiry as recommended by Clarke (2000), followed by a series of
quantitative inquires. The initial qualitative inquiry is exploratory in nature and is
intended to discover the wider breadth of the social and organizational factors that
influence a positive safety culture. It is followed by more quantitative inquiries aimed at
concentrating the initial discoveries toward a consensus of most important. The
exploratory approach, i.e., open-endedness of the first inquiry, is intended to gain the
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maximum understanding of the range of possible factors and minimize biases induced by
assumptions of this researcher (Ray & Sahu, 1990). Linstone and Turoff (2002) describe
the Delphi methodology as a useful technique for “re-definition of problem attributes or
solution opportunities” which directly applies to the problem under study by this
dissertation.
In contrast to random sampling, the Delphi also requires purposeful sampling,
i.e., the study respondents are selected for their demonstrated expertise. Delbecq, Van de
Ven, & Gustafson (1975) describes these expert participants as those with “a deep
understanding in the problem and experience to share” and Duffield (1993) as
“representative of their profession or professional organization.” For this dissertation, the
selected respondents’ knowledge, skills, and experience with occupational safety bring a
much wider discovery of potential factors that relate to safety culture. In short, the
exploratory front-end and the purposeful sampling associated with the Delphi
methodology has provided significant potential to compensate for the shortcomings
experienced by previous research
As discussed, Clarke (2000) recommended a qualitative approach as an
alternative to the overused survey questionnaires. However, she did not specifically
recommend a Delphi methodology. Five other traditions of qualitative inquiry (Creswell,
1998) have been examined as potential alternatives: (a) biography, (b) phenomenology,
(c) grounded theory, (d) ethnography, and (e) case study. All are exploratory in nature.
However, because of the small sample focus, all but the phenomenology would have
limited generalizability. Polkinghorne (1989) gives example of phenomenological
studies with the number of informants ranging from five to 25 which might appear to be

27
adequate for this study. Creswell (1998) notes, however, that it is essential that the
selected informants have experienced the phenomena being studied. In this case, safety
culture would be the phenomena, and ensuring informant experience may present some
difficulty. Additionally, the phenomenology taken in its purest form is not usually
intended for exploring relationships (e.g., organizational practices to safety culture), but
rather studies the concept of how people experience the phenomena (Creswell, 1998). In
short, it appears the Delphi methodology offers the most promise.
The Delphi Method
As part of the cold war defense research in the 1950’s, the US Air Force
contracted the Rand Corporation to conduct a study using expert opinion to determine the
optimal US industrial system target from a Soviet strategic planning view that required
the fewest A-bomb munitions. This study, including the methodology used, was called
“Project Delphi,” hence the origin of the method’s name (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963).
Alternative approaches to handling this problem at that time would have required data
collection from multiple intelligence channels, most of which individually were
considered to be sufficiently biased to dominate the simulation model.
Because of the classified nature of the originating study, it took until the late
1960’s for Delphi to gain the attention of researchers outside the defense community.
Because of the rapid pace of aerospace and electronics development at that time, Delphi
became the methodology of choice for technological forecasting and justification of large
expenditures, especially in the aerospace and defense industries. Traditional researchers
unfamiliar with Delphi applications might have an image that Delphi is limited to
forecasting. However, during the last quarter-century, thousands of research studies
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using Delphi methodologies have been conducted in diverse disciplines such as
operations, management science, environment, transportation, health, and other social
sciences (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). Objectives have grown beyond forecasting to
studying problems that do not lend themselves to precise analytical techniques or to
problems that are readily susceptible to sample biases (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). Some
of the more prominent examples of non-forecasting research using Delphi are included in
the following discussion.
Jung-Erceg, Pandza, Armbruster, and Dreher (2007) conducted a study to
determine the absorptive capacity of manufacturing firms in Europe. Absorptive capacity
is a firm’s capability to assimilate external knowledge for the purpose of increasing the
firm’s innovativeness. Absorptive capacity was thought to be a function of the firm’s
existing stock of knowledge and the firm’s diversity of expertise, experience, and culture.
Because these variables are highly dynamic, contextually based, and difficult to
operationalize, analysis by traditional quantitative methods would not be practical. In
particular, Jung-Erceg et al. (2007) noted that it was unlikely that a simple random
sample would adequately include all the contexts, diversity, and dynamics of the
variables, and just as unlikely to facilitate convergence of the results. Jung-Erceg et al.
(2007) concluded that an initial exploratory approach was necessary and turned to a
Delphi methodology with its purposeful sampling and iterative inquiry. They assembled
a panel of experts that deliberately cut across gender, age, occupation, knowledge, skills,
and other essential characteristics to ensure completeness for informing the research. The
initial inquiry of the panel produced a large number (101) of wide ranging responses, and
by the iterative Delphi procedure, narrowed it down to eight as the most important. Thus,
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Jung-Erceg et al. (2007) successfully used a Delphi methodology to research a problem
with a somewhat fuzzy set of independent variables. It is for reasons very similar to the
Jung-Erceg et al. (2007) research study that Delphi methodology has been used for this
dissertation study. For this study, the lack of general consensus regarding the factor
structure of safety culture in the existing research indicates a need for an initial
exploratory approach by a panel of experts that will span the different paradigms through
which safety culture is observed.
Another example is Dressel, Consoli, Kim, and Atkinson (2007) study to identify
the successful and unsuccessful practices used by university counseling center
supervisors for multicultural supervision. Multicultural supervision was defined as a
supervisory situation where the individuals in the supervisory-subordinate dyad differed
in their ethnicity. Because no set of best practices for multicultural contexts existed, and
because the range of cultures was considerably diverse, Dressel et al. (2007) recognized
the need for exploratory research coupled with a purposefully selected sample that
covered the diverse range of cultures. They successfully employed a Delphi
methodology to initially discover 141 practices which later converged into 35 most
important practices by the final round. Again a parallel can be drawn between the
Dressel et al. (2007) research and this study. In this dissertation, the lack of a consensus
group of practices related to safety culture is similar to the absences of a set of best
practices for the Dressel et al. (2007) research.
Croom (2000) used a Delphi approach to identify the web-based procurement
practices that led to successful maintenance, repair, and operating supply management.
The rapidly evolving technology of web-based procurement had not facilitated the
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development of a reliable set of practices from which a survey instrument could be
constructed. The exploratory nature of Delphi facilitated Croom’s (2000) first-ever
identification of a set of practices and the purposeful sampling, in contrast to random
sampling, ensured the full spectrum of end users was included. The parallel that is drawn
between the works of Dressel et al. (2007), Croom (2000), and this dissertation research
is that no consistent set of antecedent factors exist.
Boynton (2006) conducted a study to identify those professional values that were
key to ethical decision-making by public relations practitioners. Boynton (2006)
challenged the ethics code of the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA), which at
the time had been in its eighth iteration and was thought to be out-of-date and biased by
its self-primacy. For these reasons, Boynton (2006) selected the Delphi methodology
because of an exploratory front-end not available with traditional survey instruments.
For the initial Delphi round a single open-ended question was used: “What values do you
deem most important for public relations practitioners to employ in their jobs?” (p. 326).
After three rounds the results of the study affirmed the existing six core values found in
the PRSA code and added two more. For this dissertation study of safety culture, the
same bias stemming from self-primacy as found in Boynton’s (2006) research problem is
thought to be one of the reasons for the lack of general consensus of the factor structure
of safety culture.
In their study of the effect of quality management (QM) on corporate
performance, Saizarbitoria, Landin, and Fa (2006) found that most of the traditionally
used quantitative surveys were specifically aimed at managers assigned to the quality
control function and introduced a bias by ignoring the diversity of the management team.
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To avoid this distortion, Saizarbitoria et al (2006) used a Delphi methodology with its
exploratory inquiry and purposeful sampling to inform the research with opinions of a
wide range of experts having a variety of functions in the implementation of the QM
models. In this dissertation research, participants were purposefully selected from four
diverse groups (upper-level managers, safety professionals, consultants, and
auditor/inspectors) to avoid the distortional bias that Saizarbitoria et al (2006)
encountered with traditional survey methodologies.
The aforementioned examples of research illustrate how the purposeful sampling
aspect (panel of expert participants) of the Delphi methodology was used to compensate
for unique biases introduced by context and self-primacy. Both of the same types of
biases have confounded the previous safety culture research, which is the subject of this
dissertation study. The examples also illustrate how the exploratory nature of the first
round of inquiry of a Delphi methodology is useful for studies which have complex or
poorly defined dependent variables. In the case of this safety culture research, the lack of
general consensus on factor structure is indicative of complexity and/or poor definition of
the input variables. The author of this dissertation concludes that choice of the Delphi
methodological design for researching the organizational practices related to safety
culture is well-supported by the literature.
Chapter II Conclusion
The review of the literature presented in this dissertation study revealed that
culture of an organization can be modeled with shared values at the core that are
manifested through observable organizational practices surrounding the core and
reinforcing specific individual behaviors. Safety culture, a subset or subculture of
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organizational culture, can be expected to be manifested through a set of safety-specific
practices that ultimately lead to safe behavior by the individuals and ultimately accident
reduction. To manage safety culture effectively requires an understanding of the factor
structure or antecedents and, although the literature contains a plethora of studies with
this purpose, a lack of consensus exists regarding the factor structure. By this literature
review, numerous researchers have been identified who found that consensual weakness
may be the result of methodological issues stemming from respondent bias (relating the
party line), bias introduced by replicate survey instruments, or contextual variances. Also
identified and discussed are several studies from the literature that have applied Delphi
methodologies to address the same weaknesses. Therefore, the author concludes that the
literature supports the application of Delphi as the methodology, and Hofstede’s (2001)
onion model as the theoretical foundation, to identify the practices that relate to a positive
safety culture. Chapter III presents a discussion of a procedure for applying Delphi to the
problem of identifying the organizational practices leading to a positive safety culture.
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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Introduction to the Chapter
The review of the literature discussed in the previous chapter shows evidence that
researchers of safety culture have not been able to report a general consensus regarding
the factor structure of that culture, i.e. the antecedents of safety culture. Therefore, the
purpose of this dissertation study is to determine those organizational practices that lead
to the establishment or maintenance of a positive safety culture. In doing so, I have
utilized a Delphi methodology in contrast to purely traditional quantitative studies that
have typically been used by previous researchers.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the Delphi method, followed by
more detailed discussion of the methodological requirements of Delphi and the
procedural steps to be followed. For each appropriate step, I discuss important attributes
reported in the literature, how that information led to the structure of the actions in this
study, and the objective of conducting that procedural step. I conclude the chapter with a
discussion of validity and reliability expectations for the Delphi methodology.
Overview of the Delphi Methodology
The Delphi methodology is a mixed-method using an exploratory research
approach coupled with explanatory approach, which when combined gains consensus
about a problem solution. A key feature of Delphi is the use of a purposefully selected
group of participants who possess specialized knowledge in the problem discipline,
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instead of the random sample traditionally used to inform research (Bonnemaizon, Cova,
& Louyot, 2007; MacCarthy & Atthirawong, 2003; Ray & Sahu, 1990; Reid, 1988; Rowe
& Wright, 1999; Saizarbitoria, Landin, & Fa, 2006). The group of participants is
frequently referred to as the “panel of experts.” Delphi is an appropriate methodology for
researching problems for which there is scarce or uncertain knowledge or which do not
lend themselves to precise analytical techniques (Jairath & Weinstein, 1994; Williams &
Webb, 1994). Anonymity of the participants’ identity with respect to each other is
maintained to eliminate interpersonal and inter-organizational bias. Multiple iterative
rounds of inquiries are used to gain consensus which is the Delphi equivalent to
determining the statistical central tendency. Leedy and Ormrod (2005) describe this
approach as the “data analysis spiral” in which repetitive collection and analyses of the
data spirals into a consensus final result. The exploratory nature of Delphi stems from its
mixed-method methodology. It begins with a qualitative inquiry and ends with a more
traditional quantitative method to reach consensus. Open-ended questions are used for the
first round inquiry to the participants to maximize inclusion of a full spectrum of
variables (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). Subsequent rounds of inquiry are aimed at reducing
the spectrum of variables down to a smaller number, for which the panel of participants
reaches consensus about inclusion and importance. Each round of inquiry is prefaced
with a summary of the results of the previous round, such that participants see the entire
panel’s input, and can be expected to adjust their responses based upon the aggregate
panel response (Scheibe, Skutsch, & Schofer, 2002). The rounds of inquiry continue
until consensus is confirmed, at which time the study is concluded.
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In their “how-to” description, Linestone and Turoff (2002) specify five key
requirements necessary for success of the Delphi method: (a) a purposefully selected
panel of participants (experts) to inform the research, (b) anonymity of the panel
participants, (c) multiple reiterative rounds of questioning, (d) controlled feedback
between rounds, and (e) convergence to consensus. The remainder of this chapter
addresses this dissertation author’s application of the five key requirements of the Delphi
methodology.
Participants (the Panel of Experts)
One of the defining features of the Delphi methodology, and an essential element
for its success, (Pasukeviciute & Roe, 2001) is purposeful sampling to inform the
research instead of the random sampling desired for traditional quantitative research
methods. Sampling is done randomly when the goal is representation of a larger
population (Babbie, 2004). Purposeful sampling means “the researcher establishes in
advance a set of criteria or attributes...then searches for exemplars that match the
specified array of characteristics” (LeCompte, Preissle, & Tesch, 1993, p. 69). Creswell
(2003) states the reason for purposeful sampling is to “ensure a selection of participants
that will best help the researcher understand the problem and answer the research
question” (p.185). Delbecq et al. (1975) call this sample a panel of experts. Delbecq et
al. (1975), Keeney, Hasson, and McKenna (2001), and Powell (2003) define experts as
individuals accomplished in their field and respected as such by their peers.
Pasukeviciute and Roe (2001) note that crucial for success is that the panel participants
“must have a deep interest in the problem and experience to share” (p. 390) and they
should be “representative of their profession or professional organization” (p. 390).
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Delbecq, et al. (1975) note that besides expertise, panel members must be highly
motivated to work on the problem and be willing to remain engaged for the duration of
the study.
For this dissertation study, I have pursued participants that meet the definition of
expert from four different career disciplines: (a) safety professionals, (b) managers, (c)
safety consultants, and (d) safety oversight officers. All four of these types of people
routinely observe, participate in, or recommend organizational practices that relate to
accident and injury avoidance. However, because their job functions are different, they
view the practices through different lenses, which some researchers have found
advantageous. For example, Delbecq, et al. (1975), Powell (2003); and Rowe and Wright
(2001) report those Delphi panel participants with widely varying personalities and
substantially different perspectives produce higher quality and more acceptable solutions.
Safety professionals are those employees whose primary job function is internal
consulting and enforcement of both corporate and regulatory occupational safety
requirements. These employees are typically certified by an industry trade group and
frequently are accountable to the highest level managers in the organization. They are
usually positioned outside the line organization so they are not accountable for product
quotas or schedules. However, they are frequently the promoters of the safety practices
they observe. Utilization of these experts on the Delphi panel in this study avoids bias
that might be induced by organizational norms or peer and supervisory influence, yet still
provides an “insider” viewpoint.
Managers are those employees who direct the activities of others and are
accountable for accomplishment of the organization’s goals. They are typically CEO’s,
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COO’s, plant managers, or work group managers. Utilization of these experts brings to
the panel the input of those people who position the value of safety within the strategy of
the corporate or functional unit. They also hold the positions within the firm that are held
most accountable for accidents and incidents resulting from unsafe actions.
Safety consultants are safety professionals hired from outside the firm. Like
safety professionals previously described, they are independent of the line organizations,
with less of a day-to-day exposure to employees. They tend to bring a broader swath of
experience to the Delphi panel, having seen more than one firm and more than one set of
safety practices.
Safety oversight officers are those people who perform shop-floor audits and
inspections and report to a regulatory agency, a standards committee, or an industry trade
group. They are independent of the line organization and the firm and, as auditors, do not
usually perform field consulting while they observe. Thus they are less likely to be
biased by the business or social needs of the workers they are observing. They bring to
the panel an expertise viewed through a more wide-angled critical lens.
I have utilized the South Carolina chapter of the National Safety Council
(SCNSC) to provide intermediary assistance with recruiting panel participants. McKenna
(1994) found that using an intermediary to facilitate contact with the potential participant,
in contrast to a “cold call,” increases the willingness to participate and maintain
involvement for the duration of the Delphi rounds. The SCNSC is the state level chapter
of the National Safety Council (NSC), operating at the national level, but with offices and
resources located conveniently to this researcher’s primary location. The SCNSC
routinely provides training for managers and safety professionals at the majority of its
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600 member firms. The SCNSC is closely networked with the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), provides consulting services to its member firms
nationwide, and routinely conducts occupational safety inspections, audits, and accident
investigations. As a result of those activities, the SCNSC has developed a nationwide
sphere of influence which I have utilized to connect with potential candidates for the
panel of participants for this dissertation study.
Powell (2003) reports that participant panel size is an attribute that is equally as
important as the panel’s level of expertise. Connsiderable discussion by researchers is
found in the literature regarding the most appropriate size for a Delphi panel. In a
comparison of healthcare studies conducted over a 10 year period using Delphi
methodologies, Reid (1988) found panel sizes to be as few as ten to as many as 1,685.
Linstone and Turoff (2002) specify anywhere from 10 to 50 members. Reid (1988) notes
that replicability and generalizability of the results increases with panel size, but so does
the dropout rate increase and concludes that 20 is near optimum size. Bonnemaison,
Cova, and Louyot (2007) found that eight to ten members was sufficient, with five to
seven being the minimum threshold. They noted that beyond 12, the marginal
contributions were minimal. Delbecq et al. (1975) notes when choosing the panel size, a
tradeoff occurs between richness of data and attrition resulting from respondent fatigue.
For this dissertation research, I set a goal of at least 24 participants to be remaining at the
end of the study, which compares favorably to the recommendations of Linstone and
Turoff (2002), Reid (1988), and Bonnemaison et al. (2007). To accomplish that goal, 60
were targeted for initial recruitment, which accommodates a potential exclusion rate of
20 percent and a potential attrition rate of 50 percent (60 x (1.0- 0.20) x (1.0-.50) = 24).
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Panel participants are recruited by using a combination of purposive and snowball
sampling (du Plessis & Human, 2007; Marsden, Dolan, & Holt, 2003). For purposive
sampling, some a priori knowledge exists regarding the candidate’s credentials to warrant
a direct contact by the researcher or the intermediary. This direct contact confirms the
candidate meets inclusion criteria (discussed later), is willing to participate, and has
potential to remain engaged for the duration of the study. Purposive sampling adds some
assurance that knowledgeable participants will be on the panel (du Plessis & Human,
2007). For snowball sampling, I asked those participants recruited by purposive
sampling to identify other potential candidates for the Delphi panel. Compliance with the
inclusion criteria for the snowball recruits was ensured by my evaluation of the
demographics data submitted with the first round inquiry (see Appendix C). Recruitment
of the panel was formalized by my letter contained in Appendix B. To minimize
attrition, Hasson et al. (2000) found it essential to inform participants at the onset, in
writing, about the expectations of them for the study and I have delineated those
obligations in the recruitment letter (Appendix B).
The following inclusion criteria were used for participants from the four separate
career disciplines. Managers must have at least one year experience directing the work of
their subordinates and will have five or more subordinates reporting to them either
directly or indirectly. Safety professionals must hold entry-level or higher certification
by an industry trade group or equivalent experience as defined by the job description.
Safety consultants must have participated in providing counsel to at least three clients or
hold entry-level or higher certification by an industry trade group. Safety oversight
officers must have participated in the conduct of at least three audits or inspections and
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the reporting of findings, or hold entry-level or higher certification by an industry trade
group for at least one year. The industry trade group certification (BCSP, 2012)
requirements were reviewed and deemed to contain appropriate subject matter expertise
for inclusion criteria. Participant compliance with the exclusion criteria was confirmed
by personal contact in the case of purposive sampling and by examining the responses in
the demographic section of the Round 1 Delphi Inquiry (see Appendix C).
It is noteworthy to conclude this subsection on “Participants” by describing more
fully the recruitment letter in Appendix B. Hasson et al. (2000) noted the importance of
informing the panel with as much information as early as possible in the study. It is
through this letter that many of the important points just previously described will be
accomplished, including: (a) explain the research and its purpose, (b) explain the intent of
anonymity and the measures taken to ensure anonymity, (c) describe the expectations of
the participants, (d) affirm the voluntary nature of this study, (e) obtain implied consent,
and (f) provide contact information to the participant.
Anonymity
The problem solving capability of the Delphi methodology relies on a structured
group communication process which allows the individual participants to function as a
whole when solving complex problems (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). It relies on the
proverb that “two heads are better than one” (Rowe, Wright, & Bolger, 1991). However,
group dynamics can introduce a number of biases when the participants interact face-toface, or are able to identify each other’s contributions (Goodman, 1987; Mead &
Moseley, 2001). Most threatening is the domineering personality or outspoken individual
that takes over the process and inhibits other opinions (Couper, 1984). Other sources of
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bias include: unwillingness by some participants to take a position until all facts are
presented, participants inhibited by higher authority positions, unwillingness to abandon a
position once publicly taken, and participants who are concerned about how that their
ideas may be received (appearance of idiocy) by others (de Viliers, de Villiers, & Kent,
2005; Mead & Moseley, 2001, Weinstein, 1994). To minimize such biases and maximize
consensus, Inaki, Landin and Fa (2006), Keeney et al. (2001), MacCarthy and
Atthirawong (2003), and Ray and Sahu (1990) strongly recommend that participants must
not know the identity of the other members of the group, especially when opinions are
being expressed. Several steps were taken to ensure anonymity of the participants.
Recruitment of the participants was accomplished by individualized letters that did not
identify any other participants. For snowball recruiting, the nodal participants were not
informed if their recommended participants were included. Finally, the specialized
features of SurveyMonkey™, the web-based software for collecting data, were used to
de-identify the data being collected while still preserving the mailing addresses of the
participants.
Where instances of identifiable communications occurred, such as casual inquiries
from participants, special precautions, such as external storage media, were taken to
maintain confidentiality. To ensure any gaps of anonymity did not lead to researcher
bias, I ‘bracketed” potential pre-conceptions of the study as Creswell (1998) recommends
for any typical qualitative analysis.
Consensus
Consensus is vital to success for the Delphi methodology. It is appropriate at this
point to discuss the methods used in this research for measuring consensus especially
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since these same methods form the bases for reducing the data between rounds. Brooks
(1979) defines consensus as “a gathering of individual evaluations around median
responses with minimal divergence” (p. 378). Powell (2003) defines it in terms such as
“most participants agreed” (p. 379). Katcher, et al. (2006) reported consensus was
reached when all participants selected the same scale rating i.e., 100% agreement. The
variety of definitions led Crisp, Pelletier, Duffield, Adams, & Nagy (1997) to correctly
conclude that the issue of consensus is one of the most contentious components of the
Delphi methodology. Nonetheless, a number of substantive approaches are reported in
the literature for measuring consensus and which lead to defensible conclusions for this
dissertation.
The movement toward consensus was measured as soon as quantitative data was
collected, i.e., beginning with the Round two inquiry. The approaches for determining
consensus reported by researchers in the literature span a wide range of sophistication.
The lesser sophisticated are characterized by a “majority rules” approach, with the
definition of majority ranging from 51% up to 100% (de Villiers et al., 2005; du Plessis
& Human, 2007; Keeney et al., 2006; Katcher et al., 2006; Murry & Hammons, 1995;
Williams & Webb, 1994), with the most dominant in the 70% to 80% range. The risk of
using simple majority is that bipolarity may exist and a significant minority opinion could
get overlooked. The simple majority approach can be improved by quantifying the
“minimal divergence” in Brooks (1979) definition of consensus. Williams and Webb
(1994) used the standard deviation of the mean as a measure of divergence, using one
standard deviation as the threshold. If all practices fell within one standard deviation
(68%) of the mean, consensus would be declared. Dajani, Sincoff, and Talley (1979)
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measured the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean), V, and
declared consensus when V was less than or equal to 0.5. An alternative approach by
Duffield (1993) declared consensus when no more than 10% of the scores changed
(either direction) between rounds.
To cope with potential bi-polarities in Delphi methodologies, Brightman and
Schneider (1994), Linstone and Turoff (2002), and Saizarbitoria et al. (2006) recommend
using the median instead of the mean to measure central tendency, and interquartile
ranges (IQR) instead of standard deviations to measure divergence. They note that
median and IQR (value of the 75th percentile minus the 25th percentile) will allow
detection of bipolar tendencies and at the same time effectively reduce the impact of
statistical outliers. Rather than “declaring” consensus, Saizarbitoria et al. (2006) reported
the “degree of consensus” reached by comparing the change of the IQR from one round
to the next. Crisp et al. (1997) agrees that there is no black and white numerical decision
point for consensus and that a judgment of stability is a preferable indication of
consensus.
My review of the literature uncovered four statistical measures of stability: (a) the
two-sample z-test for the difference between two means (Hartnett & Murphy, 1985), (b)
the Wilcoxon rank sum test statistic (Z) (Brightman & Schneider, 1994; Dovich, 1988),
(c) the Kendall coefficient of concordance (W) (Jairath & Weinstein, 1994; Legendre,
2005; Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996), and (d) the Kruskal-Wallis test
statistic (H) (Brightman & Schneider, 1994). The two-sample z-test relies on either the tdistribution or the standard z-distribution to assess the equality of the means for two
Delphi rounds of inquiry. Kendall’s W is a non-parametric statistic that assesses the
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agreement among raters. The raters, or participants, in a Delphi study rank the list of
practices from most important to least important from which Kendall’s W is calculated.
If W equals one, then agreement among the participants is unanimous; if zero, there is no
agreement; and values in between indicate a greater or lesser degree of agreement. The
Wilcoxon Z is also a non-parametric statistic that assesses two different sets of data for
the degree of difference in the dispersion around the two medians. For a Delphi study,
the Wilcoxon Z can be used to determine the change in divergence (dispersion about the
median) from one round of inquiry to the next. Minimal change in the divergence would
indicate stability. The Kruskal-Wallis H is a non-parametric statistic that measures the
degree of agreement between the medians of two sets of data or, in the case of a Delphi
study, the medians of two successive rounds of inquiry.
In this dissertation, I used a combination of the consensus approaches discussed
above. For the early rounds of inquiry, where the method is just transitioning from
qualitative to quantitative, I used majorities, medians, and IQR’s for decisions regarding
attrition of practices collected in the initial exploratory round. With the second and
subsequent rounds, I relied primarily upon two-sample z-tests of means equality and the
non-parametric Wilcoxon Z test to evaluate the degree of consensus. Application of
these tests are presented in detail in Chapter IV.
Multiple Iterative Rounds of Inquiry
The classic Delphi methodology is essentially an iterative series of questionnaires
posed to the panel of participants. In the Delbecq et al. (1975) model, the first
questionnaire is a broad-based question. Each subsequent questionnaire is built upon the
responses of the preceding questionnaire. The process stops when the responses attrite
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down to a final set for which consensus can be confirmed. The following discussion
describes the procedure, objective and justification for the each successive round.
Round 1 inquiry. The objective of the Round 1 inquiry is to obtain a broad list
of organizational practices the panel participants conclude are related to a positive safety
culture. The inquiry is deliberately non-specific to engage the respondents in
“brainstorming” to elicit a wide-ranging list of practices. In Chapter II,
I argued that the exploratory research contribution resulting from Delphi contrasts this
study with previous safety culture research by not biasing the participant responses with a
predetermined list of outcomes. To that end, the recommendations of Delbecq et al.
(1975) have been followed and the inquiries began with an open-ended question that
allows free responses from the participants. The impact of this open-ended, Round 1
inquiry is best described by the converse analogy made by Linstone and Turoff (2002) to
a multiple choice examination, which by its nature biases the respondent with insights of
the instructor’s mode of thought as well as the substance of the question. The use of an
open-ended inquiry may necessitate additional rounds of inquiry. However, the tradeoff
is in favor of reduced bias imposed by the investigator.
The open-ended approach has some drawbacks in that it can generate large,
unmanageable amounts of data. Therefore, Schmidt (1997) and Hasson et al. (2000)
recommend limiting the number of items in the response for the first open-ended inquiry.
In this dissertation, I set a limit of seven items for the first round of inquiry based upon
the following examples in the literature: Schmidt (1997) recommends a limit of six
items; Ray and Sahu (1990) used a limit of five; and Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, and Cule
(2001) used a limit of six. Dressel, Consoli, Kim, and Atkinson (2007) did not define a
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limit and received an average of seven items from the participants on the first round of
inquiry. Therefore, the limit of seven chosen for this study approximates response levels
reported in the literature.
Appendix C contains the Round 1 open-ended inquiry. This particular inquiry
format was selected to facilitate the analysis (discussed later) between Rounds 1and 2. I
pilot tested the Round 1 inquiry questionnaire with potential panel participants to test
readability and the delivery and collection channels. In this Round 1, the participants are
asked to provide up to seven practices as single words or short phrases (entered in the
left-hand column) with attendant detailed explanations, including examples, in the right
hand column. The single word or short phrase descriptors for the practices (left-hand
column) allows for more simplified removal of duplication. The details and examples
from the right-hand column provide more in-depth understanding of the practice
descriptors, allowing additional collapsing of the list, or identifying the need for further
reconciliation. The Round 1 inquiry also collected demographic information about the
potential participants (see Appendix C) which was used for judgment against the preestablished inclusion/exclusion criteria.
Following approval of the Internal Review Board, the Round 1 inquiry was
transmitted to the potential participants as a web hyperlink in the recruitment letter. The
transmittal included guidance for completion of Round 1 and guidance for future data
collection via the SurveyMonkey™ website.
The Round 1 inquiry actually consisted of two separate surveys, 1a and 1b, daisychained within the SurveyMonkey™ website. The intent of the separation is to permit
de-identification of the participants’ responses while still maintaining an e-mail address
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list of the panel participants. The 1a survey collected the actual subjective research data
while the 1b survey collected demographic information and e-mail addresses. The “done”
button at the end of 1a survey actually transferred the respondent into the 1b survey (the
daisy-chain). By this method research data and demographic/ID data were collected in
two disconnected databases, thus producing de-identification of the participants. The ID
data consisted of a simple e-mail address list used for transmitting Rounds 2, 3, and 4
inquiries to the participants.
Round 1 data analysis. Two major objectives were the focus of the Round 1
analysis: (a) to complete the inclusion-exclusion test for each potential panel participant,
and (b) collapse the data into a single initial list of practices that are related to a positive
safety culture. Data collected by the SurveyMonkey™ website was down-loaded in a
Microsoft Excel™ format which served the purpose of analysis and archive requirements.
Demographic data. I compared the demographic data for each participant against
the inclusion criteria previously discussed. Those meeting the inclusion criteria were emailed by the author to thank them for their input and to confirm their e-mail addresses
for inclusion in the SurveyMonkey™ collector. At this point I also confirmed that the
goals of recruiting at least 60 participants before exclusion tests, and at least 48 after
exclusion tests were met. The expected outcome of this part of the analysis was a starting
count of the panel participants. If less than 48, recruiting would continue until 48
participants were obtained before continuing the analysis.
Practices and descriptions. The practices and attendant detailed descriptions
were also collected in Microsoft Excel™ format. The first step was to review the list and
remove undisputable duplicates, and miscellaneous off-normal responses. Delbecq et al.
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(1975) notes that whenever an open-ended question is offered in confidence, human
nature can produce some strange responses. A frequency count of duplication was
maintained for feedback in the next round of inquiry
I applied software-assisted content-analyses to the practice descriptors and the
detailed explanations and examples (right-hand and left hand columns of survey
questionnaire in Appendix C) to discover commonalities that might justify thematic
clustering and further collapse of the list (Babbie, 2004: Creswell 1998). As necessary, a
thesaurus was used to review synonyms and words for likeness and combination. Where
two or more practice descriptors appeared identical and collapsible, but the detailed
explanations were even slightly different, both detailed explanations were retained and
combined to capture the full breadth of the response. Hasson et al. (2000) reports that a
basic tenet of Delphi is that participants should ultimately be the judges, not the
researcher. Therefore, where doubt existed about identicalness, I reiterated the original
data back into the following round of inquiry (du Plessis & Human, 2007).
I then applied software-assisted content- analyses to each of the thematic clusters
to discover commonalities that might further collapse into specific practices with
aggregated definitions. I tracked the number of times a practice or definitional phrase
was mentioned so that it could be translated into a frequency for feedback in the next
round of inquiry. The outcome of this Round 1 analysis was an initial list of practices,
the frequency each occurred, and a detailed definition associated with each practice. This
outcome was peer debriefed prior to proceeding to the Round 2 inquiry.
Round 1 peer debriefing. du Plessis and Human (2007) recommend peer
debriefing as a way to increase the validity of the Delphi process. Lincoln and Guba
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(1985) describe it as exposing the study’s process, interim results, and investigator to a
disinterested peer to explore aspects of the study that might otherwise remain implicit in
the researcher’s mind. They specify four responsibilities of the peer: (a) act as devil’s
advocate, (b) test working conclusions that may be emerging in the researcher’s mind, (c)
test the next steps in the emerging methodology, and (d) provide the researcher an
opportunity for catharsis. I peer debriefed at this point with a non-business university
faculty member possessing substantive knowledge of occupational safety and qualitative
research methods.
Feedback: Round 1 to Round 2. For the Delphi methodology, the results of the
Round 1 analysis form the basis for the feedback included in the Round 2 inquiry.
Goodman (1987) reports that the strength of the Delphi process lies in the feedback to
guide the panel of participants toward a consensual conclusion. Keeney et al. (2001)
describes the feedback as “the process that facilitates the systematic emergence of a
judgment” (p. 197). Crisp et al. (1997) and Powell (2003) observe that feedback is the
primary channel of communication between members of the panel and its quality and
quantity is essential to obtaining a group decision. Rowe et al. (1991) note that it is
crucial that the feedback contain both the majority opinions (central tendency) and the
minority opinions (the outliers) to ensure that improvement of the participants’ positions
are maximized. Based on this guidance from the literature, I used the Round 2 inquiry to
feed back to the participants the complete information from the Round 1 analysis
including: the collapsed list of practice descriptors, the attendant descriptions, and the
frequencies of occurrence.
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Round 2 inquiry. A mixed-method version of the Delphi methodology uses both
qualitative and quantitative methods and the transition begins with this Round 2 inquiry.
The objectives of the Round 2 inquiry are to: (a) provide the participants with sufficient
feedback from the first round to allow them to comprehend the positions of the other
participants; (b) obtain each participants quantifiable agreement, or disagreement, with
practices that should remain on the list; and (c) obtain quantifiable decisions from each
participant about how important each of the practices is for establishing or maintaining a
positive safety culture. Keeney et al. (2001) recommend that all post Round 1 inquiries
be structured questionnaires that incorporate feedback from the previous rounds. Delbecq
et al. (1975) recommend that the response method be simple to understand. I used the
complete list of practices produced by the Round 1 analysis in combination with 5-point
Likert-type scales to obtain the participants’ judgment on agreement and importance
ranking of the practices (See Appendix E). The inquiry is a three-part questionnaire:
Section A queries the participants for their judgment that the practice belongs on the list;
Section B queries the participant for importance ranking of the practice; and Section C
queries the participant for missing or emergent data. The frequency, i.e., the number of
respondents who mentioned the practice or some portion of the description of the
practice, is included in the first sentence of Section A that introduces the practice.
At the bottom of the scale, section is included for the respondents to explain
entries at the extremities of the scale. Rowe et al. (1991) reported that it was important to
capture and communicate the outliers, and this part of the inquiry is intended to
accomplish that purpose.
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Section C is included for the purpose of capturing practices that were missed by
the participants in the Round 1 inquiry, or practices that were lost during collapsing in the
Round 1 analysis. Section C further serves to close the loop on the “member checking”
that is intended to support the validity of this study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
I used the SurveyMonkey™ website to transmit the Round 2 inquiry and receive
the responses from the participants. Round 2 was pilot-tested like Round 1 and adjusted
as necessary.
Round 2 data analysis. The objectives of the Round 2 analysis are to detect early
indications of consensus by the panel of participants about which practices might be
related to a positive safety culture, and to use the early indication to decide which
practices should be carried forward to the Round 3 inquiry. Some practices will stay on
the list, while others will be deleted from any further analysis. I converted responses to
quantitative data by assigning numerical scores to the scale responses: “5” for strongly
agree and very important; “1” for strongly disagree and very unimportant; and others
portioned equally between. With quantitative measures, I used traditional statistical
measures to interpret convergence to consensus. Per the previous discussion regarding
consensus, I used the 70% to 80% range as the first test for decisions to drop or carry
forward practices to the Round 3 inquiry. The following rules were applied for making
the first decisions:
Practices for which 80% of the participants selected “strongly agree, agree, very
important, or important” will be carried to Round 3.
Practices for which 80% of the participants selected “strongly disagree, disagree,
unimportant, or very unimportant” will not be carried to Round 3.
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Because the first test rules above are examining the extremes of the spectrum, I expected
some number of practices, specifically those between the extremes, to require further
examination to determine carryover. I examined these remaining practices on a case-bycase basis using medians and interquartile ranges (IQR) (Brightman & Schneider, 1994;
Linstone & Turoff, 2002; Milkovich, Annoni, & Mahoney, 1972; Saizarbitoria et al.
2006) to judge dispersion of the responses. Wide dispersion indicates that the participant
panel is still too divergent on consensus, and further inquiry is warranted; however, a
narrower dispersion indicates early convergence and the practice may be a candidate for
dropping . I used this dispersion measure and the position of the median to make a
judgment whether to drop or carry over those practices falling between the consensus
rules previously discussed. The expected outcome of this part of the second round
analysis is a shortened list of practices.
The Round 2 inquiry also asks the participants to list any “new” or “missing”
practices after the scale ratings. If any practices retrieved from this section of the inquiry
exactly matched those that were dropped, they also would be dropped. All remaining
new or missing practices would be added to the shortened list and carried forward to
Round 3 for evaluation by the participants.
Feedback: Round 2 to Round 3. As done in the previous round, feedback to the
participants included information from the Round 2 analysis: the further-collapsed list of
practice descriptors, the attendant descriptions, and the individual scoring information for
each practice.
Round 3 inquiry. The objectives of the Round 3 inquiry were to: (a) provide the
participants with sufficient feedback from the first round to allow them to comprehend
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the positions of the other participants; (b) obtain each participant’s quantifiable
agreement, or disagreement, with practices that should remain on the list; and (c) obtain
quantifiable decisions from each participant about how important each of the practices is
for establishing or maintaining a positive safety culture. The format of this inquiry is
almost identical to the previous round with the exception being the additional votes
received in the previous inquiry for each item on the scales (see Appendix F). As with
the previous rounds of inquiry, I pilot-tested test this inquiry for readability and function,
and made adjustments as necessary
Round 3 analysis. The primary objective of this analysis was to determine the
degree of consensus regarding the practices that lead to a positive safety culture. I used
the two-sample z-test for means equality and the non-parametric Wilcoxon Z test to
determine consensus.
Round 4 Inquiry. The objectives of this final inquiry were to confirm consensus
and obtain final member checking. I also used this inquiry to thank participants, solicit
feedback, and provide an opportunity to request a summary of results.
Validity and Reliability
Researchers have vigorously debated whether the Delphi technique can be
considered valid and reliable by traditional definition (Crisp, Pelletier, Duffield, Adams,
& Nagy, 1997; Goodman, 1987; Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 2001; McKenna, 1993;
Powell, 2003; Rowe, Wright, & Bolger, 1991; Williams & Webb, 1994). Procedural
issues are frequently the bases for criticisms, particularly the lack of a singular
experimental design. Some researchers have suggested that because Delphi aligns more
with qualitative research methods, the concepts of validity and reliability should be
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replaced by discussion of credibility (LeCompte, Preissle, & Tesch, 1993) or
trustworthiness (Creswell, 1998; Lincoln & Guba, 1985;). For this dissertation study, I
used a classical Delphi technique which is a mixed-method utilizing both qualitative and
quantitative inquiries. Therefore, in the following discussion, I address the subject of
quality in traditional terms of validity and reliability. As the Delphi technique became
more pervasive in last two decades, common suggestions for improvement of the quality
have begun to emerge (Crisp, Pelletier, Duffield, Adams, & Nagy, 1997; Hasson,
Keeney, & McKenna, 2000; Rowe, Wright, & Bolger, 1991; Williams & Webb, 1994). I
describe the study rigor intended to maximize validity and reliability.
Internal Validity. Lincoln and Guba (1985) define internal validity as “the extent
to which variations in an outcome (dependent) variable can be attributed to controlled
variation in an independent variable. A causal connection between dependent and
independent variables is usually assumed” (p. 290). This definition suggests a research
design that would test outcome variance against the error variance. Research designs
using Delphi methodology, including this dissertation research design, are exploratory or
explanatory in nature and the researchers do not typically seek out causal relationships.
Thus, on the surface, the concept of internal validity does not appear to have strong
relevancy for this dissertation study. However, Leedy and Ormrod (2005) note that
internal validity is important in any research project because the research must have
confidence that the conclusions drawn are warranted from the data collected. Lincoln
and Guba (1985) address eight procedural threats to the validity of study findings
regardless of causality. Because of the non-experimental nature of Delphi used in this
dissertation study, four of those threats have some applicability: (a) history, (b)
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maturation, (c) sampling, and (d) panel attrition. History refers to unforeseen external
events that might occur between rounds of inquiry and confound the measurements.
Because such events are unforeseen, they cannot be controlled. Nevertheless, their
likelihood will be minimized by keeping the turnaround time between inquiries as short
as possible. I maintained strict confidentiality of panel member identities to prevent
unforeseen emergence of the biases induced by group dynamics that were previously
discussed. Maturation effects occur when the passage of time between inquiries is long
enough to allow the thought processes of the respondent to change. Again the potential
effects of maturation were mitigated as much as possible by minimizing the turnaround
time between inquiries.
Sampling in Delphi research is not randomized, but rather a purposeful selection
of panel participants who have representative knowledge, interest in the topic, and
willingness to engage in the iterative process of Delphi. In this dissertation, I rely on the
inclusion and exclusion criteria previously discussed to staff the panel. Panel attrition is
the most significant threat to the validity of the Delphi methodology, and in this
dissertation it was minimized by limitations on the panel size. Larger panels might
produce richer data, but the iterative participant response required might also cause
respondent fatigue resulting in disengagement, poor response rates, and ultimately
attrition. Some tradeoffs are inevitable. In this dissertation, I minimized attrition by
controlling feedback information to reduce overload, and used reminder mailings. Baker,
Lovell, and Harris (2006), Hasson, Keeney, and McKenna (2000), and Williams and
Webb (1994), report that both purposeful selection of the Delphi panel and the actions
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taken to minimize their attrition are also actions that increase content, face, and
concurrent validity of the study.
Finally, Silverman (2005) notes that both qualitative and quantitative researchers
have no “golden key” to internal validity. To maximize internal validity in this
dissertation, I have rigorously executed all of the above discussed strategies and have
used “member checks” to raise the confidence that the conclusions drawn are warranted
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). I have deliberately structured the participant feedback from
one round of inquiry to the subsequent round to accomplish, in part, the member
checking. Besides completeness of the feedback, I requested “missed” information in the
subsequent rounds of inquiry to the participants. The missed information request affords
the participants an opportunity to adjust the author’s analyses.
External Validity. Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Leedy and Ormrod (2005) define
external validity as the extent to which the conclusions drawn are generalizable. Lincoln
and Guba (1985) identify four threats to the external validity: (a) history, (b) selection
effects, (c) setting effects, and (d) construct effects. The history threat for external
validity is the same as internal validity and the mitigating strategy has already been
addressed. The selection effect threat occurs when the sample is not representative of the
population. The setting effect threat occurs when the context of the study is too limited
or the limits are not known. The construct effects threat refers to the possibility that the
construct under study is applicable only to a sample or a different population.
Leedy and Ormrod (2005) provide three strategies for minimizing the threats and
maximizing external validity: (a) real life setting, (b) representative sample, and (c)
replication. These three strategies do not necessarily correspond respectively to the
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aforementioned threats. It is the combination of the strategies that mitigate the combined
effects of the threats. The purposeful selection of the Delphi panel of experts, as
previously described, is how I have deployed the strategies of real life setting and
representative sample. Regarding the third strategy, replication, I do not plan to replicate
this dissertation study under another context, but rather rely upon demonstrations of
replication by prior researchers and strict adherence to the protocol and procedures of the
Delphi methodology is rigorously followed.
Reliability. Lincoln and Guba (1985) consider reliability to be synonymous with
consistency and accuracy, and testable by replication. They report the threats to
reliability will most likely come from careless acts in the measurement or assessment
process. I have used peer debriefing (Creswell, 2003; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Williams
& Webb, 1994) with at least one outside reader to review the data management including
collapsing, combining, and interpreting of data, where potential exists for bias or
distortion. This approach, when combined with member checks, ensures transparency of
the study and improves the reliability of the outcomes.
Chapter III Conclusion
Two important notions were described in the literature review in Chapter II: First,
the link between practices and safety culture; and second, the lack of general consensus
of the factor structure of safety culture attributable to the methodologies that have thus far
been used to explore that factor structure. In this Chapter III, an alternative research
method, the Delphi methodology, has been presented in detail as a means for defining
antecedents of safety culture while eliminating the biases that may have contributed to
lack of consensus in previous research.
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Chapter IV presents data collection results and their analysis. With the Delphi
methodology there are multiple inquiries and data captures, including separate analyses
between data collections. Data are presented in sufficient detail to explain the collapsing
of results. Where appropriate, discussions include explanation of decision-making for
carryover into subsequent rounds including the supporting statistics. The final Chapter V
summarizes the results, conclusions, implications for practitioners, and extensions for
further research.
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CHAPTER IV

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Introduction to the Chapter
The goal of this research study was to determine the organizational practices that
lead to the establishment or maintenance of a positive safety culture. I have exhaustively
discussed the lack of a general consensus in the literature regarding the factor structure of
safety culture. I have also argued that a Delphi research methodology, which includes an
exploratory research component, is appropriate for addressing the gaps in the existing
research that may be contributing to the lack of consensus on factor structure. This
chapter presents the results and the concurrent analyses of having executed the Delphi
approach described in Chapter III.
Data Collection
All data were collected using the SurveyMonkeyTM website. Special restrictive
settings had to be selected for the SurveyMonkeyTM operation to ensure anonymity and
confidentiality. Using Delphi presents somewhat of a challenge. Delphi requires
multiple queries of the same set of participants; therefore, it was necessary to know the
contact information (e-mail addresses) of the participants for subsequent queries. I
separated the Round 1 inquiry into two surveys within SurveyMonkeyTM so the e-mail
addresses collected would be stored separately from all other data. This approach
successfully de-identified the data, however, the drawbacks are discussed in Chapter V.
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The Participants (Panel of Experts)
The South Carolina National Safety Council provided a consultant who acted as
an intermediary for recruiting most of the panel participants. The intermediary had some
personal and professional knowledge of the candidates which provided better assurance
that the goals of the panel makeup would be readily attained. Appendix A is the
authorization to make the necessary contacts for this research. Approximately one half of
the initial panel membership was recruited by direct contact and the other half by
snowballing. The snowballing was accomplished primarily through the intermediary’s
blog site.
The recruitment letter (see Appendix B) contained a web hyperlink which led the
participant to enter the survey website. Potential participants could opt-out by simply not
clicking on the hyperlink.
Initial recruitment was 68 participants versus my goal of 60. This goal was based
upon worst-case attrition rates mentioned in the literature from which I forecasted an endof-study panel size of 24. Actual attrition rates were less than half of those rates in the
literature and panel participant sizes are reflected in Table 7.
Recruitment was part of the Round 1 inquiry. The demographic data (see
Appendix C) was used to test for the exclusion-inclusion against the criteria previously
discussed. Three respondents were excluded: One respondent (safety professional) failed
to meet the industry certification criteria; a second respondent (manager) chose not to
provide the span-of-control data necessary for evaluation and was therefore excluded;
and a third respondent provided frivolous responses suggestive of an unreliable
informant. The profile of the panel initially recruited is shown in Table 1. Having met
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the profile goals of six participants from each category, I proceeded with the remaining
analysis of Round 1 data.

Table 1
Delphi Panel Participants by Occupation

Initially
Recruited

Excluded*

Final Number of
participants

Safety Professional

48

2

46

Auditor or Regulator

7

0

7

Consultant

7

0

7

Manager

9

1

8

Participant Category

Total
68
*One Safety Professional was excluded for failure to meet professional certification
criteria; a second Safety Professional was excluded for responding frivolously; and one
manager was excluded for failure to provide span-of-control information.

Round 1 Inquiry
The primary focus of the Round 1 inquiry was the collection of up to seven
“practices” and definitions from each panel participant. The question format was openended (see Appendix C) to facilitate the exploratory research component of this
dissertation study. In total, 275 practices were tallied prior to analysis. Submission rates
averaged 4.1 practices per panel participant and ranged from one to seven per participant.
Thirty-one practices were submitted without an attendant definition. All other practice
responses contained definitions. A few definitions were in excess of 100 words each.
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All information was obtained within 10 days following issuance of the recruitment letter.
The collector for Round 1 was left open for 30 days; however, the latter 20 days of the
period were silent. All data were downloaded into an ExcelTM spread sheet for further
analysis.
I used Creswell’s (1998) phenomenology model for textual analysis. A computerassisted word-and-phrase-search software routine was used for the first-pass textual
analysis. My objective was to sort the data into more manageable chunks (Miles &
Huberman, 1998) according to broad subject categories. I identified 13 broad categories
as shown in Table 2. All raw data was match-fitted into one of these 13 broad categories
and then each category was separately analyzed.
I analyzed the individual broad categories by selecting sentences and phrases that
had similar themes. The broad categories, including the raw data, were laid out on a
Table top map and phrases were color coded to match themes. These tabletop colorcoded maps proved useful in conducting the peer debriefings. Similar color-coded
phrases were extracted from the raw data and recomposed into a single practice
descriptor and detailed definition. During the de-composition and re-composition
process, care was taken to record the number of times the theme was cited by different
panel participants. The re-compositions, including the citation frequencies, would be
returned to the Delphi panel for the next round of inquiry. Appendix D is a detailed
example of the previously described thematic analysis for the broad category of
“management.” I disaggregated the raw data in this category and recomposed them into
four candidate practices and definitions for a return to the Round 2 inquiry. I have used
differentiating fonts in Appendix D as a proxy for the color-coded maps.
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Table 2
Practices Collected By Round One Inquiry
Broad Category
Management

Practice

n

Definition

1. Management

11

Walk the talk. Managers at all levels are

involvement and

involved in all EHS activities such as

participation

safety meetings, safety program & goals
development, evaluating performance
metrics, audits, inspections, pre-startup
safety reviews, job cycle checks,
incident investigations, and wearing the
appropriate personal protective
equipment just like front line workers.

2. Safety leadership

4

Managers set safety goals and objectives
for accident frequencies and employee
participation in safety activities,
including measurement criteria for
performance against those goals, and
communicates the goals and
performance frequently to the entire
organization.

3. Management
systems

3

A system of corporate governance exists
that defines and owns safety as a
corporate value, states a vision and
belief about the value of safety, and
defines the roles and expectations of all
members for safety.
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Broad Category

Practice
4. Management

n
3

commitment

Definition
Management makes accident reduction
an integral part of the business plan by
allocating sufficient budget and
manpower resources to support
attainment of the safety goals and
objectives.

Communication

5. Posters, signs,

8

Use of signs, posters, banners and other

banners, and E-

visual materials to either warn people of

mails

hazards or to promote safe practices.
Use memos or e-mails where signs are
not appropriate.

6. Atmosphere of

10

Conduct open communication regarding
safety problems and concerns.

openness

Reinforce that retaliation will never
result from reporting a safety concern or
counter opinion.

7. Share experiences

10

Use videos, written reports,
presentations, and personal discussions
to communicate lessons learned from
safety successes and accident analyses.
Communicate to everyone including
customers.

8. Communications
accuracy

6

Ensure job communications are frequent
and accurate by using phonetics and
repeat-backs.
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Broad Category
Near miss

Practice
9. Near miss review

n
6

Definition
A formalized system for reporting,
analyzing, and acting upon near-miss
accidents. No-fault self-reporting is
encouraged. Analysis is for root cause.
Remedial actions are determined,
deployed, and communicated.

Hazard
assessment

10. Hazard

6

assessment

Hazards analyses are conducted for
specific jobs and facilities on a recurring
schedule to identify potential hazards
and the adequacy of their mitigation.
Procedures and work instructions are
included for compliance, with specific
focus on changed conditions. Corrective
actions are documented.

Oversight

11. Audits

8

Formalized audits of worker safety and
the safety programs are conducted
according to a written plan and schedule.
Findings are recorded, reported and
tracked through disposition.

12. Inspections and
walkthroughs

8

Less formal than an audit. Conducted in
the work place by all levels of
management and peers. Findings are
corrected as they are found. Interaction
is encouraged. Reporting, if any, is
more general.
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Broad Category

Practice
13. Observations

n
9

Definition
Usually conducted by peers as part of a
behavior-based program. Findings are
corrected on the spot. Reporting is deidentified.

Safety first

14. Putting safety

3

first

Commonly called toolbox talks, pre-job
briefs, or meeting preambles. Start all
evolutions with a discussion about
safety.

Training

15. Orientation

11

training

16. Monthly safety

Newly assigned employees are trained in
foundational S&H topics.

17

meetings

Monthly meetings are venues for
essential ongoing S&H training. They
consist of timely S&H topics, lessons
learned, shared experiences, and
program changes. They are typically
interactive and rely on participant
involvement.

17. Conferences

3

Safety professionals attend national
conferences to gain cutting edge
knowledge of the latest advances in
safety.

18. Annual training
and testing

4

Every employee annually receives S&H
refresher training and must satisfactorily
pass a test.
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Broad Category

Practice
19. Job specific

n
5

training

Definition
Employees are trained to be skilled at
their specific task, use the correct tools,
follow the work plans (procedures), and
recognize abnormal conditions.

20. Training quality

3

All training is conducted by qualified
instructors, is objective based, contains
real (versus hypothetical) situations, and
is assessed periodically.

Employee
involvement

21. Employee

26

involvement

Employees at all levels of the
organization participate in training,
observation, inspection, problem
solving, committee participation, policy
and procedure development, and
accountability for safety performance.

Stop work

22. Time Out

26

All employees have the responsibility

authority &

and authority to stop work or declare a

Time Out

stand down when an evolution in
progress does not appear to be
proceeding safely. All employees are
encouraged to maintain a healthy
uneasiness with a questioning attitude
and call for a stop-work when the
situation doesn't "feel" right.

Accountability

23. Performance

8

Personal safety performance is included

evaluations

as part of the annual performance

include safety

review.
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Broad Category

Practice
24. Disciplinary

n
8

actions

Definition
Appropriate sanctions are administered
against employees who fail to perform
safely.

25. Enforcement

3

Organizations that fail to comply with
S&H policies, rules, and regulations are
penalized (e.g., compensation),
including suppliers and customers.

Trust

26. Building trust

11

Coach instead of being a police officer,
avoid placing blame, follow through on
commitments, correct problems rather
than just reporting them, and constantly
use good interpersonal skills.

Documented
policies

27. Policies and

15

Written guidance and instructions exist
for safely conducting evolutions at all

procedures

levels in the organization. Content is in
compliance with statutory regulations,
corporate values, and industry best
practices. Content is user-friendly.

28. Periodic review

10

Policies and procedures are reviewed

of policies and

periodically and revised promptly to

procedures

comply with changed conditions.
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Broad Category
Incentives

Practice
29. Pay for

n
11

performance

Definition
Financial incentives (pay bonuses),
clearly tied to positive S&H
performance, are provided to all
employees who contribute toward
achieving goals and objectives.

30. Celebration

11

Recognition events are held to reward
S&H accomplishments.
Commemorative tokens are provided to
mark the occasion. All employees are
provided the time to celebrate.

Note. n = the number of respondents who cited the particular practice.

The remaining 12 broad categories were analyzed according to the same process
described in Appendix D. Initially, 28 recomposed practices were identified. However,
as the result of peer debriefing, I elected to subdivide two of the practices resulting in a
total of 30 practices for the Round 2 inquiry. I conducted the peer debriefing with a Nova
Southeastern University faculty member who was familiar with the Delphi methodology,
but not a member of the business school. She provided excellent devil’s advocacy. Table
2 contains the results of my complete analysis of the data from the Round 1 inquiry,
including the first cut broad categories, the re-composed practice descriptors and detailed
definitions, and n, the frequency of citation.

Round 2 Inquiry
The objectives of the Round 2 inquiry were to (a) transition from qualitative to
quantitative inquiry, (b) provide the participants with sufficient feedback from the first
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round analysis to allow them to comprehend the positions of the other participants; (c)
obtain each participant’s quantifiable agreement, or disagreement, with the recomposed
practices and descriptions; (d) obtain quantifiable decisions from each participant
regarding the importance of each practice for establishing or maintaining a positive safety
culture; and (e) provide an opportunity to challenge the results of my judgments made
during the Round 1 analysis.
Appendix E is an example of the Round 2 inquiry provided to the participants via
SurveyMonkeyTM. The Appendix shows the complete detail for the first practice
“Management Involvement and Participation.” It begins with a statement of the practice,
frequency of citation by the panel, and the composed definition of the practice. Section
A queries the participants’ agreement, using a 5-point scale, with the practice as it has
been composed; Section B queries the participants’ view of the importance, using a 5point scale, the practice has for achieving a positive safety culture. This same line of
inquiry was repeated for all remaining 29 practices. The repetition of each practice was
excluded from Appendix E to save space. Section C queried for an open-ended response
to provide the participants an opportunity to revise the list of 30 practices and offer any
non-specific comments. The Round 2 inquiry was e-mailed to all the addresses provided
by the Round 1 inquiry except for the 3 exclusions. No delivery failures occurred.
Fifty-two of the original 68 panel participants responded to the Round 2 inquiry.
Because of the data de-identification requirement, non-responders could not be
specifically pursued. I elected to wait no longer and closed the data collector at 52
because it compared favorably with my forecast of 40 after attrition. Not all 52
participants responded to all of the inquiry questions. The responses per question ranged
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from a low of 49 to a high of 52. Actual response rates are given by “N” in Table 3. The
5-point scale responses were assigned scores for computational analysis. For the
agreement inquiry, strongly agree was assigned 5 points, and strongly disagree was
assigned 1 point with intermediates evenly spaced. For the importance inquiry, very
important was assigned 5 points, and very unimportant was assigned 1 point with
intermediates evenly spaced. The data were analyzed with SPSSTM and the descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 3.

Table 3
Practices Evaluated by Round 2 inquiry
Practice
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Management involvement
and participation
Agreement
Importance
Safety leadership
Agreement
Importance
Management systems
Agreement
Importance
Management commitment
Agreement
Importance
Posters, signs, banners, and
E-mails
Agreement
Importance
Atmosphere of openness
Agreement
Importance
Share experiences
Agreement
Importance
Communications accuracy
Agreement

5+4

Mean Median
N

Score

Score

σ

IQR

%

Action

52
52

4.87
4.94

5
5

0.341
0.233

0
0

100
100

Retain

52
51

4.54
4.63

5
5

0.603
0.656

1
1

94
90

Retain

52
51

4.37
4.41

4.5
5

0.735
0.746

1
1

88
88

Retain

50
50

4.74
4.80

5
5

0.522
0.400

0
0

96
100

Retain

52
52

3.69
3.60

4
4

1.048
1.079

1
1

69
58

Drop

52
52

4.65
4.71

5
5

0.676
0.660

1
0

92
96

Retain

52
52

4.31
4.13

4
4

0.666
0.785

1
2

88
75

Retain

52

3.85

4

0.907

2

62

Drop
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Practice

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Importance
Near miss review
Agreement
Importance
Hazard assessment
Agreement
Importance
Audits
Agreement
Importance
Inspections and
walkthroughs
Agreement
Importance
Observations
Agreement
Importance
Putting safety first
Agreement
Importance
Orientation training
Agreement
Importance
Monthly safety meetings
Agreement
Importance
Conferences
Agreement
Importance
Annual training and testing
Agreement
Importance
Job specific training
Agreement
Importance
Training quality
Agreement
Importance
Employee involvement
Agreement
Importance
Stop work authority

5+4

Mean Median
N

Score

Score

σ

IQR

%

51

3.84

4

0.872

2
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51
51

4.33
4.35

5
5

0.784
0.836

1
1

80
80

Retain

51
51

4.57
4.63

5
5

0.602
0.593

1
1

94
94

Retain

51
51

4.25
4.24

4
4

0.737
0.730

1
1

86
86

Retain

51
51

4.57
4.61

5
5

0.533
0.527

1
1

98
98

Retain

51
51

4.00
3.94

4
4

0.840
0.872

2
2

69
63

Drop

51
51

4.16
4.12

4
4

0.849
0.878

1
1

80
76

Drop

51
51

4.63
4.55

5
5

0.483
0.695

1
1

100
98

Retain

51
51

4.27
4.22

4
4

0.794
0.800

1
1

82
76

Retain

51
51

3.78
3.65

4
4

0.976
1.026

2
2

57
53

Drop

51
51

3.82
3.63

4
4

0.964
1.102

1
1

71
61

Drop

51
51

4.57
4.57

5
5

0.634
0.693

1
1

96
92

Retain

51
51

4.24
4.24

4
4

0.703
0.782

1
1

88
82

Retain

50
50

4.62
4.58

5
5

0.690
0.751

1
1

92
88

Retain

Action
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Practice

23

24

25

26

27

28

Agreement
Importance
Performance evaluations
Agreement
Importance
Disciplinary actions
Agreement
Importance
Enforcement
Agreement
Importance
Building trust
Agreement
Importance
Policies and procedures
Agreement
Importance
Periodic review of policies
and procedures

5+4

Mean Median
N

Score

Score

σ

IQR

%

Action

50
50

4.64
4.60

5
5

0.592
0.632

1
1

94
92

Retain

50
50

4.32
4.24

4
4.5

0.811
0.950

1
1

90
82

Retain

50
50

3.98
3.98

4
4

0.948
0.927

1
2

78
76

Drop

50
49

3.72
3.78

4
4

1.114
1.055

2
2

64
67

Drop

50
50

4.74
4.72

5
5

0.482
0.449

0
1

98
1.00

Retain

50
50

4.12
4.08

4
4

0.791
0.821

1
1

0.78
0.78

Drop

4
0.956
2
0.66
Agreement
50 3.92
Drop
Importance
50 3.92
4
0.913
2
0.70
29 Pay for performance
Agreement
49 3.08
3
1.175
2
0.33
Drop
Importance
49 3.06
3
1.202
2
0.35
30 Celebration
Agreement
50 4.06
4
0.835
1
0.76
Drop
Importance
50 3.94
4
0.835
2
0.66
Notes. N = the number of panel participants responding for the specific question. σ is
the standard deviation of the mean score. IQR is the inter-quartile range about the
median score. “5+4 %” is the percent of respondents that selected either strongly agree,
agree, or very important, important.

Because the ultimate objective of Delphi is to determine consensus, these
particular descriptive statistics are intended to indicate the panel’s central tendency and
the dispersion of the opinion among the panel participants. The mean and median are
measures of central tendency, while the standard deviation and the inter-quartile range
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(IQR) are measures of dispersion around those central tendencies respectively.
Brightman and Schneider (1994) suggest the median is preferable when the number of
outliers is sufficient to warrant evaluation of bi-modal tendencies. Initial inspection of
the data revealed no evidence suggesting a bi-modal behavior; however, the median and
IQR are presented for completeness.
The column labeled “5+4 %” in Table 2 contains statistical information used to
decide which practices would be carried over into the Round 3 inquiry. In Chapter III, I
defined the decision rule for carry over as those practices for which at least 80% of the
participants gave scores of 4 or 5 would move to Round 3. The “5+4 %” column lists
the percentage of participants that selected 4 or 5 for the survey questions. Upon
applying the decision rule to these data, the following 12 practices were dropped from
continued evaluation by the Delphi methodology:
•

5. Posters, signs, banners & e-mails

•

8. Communications accuracy

•

13. Observations

•

14. Putting safety first

•

17. Conferences

•

18. Annual training and testing

•

24. Disciplinary actions

•

25. Enforcement

•

27. Policies and procedures

•

28. Periodic review of policies and procedures

•

29. Pay for performance
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•

30. Celebration

Two additional practices, number 7, “share experiences,” and number 16, “monthly
safety meetings,” were on the borderline and could have been dropped by strict adherence
to the decision rule. However, after closer examination on an individual basis, I decided
to retain them into Round 3. Number 7, scored only 88 and 75, and number 16, scored
only 82 and 76, but both practices had a relatively narrow dispersion as indicated by the
low standard deviation, thereby indicating close agreement by panel participants.
The combination of borderline score and narrow dispersion suggested another
round of evaluation by the full panel was in order. The peer debriefer concurred with this
decision and no changes were made as a result of that quality review. The comments
provided in Section C of the inquiry were few and inconsequential. No new practices
were added as a result of the comments, nor was any syntax of existing practices
changed.

Round 3 Inquiry
The objectives of the Round 3 inquiry are not too dissimilar to the previous round
which were to: (a) provide the participants with sufficient feedback from the previous
round to allow them to comprehend the analysis and the positions of the other
participants; (b) obtain each participant’s quantifiable agreement, or disagreement, with
practices that remain on the list; and (c) obtain quantifiable decisions from each
participant about how important each of the practices is for establishing or maintaining a
positive safety culture. The significant difference between Round 3 and the previous
Round 2 inquiry is the feedback provided to the participants. In Round 3, the participants
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were informed that the number of practices has decreased from 30 to 18 as a result of
their input, and the prior voting results of the group are included on each survey question.
Appendix F is an example of the Round 3 inquiry provided to the participants via
SurveyMonkeyTM. Again, the Appendix shows the complete detail for only the first
practice, “Management Involvement and Participation.” It begins with a statement and
detailed definition of the practice followed by a query of the participants’ rating of
agreement and importance using a 5-point scale. The number of votes received in the
prior round of inquiry is listed beside each scale descriptor so the participant can readily
see how the panel vote was divided in the prior round. This same line of inquiry was
repeated for the remaining 18 practices. The repetition is excluded from Appendix F to
save space. A final open-ended question is provided to give the participants an
opportunity to suggest modifications. The Round 3 inquiry was e-mailed to all the same
addresses used for the previous inquiry. No delivery failures occurred.
Fifty-six panel participants responded to the Round 3 inquiry after 5 days. This
was four more than responded in Round 2 indicating that at least 4 participants thought to
be lost to attrition rejoined that panel. I elected to wait no longer and closed the data
collector at 56 because again it compared favorably with my attrition forecast. As before,
not all participants responded to all of the inquiry questions. Four of the practices
received responses from only 54 participants. Actual response rates are given by “N” in
Table 4. The 5-point scale responses were again assigned the same numerical scores for
computational analysis. SPSSTM was used to calculate the mean, standard deviation,
median, IQR, and 5+4% for the Round 3 response data as done for the previous Round 2.
In order to preserve the identity of the practices from round to round, I retained the same
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practice numbering even though 12 practices were dropped from the set. For that reason,
the practice numbers in Table 4 are not continuous. The gaps are caused by the dropped
practices. The Round 3 analysis, however, provided the first opportunity to
quantitatively test for consensus, the desired outcome of the Delphi methodology.

Consensus Testing: Round 3
Two sample z test. Consensus occurs when the central tendency of the participant
panel’s response, and the dispersion of the responses about that central tendency, both
stabilize, that is, they do not significantly change from one round of inquiry to the next. I
tested for the first part of consensus definition (stability of central tendency) by
comparing the means of each practice for equality. The hypotheses for this test are:
H0: ūnr2 - ūnr3 = 0
Ha: ūnr2 - ūnr3 ≠ 0
where ūnr2 is the mean for practice n from Round 2 and ūnr3 is the mean for
practice n from Round 3.
The two-sample z test statistic for testing ūnr2 - ūnr3 is:
z = (ūnr2 - ūnr3) / [(σnr22 / Nnr2) + (σnr32 / Nnr3)]½
For a two-tailed test at α = 0.05, if the calculated z value exceeds the critical z = 1.96 then
the null hypothesis must be rejected. For this study, rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that consensus was not achieved. The calculated z test statistic for each of the
practices, and its corresponding p-values are listed in the rightmost two columns in Table
4. The null hypothesis was rejected for two practices, number 2, safety leadership, (z =
2.08, p = 0.0376) and number 19, job specific training, (z = 1.97, p = 0.0488)
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Table 4
Results of Round 3 Inquiry and Comparison with Round 2

Practice
1. Management Involvement
& Participation

2.

3.

4.

6.

7.

8.

9.

11.

12.

Agreement
Importance
Safety Leadership
Agreement
Importance
Management Systems
Agreement
Importance
Management Commitment
Agreement
Importance
Atmosphere of Openness
Agreement
Importance
Share Experiences
Agreement
Importance
Near Miss Reviews
Agreement
Importance
Hazard Assessment
Agreement
Importance
Audits
Agreement
Importance
Inspections and
Walkthroughs
Agreement
Importance

N

Mean Med

σ

IQR

5+4,
%

Comparison of
Means Rounds
2&3
z
p
scores values

56 4.964
56 4.964

5
5

0.186
0.186

0
0

100
100

1.85
0.54

0.0644
0.5892

56 4.25
56 4.357

5
5

0.829
0.854

1
1

82
82

2.08
1.85

0.0376
0.0644

54 4.241
54 4.333

4
4

0.607
0.720

1
1

94
93

0.95
0.55

0.3422
0.5824

54 4.778
54 4.926

5
5

0.497
0.262

0
0

96
100

0.38
1.88

0.704
0.0602

56 4.857
56 4.821

5
5

0.350
0.383

0
0

100
100

1.94
1.05

0.0524
0.2938

56 4.107
56 4.179

4
4

0.795
0.710

1
1

86
82

1.42
0.30

0.1556
0.7642

54 4.556
54 4.481

5
5

0.685
0.739

1
1

89
85

1.54
0.83

0.1236
0.4066

56 4.643
56 4.607

5
5

0.549
0.618

1
1

96
93

0.66
0.17

0.5092
0.865

56 4.161
56 4.161

4
4

0.701
0.701

1
1

86
86

0.68
0.54

0.4966
0.5892

56 4.607
56 4.679

5
5

0.557
0.538

1
1

96
96

0.37
0.69

0.7114
0.4902
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5+4,
%

Z

p
values

Practice
N Mean Med
IQR
scores
σ
15. Orientation Training
Agreement
54 4.704
5
0.457
1
100
0.83
0.4066
5
0.457
1
100
1.34
0.1802
Importance
54 4.704
16. Monthly Safety Meetings
Agreement
56 4.304
4
0.679
1
91
0.20
0.8414
4
0.880
1
79
0.67
0.5028
Importance
56 4.107
19. Job Specific Training
Agreement
56 4.786
5
0.490
1
96
1.97
0.0488
Importance
56 4.786
5
0.490
1
96
1.85
0.0644
20. Training Quality
Agreement
56 4.018
4
0.855
1
80
1.44
0.1498
4
0.803
1
86
0.72
0.4716
Importance
56 4.125
21. Employee Involvement
Agreement
56 4.75
5
0.509
0
96
1.09
0.2758
Importance
56 4.75
5
0.509
0
96
1.35
0.177
22. Time Out
Agreement
56 4.607
5
0.618
1
93
0.28
0.7794
5
0.666
1
89
0.34
0.7338
Importance
56 4.643
23. Performance Evaluations
Include Safety
4
0.854
1
82
0.23
0.818
Agreement
56 4.357
Importance
56 4.429
4
0.863
1
82
1.07
0.2846
26. Building Trust
Agreement
56 4.786
5
0.490
0
96
0.48
0.6312
5
0.350
0
100
1.74
0.0818
Importance
56 4.857
Note. N is the number of respondents; σ is the standard deviation of the mean; IQR is the
interquartile range; 5+4 % is the percent of respondents that selected strongly agree,
agree, very important, or important; Z is the resultant statistic for test of equality of the
means for Rounds 2 and 3; p is the value for the corresponding statistical test.

indicating that consensus did not exist among the panel participants for inclusion of these
practices, based upon inequality of the mean between Rounds 2 and 3.
Wilcoxon non-parametric rank test. The second part of testing for consensus, the
stability of the dispersion around the median, is determined by the Wilcoxon nonparametric rank test. Appendix H is a detailed example of how this test is conducted.
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The hypotheses for the test are:
H0: The two populations have equal dispersions
Ha: The two populations have unequal dispersions
The calculated z values for the agreement rankings and the importance rankings were
0.348 and 0.6011 respectively. For a two-tailed test at α = 0.05, if the calculated z value
exceeds the critical z = 1.96 then the null hypothesis must be rejected. In this case the
null hypothesis was accepted for both agreement and importance. Thus I can safely
conclude that, based upon dispersion about the median, consensus was achieved between
Rounds 2 and 3. The corresponding p values for this test are listed in Table 7.
At this point, I had mixed results about consensus: based on the means equality
test, 2 of the 18 practices failed consensus; based on dispersion about the median,
consensus was strong. For the two practices that failed consensus, the p-values (see
Table 4) were 0.0488 and 0.0376, both of which I considered close enough to the
threshold of 0.05 to warrant further examination. I elected to begin this examination by
conducting a Round 4 inquiry with the same 18 practices carried in Round 3.
Round 4 Inquiry
The objectives of the Round 4 inquiry were identical to those for Round 3, (a)
provide the participants with sufficient feedback from the previous round to allow them
to comprehend the analysis and the positions of the other participants; (b) obtain each
participant’s quantifiable agreement, or disagreement, with practices that remain on the
list; and (c) obtain quantifiable decisions from each participant about how important each
of the practices is for establishing or maintaining a positive safety culture. Appendix G is
an example of the Round 4 inquiry provided to the participants via SurveyMonkeyTM.
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Again, the Appendix shows the complete detail for only the first practice “Management

Involvement and Participation.” This same line of inquiry was repeated for the remaining
18 practices. The repetition is excluded from Appendix G to again save space. A final
open-ended question was provided to give the participants an opportunity to suggest
modifications. The Round 4 inquiry was e-mailed to all the same addresses used for the
previous inquiry. No delivery failures occurred.
Sixty panel participants responded to the Round 3 inquiry after 5 days. This was
four more than responded in Round 3 indicating that at least 4 participants rejoined that
panel. Again, not all participants responded to all of the inquiry questions. Four of the
practices received responses from only 52 participants. Table 5 illustrates the variance in
panel membership over the duration of all four rounds of inquiry.
Table 5
Participant Panel Populations
Responses per Question
Round of Inquiry

Participants in the Round

Least

Most

1

68

NA

NA

2

52

49

52

3

56

54

56

4

60

54

60

The results of this analysis of data collected from the Round 4 inquiry are
provided in Table 6. The format of Table 6 is identical to previous rounds for
comparative purposes.

Consensus Testing: Round 4
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Two sample z test. The calculated z test statistic for each of the practices, and its
corresponding p-values, are listed in the rightmost two columns in Table 6. All
calculated values of z were less that the critical value of 1.96 for a two-tailed test at α =
0.05. Thus, I can conclude that consensus has been achieved based upon the equality of
all means.
Wilcoxon non-parametric rank test. The calculated z values for the agreement
rankings and the importance rankings were 0.9082 and 0.7881 respectively; both less
than the critical z = 1.96 for a two-tailed test at α = 0.05. Thus, I can conclude that, based
upon dispersion about the median, consensus was achieved between Rounds 3 and 4.
The corresponding p values for this test are listed in Table 7.
A visual comparison of the z and p values in Tables 4 and 5 provide some clues as
to why consensus was reached after Round 4. The majority of the z scores significantly
decreased and the majority of the p values significantly increased from Round 3 to Round
4, which is indicative of a convergence of the opinion of the panel participants. Round 3
and Round 4 contained the same number (18) of practices which likely accounts for the
convergence. In contrast, Round 2 to Round 3 had a decrease (30 to 18) in the number of
practices causing a dilution of the votes in the former round. It is also possible that the
effects of participants re-joining the panel between rounds may have had just enough
impact on the consensus tests to change the borderline values. With consensus reached
after Round 4, I terminated data inquiries for this study.

83
Ranking of the Practices
Besides a consensus list of practices that lead to a positive safety culture, the
research data provide the opportunity to rank the practices in priority of importance.
Some combination of both the agreement rating and the importance rating is more
5.000

Mean Agreement

4.500

4.000

3.500

3.000

2.500
2.500

3.000

3.500

4.000

4.500

5.000

Mean Importance
Figure 2. The Round 4 mean agreement rating versus the mean importance rating for
each practice.

appropriate for a practitioner than either one alone. Figure 2 is a plot of the mean
agreement rating versus the mean importance rating. The near-linear relationship
suggests little difference between the two parameters with respect to ranking. As a result,
I have ranked the practices according to the average of the agreement and importance
ratings. The final rankings are shown in Table 8. I changed the practice numbers to
letters to distinguish its position in the rank with its former identity carried in the data
analysis.
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Figure 3 shows a plot of the averaged practice mean ratings including the 95%
statistical confidence interval. This plot shows that some overlap of rank exists between
adjacent practices or groups of adjacent practices; however, there is a clear distinction of
rank from top to bottom.
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Table 6
Results of Round 4 Inquiry and Comparison with Round 3

1

2

3

4

6

7

9

10

11

12

Practices
N
Management Involvement &
Participation
Agreement
60
Importance
58
Safety Leadership
Agreement
55
Importance
56
Management Systems
Agreement
54
Importance
54
Management Commitment
Agreement
53
Importance
53
Atmosphere of Openness
Agreement
58
Importance
57
Share Experiences
Agreement
58
Importance
55
Near Miss Reviews
Agreement
56
Importance
52
Hazard Assessment
Agreement
56
Importance
58
Audits
Agreement
58
Importance
56
Inspections and
Walkthroughs
Agreement
57
Importance
56

Comparison of
Means, Rounds
3&4
Z
p
score
value

σ

IQR

5+4,
%

5
5

0.499
0.221

0
0

0.97
1.00

1.41
0.42

0.159
0.674

4.218
4.429

4
5

0.928
0.776

1
1

0.82
0.86

0.19
0.46

0.849
0.646

4.278
4.333

4
4

0.524
0.720

1
1

0.96
0.93

0.34
0.00

0.734
1.000

4.755
4.868

5
5

0.580
0.584

0
0

0.96
0.98

0.22
0.66

0.826
0.509

4.759
4.789

5
5

0.702
0.449

0
0

0.97
0.98

0.95
0.41

0.342
0.682

4.103
4.218

4
4

0.824
0.706

1
1

0.86
0.84

0.02
0.29

0.984
0.772

4.482
4.519

5
5

0.779
0.720

1
1

0.86
0.87

0.53
0.27

0.596
0.787

4.625
4.483

5
5

0.696
0.856

1
1

0.96
0.88

0.15
0.89

0.881
0.373

4.103
4.179

4
4

0.759
0.758

1
1

0.83
0.88

0.42
0.13

0.674
0.897

4.596
4.661

5
5

0.617
0.576

1
1

0.96
0.95

0.10
0.17

0.920
0.865

Mean

Med

4.867
4.948
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5+4,
%

Z
score

Practices
N
Mean Med
IQR
σ
15 Orientation Training
Agreement
52 4.712
5
0.453
1
1.00
0.09
1
0.96
0.93
Importance
56 4.607
5
0.618
16 Monthly Safety Meetings
1
0.91
0.09
Agreement
55 4.291
4
0.730
Importance
56 4.089
4
0.969
1
0.79
0.10
19 Job Specific Training
Agreement
56
4.75
5
0.605
0
0.95
0.34
1
0.96
0.19
Importance
56 4.768
5
0.500
20 Training Quality
1
0.77
0.43
Agreement
57 3.947
4
0.887
Importance
54 4.204
4
0.620
1
0.89
0.58
21 Employee Involvement
Agreement
58 4.603
5
0.808
1
0.91
1.16
0
0.97
0.25
Importance
58 4.724
5
0.581
22 Time Out
1
0.93
0.06
Agreement
55
4.6
5
0.677
Importance
58 4.517
5
0.895
1
0.84
0.85
Performance Evaluations
23 Include Safety
Agreement
54 4.407
5
0.782
1
0.85
0.32
Importance
57 4.386
5
0.874
1
0.81
0.26
26 Building Trust
Agreement
58 4.707
5
0.643
0
0.93
0.70
0
0.98
0.74
Importance
57 4.789
5
0.521
Note. N is the number of respondents; σ is the standard deviation of the mean; IQR is the
interquartile range; 5+4 % is the percent of respondents that selected strongly agree,
agree, very important, or important; Z is the resultant statistic for test of equality of the
means for Rounds 3 and 4; p is the value for the corresponding statistical test.

p
value
0.928
0.352
0.928
0.920
0.734
0.849
0.667
0.562
0.246
0.803
0.952
0.395

0.749
0.795
0.484
0.459
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Table 7
Wilcoxon Results: Tests for Consensus

Comparison
Round 2 to Round 3

Z score

p value

Agreement

0.348

0.9082

Importance

0.6011

0.7881

Agreement

0.6327

0.7673

Importance

0.1424

0.9099

Round 3 to Round 4

Note. For p values greater than 0.05, reject the alternative hypothesis and accept the null
hypothesis.

Chapter IV Conclusion
Both research questions set for this dissertation study were successfully answered.
A Delphi participant panel was successfully recruited to inform this research and panel
membership was retained at levels above what was forecasted through termination of the
study. Attrition was minimal. The data was collected electronically via
SurveyMonkeyTM while de-identification requirements were maintained. A set of
practices that lead to a positive safety culture were obtained and consensus regarding the
practice set was achieved after four rounds of inquiry. The consensus set is provided in
rank order of importance and agreement in Table 8.
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Table 8
Final Consensus Practices in Rank Order
Practice

AVE Mean

A.

Management Involvement & Participation

4.91

B.

Management Commitment

4.81

C.

Atmosphere of Openness

4.77

D.

Job Specific Training

4.76

E.

Building Trust

4.75

F.

Employee Involvement

4.66

G.

Orientation Training

4.66

H.

Inspections and Walkthroughs

4.63

I.

Time Out

4.56

J.

Hazard Assessment

4.55

K.

Near Miss Reviews

4.50

L.

Performance Evaluations Include Safety

4.40

M. Safety Leadership

4.32

N.

Management Systems

4.31

O.

Monthly Safety Meetings

4.19

P.

Share Experiences

4.16

Q.

Audits

4.14

R.

Training Quality

4.08
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Mean Scale Rating

4.900

4.700

4.500

4.300

4.100

3.900

3.700
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

Q

R

Practice
Figure 3. The final average of Agreement and Importance mean ratings for each
practice including the 95% confidence interval. Refer to Table 8 for the practice
corresponding to the letters on the abscissa.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Introduction to the Chapter
A positive safety culture within an organization is related to a reduction in the rate
of occupational accidents and injuries. However, researchers to date have been unable to
reach a general consensus on the factor structure or the antecedents that lead to a positive
safety culture. Schein (1990) defines culture as the shared set of attitudes, beliefs, and
values. Hofstede’s (2001) onion model of organizational culture submits that values are
at the core of organizational culture and that “practices” are the manifestation of those
values. The aim of this dissertation study was to identify the set of practices that are
related to positive safety culture.
The literature review showed the lack of a general consensus regarding the factor
structure of safety culture resulted from weaknesses in methodology and research
context. The exploratory front-end of the Delphi methodology was used in this
dissertation research to overcome those weaknesses.
In this chapter, I will discuss the findings in the context of emerging conclusions
from the study. The chapter begins with the outcomes related to the specific purpose of
the study, followed by a discussion of the Delphi process and its unique contributions to
the outcomes. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for both
practitioners and researchers, the limitations of the study, and potential extensions for
further research.
Discussion of Outcomes Related to Purpose
The purpose of this research was to answer the following research questions:
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Question #1: What practices are used by the members of organizations to
establish or maintain a positive safety culture within those organizations?
Beginning with 275 practices offered by the 68 panel participants in the initial
round, the list reduced to 30 candidate practices through content analysis of the raw data.
Question #2: Does consensus exist among a panel of safety experts for the set, or
subset, of the practices discovered by the first research question?
Through the implementation of the Delphi technique and the perspective of the 68
panel participants, consensus was reached for the inclusion of 18 practices. After four
rounds of Delphi inquiries and analyses, the panel participants also reached consensus
regarding the importance of these 18 practices. The consensus practices are listed in
Table 8.
The differences between the individual practices within the ranking of the 18
practices were small for adjacently ranked practices. In fact, as many as five practices
had statistical means that fell within the confidence intervals with each other. However,
over the spectrum of all 18, there is a clear hierarchy of importance.
Consensus Practices Related to Safety Culture
Of the 30 practices set forth by the Round 1 inquiry, consensus was reached on
both agreement and importance for 18 of them and final member-checking confirmed the
18. Panel members also indicated potential existed for merger of a few of the practices.
However, there was no consensus as to which ones. The following discusses the
consensus practices.
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Management involvement and participation. This practice ranked highest on the
importance and agreement scale and had the narrowest dispersion of the 18 practices
indicating very strong consensus for its inclusion. Participants most frequently
characterized the practice by the cliché, “walk the talk,” meaning that safety culture
would be established and maintained when managers at all levels personally act out all
attributes of the established ESH activities. Such activities include: safety meetings,
safety program and goals development, evaluating performance metrics, audits,
inspections, pre-startup safety reviews, job cycle checks, incident investigations, and
wearing the appropriate personal protective equipment just like front line workers. One
panel participant noted “when senior management [is] involved in audits, inspections,
and the like …there seems to be improved safety culture, as all employees see that it is
something valued by senior leadership.” The repeated demonstration of safety as a value
is at the core of the Hofstede (2001) onion model that I used as the theoretical foundation
for this study
Management commitment. Placing second in the ranking, this practice notes that
two unique management functions, business planning and resource allocation, must
equally include occupational safety as an element of the business for successful
establishment of a safety culture. The practice recognizes that safety goals and objectives
cannot be realized without a success-oriented plan and the appropriate resources
(monetary and manpower) to execute that plan. More importantly, the inclusion of safety
in the resource planning demonstrates to members of the organization, that safety is on
the same level as production, service, etc. One panel participant related “my
management understands that preventing accidents saves money…and supporting
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[safety] initiatives publicly makes a huge difference in whether employees pay
attention…and takes us seriously.” The most frequently stated portion of the definition
of this practice was the willingness of the firm to monetarily fund the safety improvement
initiatives.
Atmosphere of openness, and building trust. While these two practices were
defined and evaluated separately by all four rounds of inquiry, their definitions are
intertwined and with their ranking scores nearly equal, merit discussion together. The
definition of “atmosphere of openness” relates to promoting and conducting open
communications throughout the organization regarding safety problems without fear of
retaliation even for counter opinions. Correction of problems requires a clear
understanding of the details, the discussion of which must be free of any chilling effects.
One panel participant noted, “allow[ing] concerns to be brought forward and addressed
by all levels results in buy-in by the majority of the employees, which leads to a positive
safety culture.”
The practice of “building trust” refers to blame avoidance, coaching versus
policing, action versus promises, and good interpersonal skills, all of which are
antecedents to building an atmosphere of openness. Prior research by Clarke (1998), Cox
and Cox (1991), Lee (1998), Mearns et al. (1998), Silva et al. (2004), and Rundmo
(2000) also found that the equivalent of both practices were present in the factor structure
when either one appeared. Thus, these two practices are interconnected and, from a
practitioner’s view, may be considered as a single practice.
Employee involvement. The objective of this safety practice is the same as any
generic employee involvement practice. Involving employees in all safety related
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activities produces more buy-in, better solutions, empowerment and self-reliance. One
participant related, “involving employees in audits, inspections, training, what-if
analyses, problem solving, discussions on job scope hazards, and on special committees
has been very successful at developing a safety mindset within their work groups.”
Time Out. Implementation of the “time out” practice was considered by many
panel participants as the ultimate employee involvement. The practice requires that all
employees have the responsibility and authority to stop work or declare a stand down
when a job in progress is perceived to be proceeding unsafely. The panel participants
unanimously noted that it is an ultimate measure of safety culture because a work
stoppage usually incurs a cost penalty and the existence of this practice demonstrates the
corporate value of safety over production.
Job specific training, orientation training, and training quality. All three of these
practices include the common activity of training, albeit different viewpoints. The first
two, “job specific training” and “orientation training”, ranked in the upper one-third of
the set of practices for several important reasons. First, employees must possess the
appropriate job specific knowledge and skills to perform job functions safely. Secondly,
their competence level is expected to be high enough, as one participant noted, "to ask the
questions such as what could go wrong here” so hazards can be identified and mitigated
before they cause accidents. Emphasis on “job specific training” is regarded as the
means to attaining the intended high levels of competence.
“Orientation training” is the pre-requisite to the job specific training and is aimed
at “creating value for safety for all coming into the plant” as noted by one panel

95
participant. Orientation training is viewed as the first task for every new employee to
complete so they are prepared for learning safety skills in the job specific training.
Finally, “training quality” was last in the rank order of importance and the
participants’ comments addressed typical quality issues such as objective-based training,
periodic assessments, and real versus hypothetical cases, with emphasis on the latter by
several participants. One participant’s statement, “safety training must be authentic and
truly represent what the employee observes in their workplace. Hypothetical situations
do little to transfer safety information” succinctly describes the training quality practice.
While the differences in importance ranking of these three training-related
practices appear significant, the definitions, comments, and examples provided by the
participants suggest they are tightly linked. “Job specific training” is the principal
antecedent of safety culture. However, its success requires the orientation training as a
prerequisite and both training programs require high training quality. Thus, for the
practitioner, these three might well be combined into a single practice.
Management systems, safety leadership, and performance evaluations that
include safety. The ranking scores for these three practices were nearly identical (4.31.
4.32 and 4.40 respectively) and examination of the participants’ comments suggests they
are perhaps three parts of the same practice. The “management systems” practice was
defined as establishing a system of corporate governance that holds safety as a corporate
value, states a vision and belief about it, and defines the roles and expectations of all
members of the organization regarding safety. As one participant commented, “too often
the safety department of a company is viewed as responsible for safety performance
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versus the line organization. It’s easy for the lines of responsibility to get blurred so
senior management must address this constantly.”
The “safety leadership” practice was defined as managers setting safety goals,
monitoring performance against goals, and providing appropriate feedback. One
participant described it as, “[managers] set up goals for the safety performance of their
departments, regions, divisions, etc. Measurement criteria are established (lost work
days, emergency responses, workers compensation costs, etc.) and managers are
accountable for improvement in their areas.” Another participant noted, “the plant
manager has a monthly meeting…devoted to safety to track progress of safety-related
projects, check status of leading safety indicators, and take action for not hitting targets.”
Thus, it appears that safety leadership is merely a subpart (a role and responsibility) of
the management systems practice. Again, from practitioner’s view, potential exists for
combining these into a single practice.
The practice of “performance evaluations that include safety” is the final element
of accountability for the previous two practices. It is defined as adding the topic of safety
performance relative to goals in the annual (or periodic) performance reviews for each
employee. A participant commented, “performance evaluations should have a defined
component devoted to safety performance and evaluations should impact salary, bonus
and promotion decisions.”
Audits, hazard assessments, inspections and walkthroughs, and near miss
reviews. These four practices are interconnected by their common purpose which is to
uncover and ubiquitously correct unsafe conditions or unsafe acts that could lead to
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accidents. Based on the participants’ comments, the differences are primarily in the
setting, the degree of formality, and the actors involved.
“Audits” are the most formal, comprehensive, and are conducted by trained
auditors. They were best defined by a participant’s comment: “A fully implemented
auditing and incident investigation procedure which focuses on reporting of incidents
(including near misses), root cause analysis, correction of hazards, and follow-up to
ensure that hazards remain corrected, is a necessary attribute of any positive safety
culture.” Formality is achieved by conducting the audits according to a procedure and
schedule. The outcome is generally documented in a written report and subsequent audits
examine the compliance with recommendation in that written report. Over a pre-planned,
designated time span, all parts of the organization are subjected to audits. The auditors
are specially qualified (often evidenced by certification) to conduct audits and may be
part of a regulatory agency.
“Near miss reviews” include a formalized mechanism for reporting, analyzing,
and acting upon events for which a serious accident was just nearly missed. Voluntary,
no-fault, self-reporting is the initiator for a near miss review which differentiates it from
the other three practices. Otherwise, the rigor of the analysis and reporting is similar to
the audit practice. One participant wrote, “the goal is to learn from mistakes and avoid
repeat incidents” which clarifies the purpose of near miss reviews.
“Hazard assessments” are less formal than audits and less comprehensive. They
include periodic evaluation of facilities, equipment, processes or people to determine if
changes over time have introduced new hazards. Results are documented and changes in
policies and procedures are implemented as necessary. A participant’s comment, “if you
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don’t know it’s a hazard, it cannot be corrected before an accident happens” succinctly
describes the purpose of the practice. Hazard assessments are usually conducted by the
people, or their peers, who normally work on the object or process being assessed.
“Inspection and walkthroughs” are even less formal. They are conducted by
managers as well as peers. Time is allotted to just “walk around” and observe people
working. Deficiencies are corrected immediately, interaction is encouraged, and
typically there is no formal reporting. One respondent wrote, “verbal feedback is
encouraged between fellow employees during these short review and observation periods
so that a feeling of caring, mutual respect, and safety dependency is obtained. The
individuals’ [identities] are confidential and not shared with management.”
It is worth noting that while these four practices are related by common purpose,
they are not dependent on one another as were the training practices. The practitioner
might implement any one effectively. However, this study concludes that all four are
related to a positive safety culture.
Monthly safety meetings. This practice requires that all employees devote some
amount of work time (typically 1 hour) every month (or some other appropriate time
period) to assemble and engage in a dialogue about safety. Topics vary and might
include refresher training, review of new safety practices, review of accident
investigations, celebration of successes, etc. Several participants found it important not
to structure these meetings but rather address the contemporary issues.
Share experiences. The objective of this practice is to encourage ongoing
communications in all directions about personal safety experiences. Participants gave
examples ranging from employees making somewhat formal testimonial presentations at
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one end of the spectrum to impromptu humorous e-mails about safety from the CEO at
the other end.
Comparison to Prior Research
The underlying justification for this dissertation research was the fact that prior
research could not reach a consensus on the factor structure of safety culture. While not
in consensus, those researchers did identify sets of practices for particular domains of
their respective studies. The following discussion compares my conclusions with those
of other researchers.
I selected 21 studies from the literature to compare with the results of this study.
These studies are some of the more frequently cited in the safety culture research stream
and were included by Cooper (2000) and Clarke (2000) in their work to define the stateof-the-art in safety culture research. The results of my comparison are illustrated in
Table 9. The letters in the header of Table 9 correspond to the letter designation of my
final results in Table 8. Denoted by “X” are those prior research studies that have found
a factor similar or identical to a practice found in this study.
Table 9
Comparison to Selected Prior Studies
Study

A B C
Brown and X X
Holmes
(1986)
Cheyne, et
al. (1998)
Clarke
(1998)

X

D E

F

Practice*
G H I J K L

M N O P

X X

X

X X

X

X

X X

X X

X

Q R

100

Study
Cooper
and
Phillips
(1994)

A B C
X

Cox and
Cox
(1991)

X

D E

F

Practice*
G H I J K L
X

X X

X

M N O P
X

Q R
X

X X

Cox, et al.
(1998)

X X

X X

X

Coyle, et
al. (1995)

X X

X X

X

DeJoy, et
al. (2004)

X

X

Diaz and
Cabrera
(1997)

X

X

Fang, et al.
(2006)

X

X X X X

FaringtonDarby
(2005)

X X X

X X

Glendon
and
Litherland
(2001)

X

X

Lee (1998)
Mearns, et
al. (1998)

X X X
X X

Mohamed
(2002)

X X X

Niskanen
(1994)

X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X X

X X

X X X
X X

X
X

X X
X X

X

X

X X

X

X

X X

X
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Study
FernandezMuniz, et
al. (2007)
O’Toole
(2002)

A B C
X

Practice*
D E F G H I J K L
X X
X

X X

X X

M N O P
X X

Q R

X

X

X

Silva, et al.
(2004)

X X

X X X

X

X X

Rundmo
(2000)

X X

X

X

X

Zohar
X
X
X
X
X
X
(1980)
Note. * A = management involvement & participation; B = management commitment; C
= atmosphere of openness; D = job specific training; E = building trust; F = employee
involvement; G =orientation training; H = inspections and walkthroughs; I = time out; J =
hazard assessment; K = near miss reviews; L = performance evaluations include safety;
M = safety leadership; N = management systems; O = monthly safety meetings; P = share
experiences; Q = audits; R = training quality

Overlap between this dissertation study and the selected 21 studies occurred for
12 of the 18 practices identified in this study. The six practices not clearly coincident
with prior research include: job specific training, near miss reviews, performance
evaluations include safety, monthly safety meetings, sharing experiences, and audits.
One additional practice, hazard assessments, appeared in only one of the 21 studies. The
reason for the six non-coincident practices is not readily apparent and is a subject for
further research. The 12 practices that did overlap appeared with varying frequency from
as much as 15 times for two of the practices identified in this study.
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Usage of the Delphi Methodology
A critical factor of this research was the use of the Delphi methodology. It
provided the “exploratory” research component necessary to compensate for
shortcomings in previous research on safety culture. These shortcomings mainly
included biases introduced by a priori knowledge of the researcher, use of replicated
survey instruments, and the need for approaching the subject from a broader perspective.
The experiences using the Delphi method merit discussion.

The Participant Panel
Delbecq et al. (1975), Keeney, Hasson, and McKenna (2001), Pasukeviciute and
Roe (2001), and Powell (2003) note that panel member selection is critical for the
adequate validity and reliability of the Delphi methodology. Most important is the level
of expertise and willingness to commit to the lengthy process. I engaged the assistance of
a national trade association, the National Safety Council, for pursing panel members.
Their large database of members with experience and zeal, combined with their brand
attached to the introduction, facilitated swift assembly of a model panel. Attrition rates
were only ~15% from start-to-finish compared with 60% typically. Turnaround times
were 10 days for Round 1, and 5 days each for Rounds 2, 3, and 4, compared to typically
30 days and 15 days respectively.

SurveyMonkeyTM
Data collection was accomplished almost exclusively by using SurveyMonkeyTM
a web-based electronic data collection system. It proved to be accurate, time-saving, and
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effective for maintaining confidentiality of the participant responses. However, some
tradeoffs arise when using SurveyMonkeyTM, specifically for Delphi methodologies. On
the positive side, “survey fatigue” is the most prominent cause of attrition in Delphi and
the web-based nature of the system makes it more responder-friendly. Prolonged
analysis between rounds of inquiry, another cause of increased attrition, is effectively
minimized with the formats of the data collectors in SurveyMonkeyTM. On the negative
side, it is normally more cost effective than postal mailings; however, the required deidentification of responses combined with the need to maintain e-mail addresses of the
participants for multiple rounds of inquiry necessitated higher cost subscription levels.
On the whole, the tradeoffs are still in favor of using SurveyMonkeyTM.

De-identified Data
Research for dissertations is typically conducted with the data de-identified so as
to hasten and streamline the Internal Review Board (IRB) approval processes. Deidentification means that there is no reasonable way to correlate the sample participants’
identities with their responses. This presents a unique challenge for the Delphi
methodology because multiple rounds of inquiry necessitates that the principal
investigator know the identities of the panel members. Without that knowledge it is not
possible to query the same participants each time. SurveyMonkeyTM accommodates deidentification rather neatly by partitioning research data separately from e-mail addresses
which allows consistent sampling. However, de-identification in general, whatever way
it is accomplished, limits the research options with Delphi. For example, tardy panel
participants cannot be individually reminded of the need to hasten responses. Also with
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de-identification, the demographic profiles become blurred after the first round of inquiry
because attrition will change the panel makeup. Therefore, demographic dependencies
cannot be measured. In addition, follow-ups for clarification of the open-ended questions
are not possible. As a result, my recommendation is to conduct Delphi-based research
with identities known by the investigator even though it requires the more rigorous path
through the IRB.

Peer Debriefing and Member Checking
Peer debriefing was conducted between rounds and provided valuable insights
into the conduct of the research. Between Rounds 1 and 2, the peer debrief led me to
reconfigure the initial list of practices from 28 to 30 by further sub-dividing two
practices. One of these practices ultimately was included in the final list of 18 consensus
practices.
Member checking was accomplished by feedback embedded in the round of
inquiry and solicitation of open-ended commentary in each and every round. Response to
the open-ended comment opportunities was extremely minimal. It is difficult to
determine if the lack of comment abundance was the result of pervasive agreement with
my analysis, apathy, or survey fatigue. Future users of Delphi should consider making
the member checking a higher priority.

Limitations of this Study
As previously discussed, de-identification of the data limits the ability for the
researcher to fine-tune the input. Intuitively, it appears to have had little material impact
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on the outcome of this research. However, it is worth minimizing the potential risk in
future research by maintaining confidential identities and obtaining permission from the
participants to do so.
The pool of candidates for recruitment of the participants was mainly focused in
the southeastern United States. A broader geographical sample would provide more
widely generalizable results.

Implications for Practitioners
I concluded this study with a set of 18 organizational practices that lead to a
positive safety culture. This set of practices was arrived at by consensus of a panel of
occupational safety experts. Knowledge of these organizational practices can provide the
tools for a firm’s leadership to manage its exposure to the risk of occupational accidents
and injuries without constant command and control. As workers become more singular
and remote (e.g., telecommuting, at-home workers, on-the-road workers, etc.), command
and control tactics used to influence behavior become less viable, making it necessary to
rely more upon instilled cultures.

Implications for Researchers
This study provides a demonstration of the Delphi methodology used to reduce
bias resulting from researchers’ a priori knowledge. Such bias is typically influential
when random sample surveys are used. Researchers may want to consider using Delphi
when faced with bias possibilities. In the case of the subject of this research, such biases
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may have contributed to the lack of a general consensus regarding the factor structure of
safety culture.
Potential Extensions of this Research
Replicating the results of this study using a different panel of participants would
increase the external validity and generalizability of the results. Replications should be
conducted without de-identification to measure variance resulting from the panel profile.
This study may be one of the earliest studies to use a Delphi methodology for
examining the safety culture. Delphi methodologies should be considered when
exploring organizational sub-cultures beyond safety, e.g., innovation, ethics, quality,
green, etc.
Hofstede (2001) demonstrated that significant cultural variances occur when
crossing international borders. Intuition suggests those same differences would apply to
the practices that produce a positive safety culture. Therefore, it would be valuable to
conduct this same research with participant panels from different countries or regions.
The results may be valuable for firms making forays offshore.
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Appendix A
Cooperative Agreement for Participant Recruitment

Authorization

Saturday, January 19, 2013 02:34 PM

Colleen Eubanks [colleen@palmettoehs.com]
To: Andrew Cwalina

Andy,

For the purpose of conducting the described safety culture research, you are
authorized to recruit survey respondents from the e-mail addressees provided
directly and from posting of the link on my firm’s website, blog page, and
Facebook page.
Colleen K. Eubanks, CIH, CSP
Palmetto EHS, LLC
803.462.4404 (Phone)
803.462.4408 (Fax)
803.260.3202 (Mobile)
www.PalmettoEHS.com
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Appendix B
Introduction and Recruitment Letter

Dear Participant,

Thank you for considering participation in this research study. This study is being
undertaken as partial fulfillment of the dissertation requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Business Administration through Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida.

The purpose of this research study is two-fold: first to determine the practices
used by organizations to establish or maintain a positive safety culture, and second, to
determine if there is a consensus regarding those practices that are essential to a positive
safety culture. Organizational “practices” are those things that may be done, or said, or
written, or communicated, or displayed, or affirmed, and which have a positive influence
on safety within the organization.

This study will be conducted using the Delphi method, a multiple-part survey
technique for determining consensus around a particular topic. You will receive at least 2
additional surveys after this one over the next two months. Your participation is
expected to require no more than 25 minutes total for all parts over the next 2 months.
Your responses to this survey will be de-identified by the survey software such that your
opinions will remain anonymous throughout the study. The anonymous nature of this
Delphi process allows all participants to have an equal voice without individual or group
pressure.

Your participation in this study is totally voluntary and anonymous. There is no
compensation for participating. A summary of the results will be provided to you upon
your request after project completion. You may find the results have some practical
value for your workplace.

111
If you are willing to participate in this study as a Delphi panel member, please
complete the remainder of this survey by clicking HERE. By entering this survey, your
consent to participate is implied and you will receive subsequent surveys as described
above. Again, this is totally voluntary and you may exit the study at any time. If you
have any questions regarding this survey, or the research study in general, please do not
hesitate to contact me, or my research committee chairperson.

My thanks in advance for your participation

Andy Cwalina
Principal Investigator, Nova Southeastern University
803-649-7064 or cwalina@nova.edu

Dr. Regina Greenwood, chairperson
800-672-7223
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Appendix C
Round 1 Inquiry
Please provide up to seven (7) practices that you either use, or you have observed being
used, to establish or maintain a positive safety culture.
PRACTICES are those things that are done, said, written, communicated, displayed, or
affirmed and which have a positive influence on the safety of the organization.
Name the practices with a single word or short phrase in the boxes on the left. Then, as
necessary, please provide a more detailed description of that practice, including
examples, in the corresponding boxes on the right.
Click the "done" button at the end when you have completed your contribution.

Practice
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Description, including examples of the practice
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Demographic Information
2. Which of the following best describes your current assignment? Check (√) all that
apply.
___ Safety Professional
___Auditor or Regulator
___Consultant
___Manager
___Other, specify__________________

3. If a Safety Professional, Auditor, Regulator, or Consultant, do you hold certification?
___Yes
___No

4. If a consultant, how many clients have you counseled?
___less than 3
___more than 3

5. If an auditor or regulator, how many audits, inspections, investigations or other
oversight activities have you conducted?
___less than 3
___more than 3

6. If a Manager, how many people report to you, directly and indirectly?
___ Less than 10
___ 11 to 100
___ More than 100

7. How long have you been in this assignment?
___ Less than 1 year
___ 1 to 5 years
___ More than 5 years

115
___ I would prefer not to answer

8. What is your age (last birthday)?
___ Less than 25 years old
___26 to 35 years old
___36 to 45 years old
___46 to 55 years old
___56 to 65 years old
___over 65 years old
___ I would prefer not to answer

9. What is your gender?
___ Male
___ Female
___ I would prefer not to answer

10. Please provide your e-mail address:
______________________________
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Appendix D
Data Analysis Example:
Raw Textual Data from the Open-ended Questions in Round 1 Inquiry Synthesized
to Form the First Cut of Organizational Practices for the Broad Category of
“Management”

The Round 1 inquiry requested the respondents to provide up to seven practices
that lead to a positive safety culture. The inquiry requested a short practice descriptor,
i.e. a single word or short phrase along with an attendant detailed description and
example. While the number of entries was limited to seven, there was no word-count
limit on the detailed description. Table D.1 shows the format of the collected data. The
leftmost column is the sequential number assigned by the SurveyMonkeyTM collector; the
second column is the short practice descriptor; and the rightmost column is the attendant
detailed description. Note that this is an example of just one of the broad categories.
There was a total of 13 broad categories (see Table 2) so the example illustrated in this
Appendix was repeated 12 more times.
Table D.1 is the output of a computer-assisted textual analysis for the broad theme
of “management.” After removal of duplicates and frivolous responses, 30 items
remained for the next phase of analysis. This second phase of analysis consisted of
disaggregating the text into stand-alone phrases, sorting the phrases into like subject bins,
and then re-aggregating the phrases into a composite sense-making definition. The
disaggregation is illustrated in Table D.1 by typographical distinctions: underscoring,
italicizing, bolding, and scripting. In the actual analysis, I produced large Table top
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chart-maps and used color-coding (not reproducible here) to perform the disaggregation
and re-composition
Table D.2 illustrates the re-composition of each distinctive typographical category
into a sense-making definition. The practice descriptor was selected based on a visual
majority of the times the phraseology was associated with the disaggregated parts. Table
D.2 was used as the basis for constructing the Round 2 Inquiry.

Table D.1
Raw Text Data: Thematic Analysis of the “Management” Broad Category
No.
2

Practice

Detailed description and examples

Senior management

The ranking manager must demonstrate his/her

commitment AND

commitment to worker safety & health through active

participation

participation in the EHS process. delegating this
responsibility will result in a failure of the system as what
is important to THE manager is important to everyone else.
If the ranking manager does not participate then neither
will middle managers and supervisors.

6

Consistent message

Staff members in the plant all have safety objectives

delivered about safety is

around accident frequencies and employee participation in

first priority.

safety. They have communicated to front line supervisors
they are serious about safety and hold the departments
accountable.
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No.
Practice
Management
support
8

Detailed description and examples
Management support is needed from the highest
level in the company and at the individual
locations. This must be spoken and reinforced with
examples that demonstrate their support frequently.

9

Management

Must be more than “we are going to comply with

commitment

OSHA” my management understands that preventing
accidents saves money; as a regulatory agency our
management believes we should hold ourselves to the
same standard as the regulated community; funds to
purchase the best equipment. I make may management
look good and they fully support me.
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No.
Practice
Management/Company
20
commitment

Detailed description and examples
The common theme I have seen across the various
organizations that have a positive safety culture is
management commitment to the safety and overall
well-being of their employees.

Everyone is looking

for the magic bullet to make companies safer, the
latest program, the latest mantra, the lasest
buzzword. Call safety a priority or a value, call
your program behavior based or people based,
without the commitment of the company and
management, the rest is just smoke & mirrors, and
the employees always know it. Once your
company is TRULY committed, you can use
whatever buzzword or program you choose, so long as
it fits the organizational and personal culture.
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No.
Practice
Management
Leadership
21

Detailed description and examples
Signed written safety management plan Publish the plan
Lead safety culture/participate in activities Show safety as
part of overall business success

31

Management

Management must be involved, to the extent possible, in

involvement

developing and reinforcing the local safety culture. the best
Behavior Based Safety Program was headed by the
Production Manager. This demonstrates that it is not just
another weird safety professional program.

32

Management Safety

Employers set up goals for managers for the safety

Goals

performance of their departments, regions, divisions, etc.
Measurement criteria are established (lost work days,
EMR, Workers compensation costs), and managers are
given responsibility to manage improvement in their areas
of responsibility.
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No.
Practice
Management
shows their
33
commitment

Detailed description and examples
When middle-level management shows a commitment to
safety by practicing it themselves and seeking the safety
office's input before taking on a project, it really shows in
the employee's behavior. E.g. when our supervisors
expect their folks to wear respirators and they do it
themselves, the employees wear their respirators even
when no one is watching.

When upper-level

management shows a commitment to safety by
adequately funding and staffing the safety office, and
supporting our initiatives publicly, it makes a huge
difference in whether the middle management and
employees pay attention to our advice. When we got an
increased budget, one-time funding to implement a
major program, and an additional employee, all the
sudden depts. that used to scoff at us started to take us
more seriously.

34

Manager communication

This is during a job when a manager communicates with a
worker to ensure the job is proceeding as expected.
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No.
Practice
Model
the
Way
35

Detailed description and examples
Leaders understand that their behavior is scrutinized by the
workforce, and ensure that they act safely and demonstrate
interest in safety improvements.

36

Include all employees in

Safety activities include meetings, incident investigations,

some safety activity led

audits, safety program development and execution, pre-

by management.

startup safety reviews, and job cycle checks, among others.
These can not be delegated to low level employees without
management leadership. Managers must be seen as
leading these activities.

37

management leadership

In regards to safety, management must lead, walk the walk
and talk the talk, safety must be a priority not lip service

38

Management

All managers wear safety glasses when required.

commitment to policy
through practice

39

Management

Upper site management and corporate management

commitment

support of the safety process and safety related
activities. This is generally demonstrated by budget
and time resources allocated for safety, and when
management has a visible but meaningful role in the
process.
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No.
Practice
Managers
giving time
40

Detailed description and examples

and effort to safety

55

Integrated Safety
Management System

A formal process that identifies management as the
"owner" of safety and as such presents a beliefs and
vision statement around safety as corporate values.
The top manager chairs a steering committee that
defines the roles and responsibilities .

95

Establish a statement

It is necessary that top management describe in

of policy on safety by

words the policy of the organization with regard to

top management and

safety and then demonstrate their own commitment

follow it.

to following it.

172 Management leadership

In regards to safety, management must lead, walk the walk
and talk the talk, safety must be a priority not lip service
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No.
Practice
175 Inclusion of safety in
Corporate values

Detailed description and examples
Corporate Values include: Serve our communities
Achieve Communicate openly and honestly
Respect diversity and care for each other Excel in
customer service and safety Do what is right

176 Senior management
involvement

When senior management are involved in audits,
inspections, and the like and routinely evaluate metrics
around safety, lead by example, etc., there seems to be
improved safety culture, as all employees see that it
is something valued by senior leadership.

194 Set expectations

If people don't understand what's expected with respect to
safety, then how can they participate?

195 Clearly define who is

to often the safety (ESH) department of a company

responsible for safety

is viewed as responsible for safety performance versus
the line organization. its easy for the lines of
responsibility to get blurred so senior management
must address this constantly
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No.

Practice

197 Safety/Health Policy
Statement

Detailed description and examples
Developed Safety/Health Policy Statement which
outlines roles/responsibilities of all levels of
organization.

198 R2A2

Roles, responsibilities, authorities and
accountabilities are clear, understood, implemented
and evaluated to ensure these are conducted at all
levels of the organization

200 Management
commitment

204 Line Managers are
responsible for safety,
not the safety
professionals

Leaders need to walk the walk and talk the talk.
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No.
Practice
Safety
Targets
209

Detailed description and examples
Developed safety targets which are now tracked,
measured, and reported in the same manner as production,
quality, cost, and delivery.

217 Leadership setting the
example

I've seen the safety culture of an organization go from
"world class" to below average in a short 90 day period
when the infusion of new leadership and direct repots felt
they did not have to follow the rules and procedures that
were part of the previous companies culture for achieving
safety excellence

219 Safety Steering
Committee

Monthly Vice President Safety Steering Committee
Meeting designed to review safety performance with core
stakeholders, in a much more working group environment.

Note. Textual descriptions are assigned to one of four groups (see Table D.2) as
designated by underscore, italicization, script font, or bold font. This Table only
represents the broad category of management. Twelve additional broad categories were
analyzed similarly.

Table D.2 contains the re-composition of the distinguished phrases in Table D.1.
The phrases were assembled into four like-content bins and a composite definition was
synthesized to capture the essential meaning of the phrases. The practice descriptor (left
hand column) was based on a majority association from the raw data. The typological
distinctions have been carried into this Table to illustrate the procedure used and flow of
information. Peer debriefing was conducted with the color-coded Table-top charts and
the content of Table D.2 was carried into Round 2 for evaluation by the Delphi panel.
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Similar results were produced for the remaining 12 broad categories and are summarized
in Table 2.

Table D.2
Re-composition of “Management” Thematic Category Analysis
Practice

Re-constructed Description

Management Involvement

Walk the talk. Managers at all levels are involved in

and Participation

all EHS activities such as safety meetings, safety
program & goals development, evaluating
performance metrics, audits, inspections, pre-startup
safety reviews, job cycle checks, incident
investigations, and wearing the appropriate personal
protective equipment just like front line workers.

Safety Leadership

Managers set safety goals and objectives for accident
frequencies and employee participation in safety
activities, including measurement criteria for
performance against those goals, and communicates
the goals and performance frequently to the entire
organization
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Practice
Management

Re-constructed Description
Management makes accident reduction an integral

Commitment

part of the business plan by allocating sufficient
budget and manpower resources to support
attainment of the safety goals and objectives.

Management Systems

A system of corporate governance exists that
defines and owns safety as a corporate value,
states a vision and belief about the value of
safety, and defines the roles and expectations of
all members for safety.

Note. Underscoring, Italicization, Bolding, and Scripting correspond to the thematic
analysis from Table D.1.
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APPENDIX E
ROUND 2 INQUIRY
Note For this Appendix
This Appendix provides an example of type and format of questions used in the
Round 2 inquiry. To conserve space, details are provided for only one of the 30 practices
that were actually contained in the Round 2 inquiry. Only the titles of the practices 2
through 30 are shown below; however, the question formats, including the 5-point scales,
for each subsequent practice were identical to practice 1. The descriptions and
frequencies for practices 2 through 30 were extracted from Table 2.

Introduction Letter for Round 2 Inquiry
Greetings Research Participant,
Thank you for completing the Round 1 survey for the research study to determine
the organizational practices that lead to a positive safety culture. As promised, there are
multiple parts to this research and the purpose of this e-mail is to launch the Round 2
survey. This survey is all multiple-choice and should require about 15 minutes of your
time.
You are one of 68 participants in the study. Nearly 300 practices were submitted,
and through combination and clustering, I have collapsed the number down to 30 that are
part of this survey. In this Round 2, I will be asking if you agree with the 30 practices,
and how important you think they are. The last question in this survey provides space for
optional comments if you should have any. Otherwise, all questions are multiple-choice.
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Begin the survey by clicking HERE. Feel free to contact me by reply to this e-mail.

Best regards,

Andy

Andy Cwalina, Principal Investigator
Nova Southeastern University
803-649-7064, cwalina@nova.edu
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The Survey

Practice: 1. Management Involvement and Participation

Section A. The following organizational practice "Management Involvement and
Participation" was referenced by 11 study participants.
Management Involvement and Participation: Walk the talk. Managers at all levels are
involved in all S&H activities such as safety meetings, safety program & goals
development, evaluating performance metrics, audits, inspections, pre-startup safety
reviews, job cycle checks, incident investigations, and wearing the appropriate personal
protective equipment just like front line workers.
Do you agree that this practice leads to a positive safety culture? Indicate your position
below
___ STRONGLY AGREE
___ AGREE
___ NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
___ DISAGREE
___ STRONGLY DISAGREE
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Strongly Disagree”
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Section B. Now please indicate how important the practice of "Management Involvement
and Participation" is to a positive safety culture.
___ VERY IMPORTANT
___ IMPORTANT
___NEITHER IMPORTANT NOR UNIMPORTANT
___UNIMPORTANT
___VERY UNIMPORTANT
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Very Unimportant”
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Practice: 2. Safety leadership
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Practice: 3. Management Systems
Practice: 4. Management Commitment
Practice: 5. Posters, Signs, Banners and E-mails
Practice: 6. Atmosphere of Openness
Practice: 7. Share Experiences
Practice: 8. Communications Accuracy
Practice: 9. Near Miss Reviews
Practice: 10. Hazard Assessments
Practice: 11. Audits
Practice: 12. Inspections and Walkthroughs
Practice: 13. Observations
Practice: 14. Putting Safety First
Practice: 15. Orientation Training
Practice: 16. Monthly Safety Meetings
Practice: 17. Conference Attendance
Practice: 18. Annual Training and Testing
Practice: 19. Job Specific Training
Practice: 20. Training Quality
Practice: 21. Employee Involvement
Practice: 22. Time Out
Practice: 23. Performance Evaluations Include Safety
Practice: 24. Disciplinary Actions
Practice: 25. Enforcement
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Practice: 26. Building Trust
Practice: 27. Policy and Procedures Available
Practice: 28. Periodic Review of Policies and Procedures
Practice: 29. Pay For Performance
Practice: 30. Celebrations

Section C: Missing Practices. If you feel that an important practice has not been included
on the above list, please add it below:
Single word or short phrase:________________________________________________
Detailed description including examples:
_________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Additional Comments (optional)
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
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Appendix F
Round 3 Inquiry
Greetings Research Participant,
Thank you for completing the surveys for Rounds 1 and/or 2 for the research
study to determine the organizational practices that lead to a positive safety culture. As
you know there are multiple parts to this research and the purpose of this e-mail is to
launch the third survey. This survey is similar to the previous, but much shorter and
should require only about 5 minutes of your time.
The first “introduction” page of the survey explains how this survey differs from
the previous ones. Please read it carefully.
Begin the survey by clicking HERE.
Feel free to contact me by reply to this e-mail
Best regards,
Andy
Andy Cwalina, Principal Investigator
Nova Southeastern University
803-649-7064, cwalina@nova.edu

Round 3 Introduction
Thanks for entering the survey.
This 3rd round of the survey looks very, very similar to the previous round with TWO
exceptions:
First, it’s shorter, and should take less time. In the previous survey there were 30
practices. You and the other participants found overwhelming support for only 18 of
those practices. Therefore, the remaining 12 have been eliminated from the study.
Second, you get to see the opinions of all the other participants, while you’re making
your selection this time. For each multiple choice question, the previous votes of all
participants are shown.
Thanks again, and click the Next button below to get started.
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1.

Management Involvement and Participation

Definition: Walk the talk. Managers at all levels are involved in all S&H activities such
as safety meetings, safety program & goals development, evaluating performance
metrics, audits, inspections, pre-startup safety reviews, job cycle checks, incident
investigations, and wearing the appropriate personal protective equipment just like front
line workers.
Do you agree that this practice leads to a positive safety culture? Indicate your position
below
___ STRONGLY AGREE (45 votes in previous round)
___ AGREE (7 votes in previous round)
___ NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round)
___ DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round)
___ STRONGLY DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round)
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Strongly Disagree”
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

Now please indicate how important the practice of "Management Involvement and
Participation" is to a positive safety culture.
___ VERY IMPORTANT (49 votes in previous round)
___ IMPORTANT (3 votes in previous round)
___NEITHER IMPORTANT NOR UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round)
___UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round)
___VERY UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round)
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Very Unimportant”
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

Practice: 2. Safety leadership
Practice: 3. Management Systems
Practice: 4. Management Commitment
Practice: 5. Atmosphere of Openness
Practice: 6. Share Experiences
Practice: 7. Near Miss Reviews
Practice: 8. Hazard Assessments
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Practice: 9. Audits
Practice: 10. Inspections and Walkthroughs
Practice: 11. Orientation Training
Practice: 12. Monthly Safety Meetings
Practice: 13. Job Specific Training
Practice: 14. Training Quality
Practice: 15. Employee Involvement
Practice: 16. Time Out
Practice: 17. Performance Evaluations Include Safety
Practice: 18. Building Trust

Additional Comments (optional)
_______________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix G
Round 4 Inquiry
Greetings Research Participant,
Thank you for completing the surveys for Rounds 1, 2, and 3 for the research
study to determine the organizational practices that lead to a positive safety culture. As
you know there are multiple parts to this research and the purpose of this e-mail is to
launch what will most likely be the last survey. This survey is identical in format to the
previous one; only the vote numbers have changed.
Begin the survey by clicking HERE.
Feel free to contact me by reply to this e-mail
Best regards,
Andy
Andy Cwalina, Principal Investigator
Nova Southeastern University
803-649-7064, cwalina@nova.edu

Round 4 Introduction
Thanks for entering the survey.
As in previous rounds, you get to see the opinions of all the other participants, while
you’re making your selection this time. For each multiple choice question, the previous
votes of all participants are shown.
Thanks again, and click the Next button below to get started.

2.

Management Involvement and Participation

Definition: Walk the talk. Managers at all levels are involved in all S&H activities such
as safety meetings, safety program & goals development, evaluating performance
metrics, audits, inspections, pre-startup safety reviews, job cycle checks, incident
investigations, and wearing the appropriate personal protective equipment just like front
line workers.
Do you agree that this practice leads to a positive safety culture? Indicate your position
below
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___ STRONGLY AGREE (54 votes in previous round)
___ AGREE (2 votes in previous round)
___ NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round)
___ DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round)
___ STRONGLY DISAGREE (0 votes in previous round)
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Strongly Disagree”
________________________________________________________________________
__
________________________________________________________________________
__

Now please indicate how important the practice of "Management Involvement and
Participation" is to a positive safety culture.
___ VERY IMPORTANT (54 votes in previous round)
___ IMPORTANT (2 votes in previous round)
___NEITHER IMPORTANT NOR UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round)
___UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round)
___VERY UNIMPORTANT (0 votes in previous round)
Please provide a short explanation if you have selected “Very Unimportant”
________________________________________________________________________
__
________________________________________________________________________
__

Practice: 2. Safety leadership
Practice: 3. Management Systems
Practice: 4. Management Commitment
Practice: 5. Atmosphere of Openness
Practice: 6. Share Experiences
Practice: 7. Near Miss Reviews
Practice: 8. Hazard Assessments
Practice: 9. Audits
Practice: 10. Inspections and Walkthroughs
Practice: 11. Orientation Training
Practice: 12. Monthly Safety Meetings
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Practice: 13. Job Specific Training
Practice: 14. Training Quality
Practice: 15. Employee Involvement
Practice: 16. Time Out
Practice: 17. Performance Evaluations Include Safety
Practice: 18. Building Trust

Additional Comments (optional)
_______________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

144

APPENDIX H

EXAMPLE OF WILCOXON RANK SUM TEST FOR DISPERSION EQUALITY OF
TWO SAMPLE POPULATIONS

145
Appendix H
Example of Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for Dispersion Equality
of Two Sample Populations

Description
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum (Dovich, 1988) test is a non-parametric test used to test
for variation in dispersion and location of the median between two populations. As the
differences in dispersion and means approaches zero, the two populations approach
consensus. In contrast to the typical “F” test for equivalence, normality of the population
distributions is irrelevant because the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is non-parametric.

The hypotheses for the test are:
H0: The two populations have equal dispersions
H1: The two populations have unequal dispersions

This illustrated example uses the actual data from the 3rd and 4th rounds of inquiry (see
Tables 3 and 4). The test is conducted by ranking the response means from both
populations from 1 to (n3+n4) where n3 is the number of response means in the Round 3
inquiry, and n4 is the number of response means in the Round 4 inquiry. The resultant
ranking is illustrated in Table H.1. Where two scores are tied for rank, the rank is split
between the two ties (example, 5th & 6th rank). W3 and W4 are the sum of rank for each
Round 3 and 4 respectively.
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Table H.1
Ranking of the Means for the Importance Ratings for All Practices in the Third and
Fourth Rounds of Inquiry.
Round
4

Mean
4.089

Combined
Rank
1

4

4.179

5.5

4

4.204

7

4

4.218

8

4

4

4

4.333

4.386

4.429

4

4.517

17

4

4.519

18

4

4.607

19.5

4

4.724

4.768

4.107

2

3

4.125

3

3

4.161

4

3

4.179

5.5

3

4.333

9.5

3

4.357

11

3

4.429

13.5

3

4.481

15

3

4.607

19.5

3

4.643

21

3

4.679

23

3

4.704

24

3

4.750

26

13.5

16

4

3

12

4.483

4.661

Mean

9.5

4

4

Round

Combined
Rank

22

25

27.5

147

Round

Mean

Combined
Rank

4

4.789

29.5

4

4.789

29.5

4

4

4.868

4.948

W4=Sum of Ranks =

Round
3

Mean
4.786

Combined
Rank
27.5

3

4.821

31

3

4.857

32

3

4.926

34

3

4.964

36

33

35

328.5

W3=Sum of Ranks =

337.5

The Z-score is calculated by:
Z

=

[W – (n1)(n1+n2+1)/2] / [(n1)(n2)(n1+n2+1)/12]½

=

[337.5 – (18)(18+18+1)/2] / [(18)(18)(18+18+1)/12]½

=

-0.142360

The test value for α = 0.05 using the standard normal probability density distribution (Z
values) is +/- 1.96. Since the calculated test value is in this range, the null hypothesis is
accepted. It is concluded that the two dispersions are equal and the 3rd and 4th rounds of
inquiry are in consensus. The reported p-value would be 0.8051.

148

REFERENCES

Allen, R. G., & Ritzel, D. O. (1996). Validity of the basic principle of safety management
or loss control. Professional Safety, 41(2), 24-28.
Arboleda, A., Morrow, P. C., Crum, M. R., & Shelley, M. C. (2003). Management
practices as antecedents of safety culture within the trucking industry:
Similarities and differences by hierarchical level. Journal of Safety Research,
34(2), 189-197. doi:10.1016/S0022-4375(02)00071-3
Ashkanasy, N. M., Wilderom, C. P. M., & Peterson, M. F. (2000). Handbook of
organizational culture, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Babbie, E. (2004). The practice of social research (10th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Back, M. & Woolfson, C. (1999). Safety culture: A concept too many. The Safety and
Health Practitioner, 17(1), 14-18.
Baker, J., Lovell, K., & Harris, N. (2006). How expert are experts? An exploration of the
concept of expert with Delphi panel techniques. Nurse Researcher, 14(1), 59-70.
Barling, J., Loughlin, C., & Kelloway, E. K. (2002). Development and test of a model
linking safety-specific transformational leadership and occupational safety.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(3), 488-496. doi:10.1037//0021-9010.87.3.488
BCSP (Board of Certified Safety Professionals). (2012). BCSP at a glance, May 25,
2012. Retrieved on July 25, 2012 from
http://www.bcsp.org/pdf/BCSP_AtAGlance.pdf

149
Bonnemaizon, A., Cova, B., & Louyot, M. (2007). Relationship marketing in 2015: A
Delphi approach. European Management Journal, 25(1), 50-59.
doi:10.10.16/j.emj.2006.12.002
Booth, R. T. (1996). The promotion and measurement of a positive safety culture. In N.
A. Stanton (Ed.), Human factors in nuclear safety (pp. 313-332). London: Taylor
& Francis.
Bottani, E., Monica, L., & Vignali, G. (2009). Safety management systems:
Performance differences between adopters and non-adopters. Safety Science, 47,
155-162. doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2008.05.001
Boynton, L. A. (2006). What we value: A Delphi study to identify key values that guide
ethical decision-making in public relations. Public Relations Review, 32(4), 325330. doi: 10/1016/j.pubrev.2006.09.001
Brightman, H., & Schneider, H. (1994). Statistics for business problem solving (2nd ed.).
Cincinnati, OH: South-Western.
Brooks, K. W. (1979). Delphi technique: Expanding applications. North Central
Association Quarterly, 53(3), 377-385.
Brown, K., Prussia, G., & Willis, P. (2003). Mental models of safety: Do managers and
employees see eye to eye? Journal of Safety Research, 34(2), 143-156.
doi:10.1016/S0022-4375(03)00011-2
Brown, R. L., & Holmes, H. (1986). The use of a factor-analytic procedure for assessing
the validity of an employee safety climate model. Accident Analysis and
Prevention, 18(6), 455-470.

150
Cadieux, J., Roy, M., & Desmarais, L. (2006). A preliminary validation of a new measure
of occupational health and safety. Journal of Safety Research, 37(4), 413-419.
doi: 10.1016/j.jsr.2006.04.008
Carder, B., & Ragan, P. W. (2003). A survey-based system for safety measurement and
improvement. Journal of Safety Research, 34(2), 157-165. doi: 10.1016/S00224375(03)00007-0
Cheyne, A., Cox, S., Oliver, A., & Tomas, J. M. (1998). Modeling safety climate in the
prediction of safety activity. Work & Stress, 12(3), 255-271.
doi:10.1080/02678379808256865
Choudry, R. M., Fang, D., & Mohamed, S. (2007). The nature of safety culture: A survey
of the state-of-the-art. Safety Science, 45(10), 993-1012. doi:
10.1016/j.ssci.2006.09.003
Clarke, S. (1999). Perceptions of organizational safety: Implication for the development
of a safety culture. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20(2), 185-199.
Clarke, S. (2000). Safety culture: Underspecified and overrated? International Journal
of Management Reviews, 2(1), 65-90. doi:10.1111/1468-2370.00031
Clarke, S. (2006). The relationship between safety climate and safety performance: A
meta-analytic review. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 11(4), 315327. doi: 10.1037/1076-8998.11.4.315
Cohen, A. (1977). Factors in successful occupational safety programs. Journal of Safety
Research, 9(4), 168-178.
Cooper, M. D. (2000). Towards a model of safety culture. Safety Science, 36(2), 111-136.
doi:10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00035-7

151
Couper, M. R. (1984). The Delphi technique: Characteristics
haracteristics and sequence model.
Advances in Nursing Science
Science, 7(1), 72-77.
Cox, S., & Flin, R. (1998). Safety culture: Philosopher’s stone or man of straw. Work &
Stress, 12(3), 189--201. doi:10.1080/02678379808256861
Creswell, J. W. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five
traditions.. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Creswell, J. W. (2003). Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method
approaches (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Crisp, J., Pelletier, D., Duffield, C., Adams, A., & Nagy, S. (1997). The Delphi method?
Nursing Research, 46
46(2), 116-118.
Croom, S. R. (2000). The impact of web
web-based
based procurement on management of
operating resource supply. The Journal of Supply Chain Management, 36(1),
36
413.
Dajani, J. S., Sincoff, M. Z., & Talley, W. K. (1979). Stability and agreement criteria for
termination
ion of Delphi studies. Technological Forecasting and Social Change,
13(1), 83-90.
Deal, T. E., & Kennedy, A. A. (1982). Corporate cultures: The rites and rituals of
corporate life.. Reading, MA: Addison
Addison-Wesley.
Dedobbeleer, N., & Beland, F. (1991). A safe
safety
ty climate measure for construction sites.
Journal of Safety Research, 22
22(2), 97-103. doi:10.1016/0022-4375(91)90017
4375(91)90017-P
DeJoy, D. M. (2005). Behavior change versus culture change: Divergent approaches to
managing workplace safety. Safety Science, 43(2), 105-129.
129. doi:
10.1016/j.ssci.2005.02.001

152
Delbecq, A. L., Van de Ven, A. H., & Gustafson, D. H. (1975). Group techniques for
program planning: a guide to nominal group and Delphi processes. Glenview,
IL: Scott, Foresman.
Della-Giustina, D. E., & Della-Giustina, J. L. (1992). Trends from the 1960s: Union
demands for safe and healthful workplaces. Professional Safety, 37(4), 29-32.
de Villiers, M. R., de Villiers, P. J. T., & Kent, A. P. (2005). The Delphi technique in
health sciences education research. Medical Teacher, 27(7), 639-643. doi:
10.1080/13611260500069947
Diaz, R. I., & Cabrera, D. D. (1997). Safety climate and attitude as evaluation measures
of organizational safety. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 29(5), 643-650.
Dovich. R. A. (1988). Nonparametrics: An alternative to the F test – Wilcoxon rank sum
test. Quality, 27(1), 52-53.
Dressel, J. L., Consoli, A. J., Kim, B. S. K., & Atkinson, D. R. (2007). Successful and
unsuccessful multicultural supervisory behaviors: A Delphi poll. Journal of
Multicultural Counseling and Development, 35(1), 51-64.
Duffield, C. (1993). The Delphi technique: A comparison of results obtained using two
expert panels. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 30(3), 227-237.
du Plessis, E., & Human, S. P. (2007). The art of the Delphi technique: Highlighting its
scientific merit. Health SA Gesondheid, 12(4), 13-24.
DuPont: The autobiography of an American enterprise (1952). New York: Scribner’s.
Eastman, C. (1911). The three essentials for accident prevention. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 38(1), 98-107.

153
Fang, D., Chen, Y., & Wong, L. (2006). Safety climate in construction industry: A case
study in Hong Kong. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,
132(6), 573-584.
584. doi: 10.1061/(ASCE)0733
10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(2006)132:6(573)
9364(2006)132:6(573)
Farrington-Darby,
Darby, T., Pickup, L.
L., & Wilson, J. R. (2005).
05). Safety culture in railway
maintenance. Safety Science, 43
43, 39-60.
Fernandez-Muniz,
Muniz, B., Montes
Montes-Peon, J. M., & Vazquez-Ordas,
Ordas, C. J. (2007). Safety
culture: Analysis of the causal relationships between its key dimensions. Journal
of Safety Research, 38
38(6), 627-641.
641. doi: 10.1016/j.jsr.2007.09.001
Gillen, M., Baltz, D., Gassel, M., Kirsch, L., & Vaccaro, D. (2002). Perceived safety
climate, job demands, and coworker support among union and nonunion injured
construction workers. Journal of Safety Research, 33(1), 33-51. doi:
10.1016/S0022-4375(02)00002
4375(02)00002-6
Glendon, A. I., & Stanton, N. A. (2000). Perspectives on safety culture. Safety Science,
34, 193-214. doi:10.1016/S0925
doi:10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00013-8
Goodman, C. M. (1987). The De
Delphi technique: A critique. Journal of Advanced
Nursing, 12, 729--734.
Guldenmund, F. W. (2000). The nature of safety culture: A review of theory and
research. Safety Science, 34
34(1), 215-257. doi:10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00014
7535(00)00014-X
Hale, A. R., & Hovden, J. (1998). Management and culture: The third age of safety. A
review of approaches to organizational aspects of safety, health and environment.
In A. M. Feyer & A. Williamson (Eds.), Occupational injury:
njury: Risk, prevention,
and intervention ((pp. 129-165). New York: CRC.

154
Hartnett, D. L., & Murphy, J. L. (1985). Statistical Analysis for Business and Economics
(3rd ed.). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Hasson, F., Keeney, S., & McKenna, H. (2000). Research guidelines for the Delphi
survey technique. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32, 1008-1015.
Hayes, B. E., Perander, J., Smecko, T., & Trask, J. (1998). Measuring perceptions of
workplace safety: Development and validation of the work safety scale. Journal
of Safety Research, 29(3), 145-161. doi:10.1016/S0022-4375(98)00011-5
Heinrich, H. W. (1941). Industrial accident prevention (2nd ed.). New York: McGrawHill.
Hodson, S. J., & Spigener, J. B. (1997). Are unions in danger of losing their leadership
position in safety? Professional Safety, 42(12), 37-39.
Hofmann, D. A., & Stetzer, A. (1998). The role of safety climate and communication in
accident interpretation: Implications for learning from negative events. Academy
of Management Journal, 41(6), 644-657.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions,
and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
HSC (Health and Safety Commission) (1993). Organizing for safety. ACSN Study
Group on Human Factors Third Report. London: HMSO
HSE (Health and Safety Executive). (1997). Successful health and safety management.
London: HSE books. Retrieved from
www.hsebooks.com/books/product/bookmark. asp?pub=0717612767.

155
ILO (International Labor Organization). (2011). International Labor Organization,
LABORSTA Internet: 8a (yearly). Retrieved from
http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest
Iñaki, H. S., Landin, G. A., & Fa, M. C. (2006). A Delphi study on motivation for ISO
9000 and EFQM. International Journal of Quality and Reliability Management,
23(7), 807-827. doi: 10.1108/02656710610679824
Jairath, N., & Weinstein, J. (1994). The Delphi methodology (part one): A useful
administrative approach. Canadian Journal of Nursing Leadership, 7(3), 29-42.
Johnson, A. (2010). A significant and disturbing trend: Deadly incident puts spotlight on
refinery safety. Safety & Health, 182(1), 38-42.
Jung-Erceg, P., Pandza, K., Armbruster, H., & Dreher, C. (2007). Absorptive capacity in
European manufacturing: A Delphi study. Industrial Management and Data
Systems, 107(1), 37-51. doi:10.1108/02635570710719043
Katcher, M. L., Meister, A. N., Sorkness, C. A., Staresinic, A. G., Pierce, S. E.,
Goodman, B. M., Peterson, N. M., Hatfield, P. M., & Schirmer, J. A. (2006). Use
of the modified Delphi technique to identify and rate home injury hazard risks and
prevention methods for young children. Injury Prevention, 12(3), 189-194. doi:
10.1136/ip.2005.010504
Keeney, S., Hasson, F., & McKenna, H. P. (2001). A critical review of the Delphi
technique as a research methodology for nursing. International Journal of
Nursing Studies, 38(2), 195-200.

156
Keeney, S., Hasson, F., & McKenna, H. P. (2006). Consulting the oracle: Ten lessons
from using the Delphi technique in nursing research. Journal of Advanced
Nursing, 53(2), 205-212.
Kotter, J. P., & Heskett, J. L. (1992). Corporate culture and performance, New York:
Free Press.
LeCompte, M. D., & Preissle, J. (1993) Ethnography and qualitative design in
educational research (2nd ed.). San Diego, CA: Academic Press
Lee, T. (1998). Assessment of safety culture at a nuclear reprocessing plant. Work &
Stress, 12(3), 217-237. doi: 10.1080/02678379808256863
Lee, T., & Harrison, K. (2000). Assessing safety culture in nuclear power stations.
Safety Science, 34(1), 61-97. doi:10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00007-2
Leedy, P. D., & Ormrod, J. E. (2005). Practical research: Planning and design (8th ed.).
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Legendre, P. (2005). Species associations: The Kendall coefficient of concordance
revisited. Journal of Agricultural, Biological, and Environmental Statistics, 10(2),
226-245.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Linstone, H. A., & Turoff, M. (2002). The Dephi method: Techniques and applications.
Retrieved from the New Jersey Institute of Technology, Information Systems
Department website: http://www.is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook.
MacCarthy, B. L., & Atthirawong, W. (2003). Factors affecting location decisions in
international operations – A Delphi study. International Journal of Operations &
Production Management, 23(7/8), 794-818. doi:10.1108/01443570310481568

157
McDonald, N., & Ryan, F. (1992). Constraints on the development of a safety culture: A
preliminary analysis. The Irish Journal of Psychology, 13(2), 273-281.
McFadden, K. L., Henagen, S. C., & Gowen, C. R. (2009). The patient safety chain:
Transformational leadership effects on patient safety culture, initiatives and
outcomes. Journal of Operations Management, 27(5), 390-404.
McKenna, H. P. (1994). The Delphi technique: A worthwhile research approach for
nursing? Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19(6), 1221-1225.
Mead, D., & Moseley, L. (2001). The use of Delphi as a research approach. Nurse
Researcher, 8(4), 4-23.
Mearns K., Flin, R., Gordon, R., & Fleming, M. (1998). Measuring safety climate on
offshore installations. Work & Stress, 12(3), 238-254.
doi:10.1080/02678379808256864
Meehan, T. E. (1995). Just what do you do in safety? Professional Safety, 40(8), 34-36.
Meyerson, D., & Martin, J. (1987). Cultural change: An integration of three different
views. Journal of Management Studies, 24(6), 623-647
Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative date analysis, Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Milkovich, G. T., Annoni, A. J., & Mahoney, T. A. (1972). The use of Delphi procedures
in manpower forecasting. Management Science, 19(4), 381-388.
Mohamed, S. (2003). Scorecard approach to benchmarking organizational safety culture
in construction. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 129(1),
80-88.

158
Moran, E. T., & Volkwein, J. F. (1992). The cultural approach to the formation of
organizational climate. Human Relations, 45(1), 19-47.
Murry, J. W., & Hammons, J. O. (1995). Delphi: A versatile methodology for conducting
qualitative research. The Review of Higher Education, 18(4), 423-436.
Neter, J., Kutner, M. H., Nachtsheim, C. J., & Wasserman, W. (1996). Applied linear
statistical models (4th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
NSC (National Safety Council). (2011). Injury facts. Itasca, IL: National Safety Council.
O’Reilly, C. A., & Chatman, J. A. (1996). Culture as social control: Corporations, cults
and commitments. Research in Organizational Behavior, 18, 157-200.
OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration). (2003). Occupational Health
and Safety Strategic Plan 2003-2008. Retrieved October 30, 2008 from
http://www.osha.gov/StratPlanPublic/strategicmanagementplan-final.html.
Pasukeviciute, I., & Roe, M. (2001). The politics of oil in Lithuania: Strategies after
transition. Energy Policy, 29(5), 383-397.
Peters, G. A. (1986). Safety law in historical perspective. Professional Safety, 31(10),
46-50.
Polkinghorne, D. E. (1989). Phenomenological research methods. In R. S. Valle & S.
Halling (Eds.), Existential-phenomenological perspectives in psychology (pp. 4160). New York: Plenum.
Powell, C. (2003). The Delphi technique: Myths and realities. Journal of Advanced
Nursing, 41(4), (376-382).
Ray, P. K., & Sahu, S. (1990). Productivity management in India: A Delphi study.
International Journal of Production and Operations Management, 10(5), 25-51.

159
Reason, J. (1998). Achieving a safe culture: Theory and practice. Work & Stress, 12(3),
12
293-306. doi:10.1080/02678379808256868
10.1080/02678379808256868
Rechenthin D. (2004). Project safety as a sustainable competitive advantage. Journal of
Safety Research, 35
35(3), 297. doi:10.1016/j.jsr.2004.03.012
Reid, N. (1988). The Delphi technique: Its contribution to the evaluation of professional
practice. In R. Ellis (Ed.), Professional competence and quality assurance
a
in the
caring professions
rofessions (pp. 230-261). London: Croom Helm.
Rousseau, D. (1990). Quantita
Quantitative
tive assessment of organizational culture: The case for
multiple measures. In B. Schneider (Ed.), Organizational climate and culture (pp.
153-192).
192). San Francisco: Jossey
Jossey-Bass.
Rowe, G., & Wright, G. (1999). The Delphi technique as a forecasting tool: issues
iss
and
analysis. International Journal of Forecasting, 15
15(4), 353-375.
doi:10.1016/S0169
doi:10.1016/S0169-2070(99)00018-7.
Rowe, G., & Wright, G. (2001). Expert opinions in forecasting. In S. Armstrong (Ed.),
Principles of forecasting:
orecasting: A handbook for researchers and practitioners
ractitioners (pp. 125144). Boston, MA: Klewer
Rowe, G., Wright, G., & Bolger, F. (1991). Delphi: A reevaluation of research and
theory. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 39
39(3), 235-251.
235
Safety. (2007). In Britannica Student Encyclopedia
Encyclopedia. Retrieved
ieved from Encyclopedia
Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/eb/article
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-207621.
207621.
Saizarbitoria, I. H. (2006). How quality management models influence company results:
Conclusions of an empirical study based on the Delphi method. Total Quality
Management, 17(6)
(6), 775-794.
794. doi: 10.1080/09593960600597768.

160
Saizarbitoria, I. H., Landin, G. A., & Fa, M. C. (2006). The impact of quality
management in European companies’ performance. European Business Review,
18(2), 114-131. doi:10.1108/09555340610651839.
Scheibe, M., Skutsch, M., & Schofer, J. (2002). Experiments in Delphi methodology. In
H. Linstone & M. Turoff (Eds.), The Delphi method: techniques and applications
(pp. 383-395). Retrieved from the New Jersey Institute of Technology,
Information Systems Department website:
http://www.is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook.
Schein, E. H. (1990). Organizational culture. American Psychologist, 45(2), 109-119.
doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.45.2.109
Schein, E. H. (2009). The corporate culture survival guide. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schein, E. H. (2010). Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schmidt, R. C. (1997). Managing Delphi surveys using nonparametric statistical
techniques. Decision Sciences, 28(3), 763-774.
Schmidt, R., Lyytinen, K., Keil, M., & Cule, P. (2001). Identifying software risks: An
international Delphi study. Journal of Management Information Systems, (17)4,
5-36.
Silva, S., Lima, M. L., & Baptista, C. (2004). OSCI: An organizational and safety
climate inventory. Safety Science, 42, 205-220. doi:10.1016/S09257535(03)00043-2
Silverman, D. (2005). Doing qualitative research (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
Smith, G. S., Chen, P. Y., Ho, M., & Huang, Y. (2006). The relationship between safety
climate and injury rates across industries: the need to adjust for injury hazards.

161
Accident Analysis and Prevention, 38(3), 556-562. doi:
10.1016/j.aap.2005.11.013
Wahlstrom, B. (2001). Assessing the influence of organizational factors on nuclear
safety. In B. Wilpert & N. Itoigawa (Eds.), Safety culture in nuclear power
operations (pp. 177-188). London: Taylor & Francis.
Weinstein, J. & Jairath, N. (1994). The Delphi methodology (part one): A useful
Administrative approach. Canadian Journal of Nursing Leadership, 7(3), 29-42.
Williams, P. L., & Webb, C. (1994). The Delphi technique: A methodological discussion.
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19(1), 180-186.
Wren, D. A. (2005). The history of management thought (5th ed.). New York: Wiley.
Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied
implications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65(1), 96-102. doi: 10.1037/00219010.65.1.96
Zohar, D. (2000). A group-level model of safety climate: Testing the effect of group
climate on microaccidents in manufacturing jobs. Journal of Applied Psychology,
85(4), 587-596. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.85.4.587
Zohar, D. (2002a). The effects of leadership dimensions, safety climate, and assigned
priorities on minor injuries in work groups. Journal of Organizational Behavior,
23(1), 75-90.
Zohar, D. (2002b). Modifying supervisory practices to improve subunit safety: A
leadership-based intervention model. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(1), 156163. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.87.1.156

162
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ackerman, P. L., Morris, M. G., &Venkatesh, V. (2000). A longitudinal filed
investigation of gender differences in individual technology adoption decisionmaking processes. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
83(1), 33-60.
Allen, R. G., & Ritzel, D. O. (1996). Validity of the basic principle of safety management
or loss control. Professional Safety, 41(2), 24-28.
Alvero, A. M., Rost, K., & Austin, J. (2008). The safety observer effect: the effects of
conducting safety observations. Journal of Safety Research, 39, 365-373.
Anonymous (1993). Who scores best on the environment. Fortune, 128(2), 114-121.
Anonymous. (1987). Promoting work place safety. Small Business Report. 12(12), 3033.
Antonsen, S. (2009). Safety culture and the issue of power. Safety Science, 47, 183-191.
Apgar, M. (1998). The alternative workplace: changing where and how people work.
Harvard Business Review, 76(3), 121-136.
Arboleda, A., Morrow, P. C., Crum, M. R., & Shelley, M. C. (2003). Management
practices as antecedents of safety culture within the trucking industry:
Similarities and differences by hierarchical level. Journal of Safety Research,
34(2), 189-197. doi:10.1016/S0022-4375(02)00071-3
Arndt, J. (1983). The political economy paradigm: Foundation for theory building in
marketing. Journal of Marketing, 47(4), 44-54.

163
Ashkanasy, N. M., Wilderom, C. P. M., & Peterson, M. F. (2000). Handbook of
organizational culture, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Aspinwall, E., & Jacinto, C. (2004). A survey on occupational accidents’ reporting and
registration systems in the European Union. Safety Science, 42-10, 933.
Athavaley, A. (2007, October 29). What price green? Wall Street Journal, p.R6.
Austin, J., Kessler, M. L., Riccobono, J. E., & Bailey, J. S. (1996). Using feedback and
reinforcement to improve the performance and safety of a roofing crew. Journal
of Organizational Behavior Management, 16(2), 49-75.
Azar, N., Cohen, A., & Zohar, D. (1980). Promoting increased use of ear protectors in
noise through information feedback. Human Factors, 22(1), 69-79.
Azjen, I. (1985). From intentions to action: A theory of planned behavior. In J. Kuhl & J.
Beckman (Eds.), Action control: From cognition to behavior (pp. 11-39). New
York: Springer Verlag.
Azjen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 50, 179-211.
Babbie, E. (2004). The practice of social research (10th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Back, M. & Woolfson, C. (1999). Safety culture: A concept too many. The Safety and
Health Practitioner, 17(1), 14-18.
Bailey, D. E., & Kurland, N. B. (1999). Telework: The advantages and challenges of
working here, there, anywhere and anytime. Organizational Dynamics, 28(2), 5368.
Baker, J., Lovell, K., & Harris, N. (2006). How expert are experts? An exploration of the
concept of expert with Delphi panel techniques. Nurse Researcher, 14(1), 59-70.

164
Barley, S. R. (1986). Technology as an occasion for structuring: Evidence from
observations of CT scanners and the social order of radiology departments.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 31(1), 78-108.
Barley, S. R. (1990). Images of imaging: Notes on doing longitudinal field work.
Organization Science, 1 (3), 220-247.
Barley, S. R., & Tolbert, P. S. (1997). Institutionalization and structuration: studying the
links between action and institution. Organization Studies, 18(1), 93-117.
Barling, J., Loughlin, C., & Kelloway, E. K. (2002). Development and test of a model
linking safety-specific transformational leadership and occupational safety.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(3), 488-496. doi:10.1037//0021-9010.87.3.488
Barwick, K. D., Komaki, J., & Scott, L. R. (1978). A behavioral approach to
occupational safety: pinpointing and reinforcing safe performance in a food
manufacturing plant. Journal of Applied Psychology, 63, 434-445.
BCSP (Board of Certified Safety Professionals). (2012). BCSP at a glance, May 25,
2012. Retrieved on July 25, 2012 from
http://www.bcsp.org/pdf/BCSP_AtAGlance.pdf
Beekmann, S. E., Doebbeling, B. N., Ferguson, K. J., McCoy, K. D., Torner, J. C.,
Vaughn, T. E., & Woolson, R. F. (2001). Monitoring adherence to standard
precautions. American Journal of Infections Control, 29, 24-31.
Behm, M. (2005). Linking construction fatalities to the design for construction safety
concept. Safety Science, 43, 589-611.
Beland, F., & Dedobbeleer, N. (1991). A safety climate measure for construction sites.
Journal of Safety Research, 22, 97-103.

165
Bello, D. (2008). The state of safety: How does the data measure up? Safety and Health,
177(1), 32-37.
Berens, G., van Riel, C. B. M., & van Bruggen, G. H. (2005). Corporate Associations and
consumer product responses: the moderating role of corporate brand dominance.
Journal of Marketing, 69, 35-48.
Bhattacharya, C. B., & Luo, X. (2006). Corporate social responsibility, customer
satisfaction, and market value. Journal of Marketing, 70, 1-18.
Biancotti, D., Cairns, D., Feyer, A., & Williamson, A. M. (1997). The development of a
measure of safety climate: the role of safety perceptions and attitudes. Safety
Science, 25(1), 15-27.
Bird, F. (1974). Management Guide to Loss Control. Atlanta, GA: Institute Press.
Bishop, P. A., Ray, P. S., & Wang, M. Q. (1997). Efficacy of the components of a
behavioral safety program. International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 19,
19-29.
Blair, E., Seo, D., Ellis, N., & Torabi, M., (2004). A cross-validation of safety climate
scale using confirmatory factor analytic approach. Journal of Safety Research,
35, 427-445.
Boettcher, W., Dickinson, A. M., & Grindle, A. C. (2000). Behavioral safety research in
manufacturing settings: A review of the literature. Journal of Organizational
Behavior Management, 20(1), 29-68.
Bond, J. (2008). The blame culture: An obstacle to improving safety. Journal of
Chemical Health and Safety, 15(2), 6-9.

166
Bonnemaizon, A., Cova, B., & Louyot, M. (2007). Relationship marketing in 2015: A
Delphi approach. European Management Journal, 25(1), 50-59.
doi:10.10.16/j.emj.2006.12.002
Booth, R. T. (1996). The promotion and measurement of a positive safety culture. In N.
A. Stanton (Ed.), Human factors in nuclear safety (pp. 313-332). London: Taylor
and Francis.
Bottani, E., Monica, L., & Vignali, G. (2009). Safety management systems:
Performance differences between adopters and non-adopters. Safety Science, 47,
155-162. doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2008.05.001
Bowen, D., Purswell, J. L., & Ray, P. S. (1993). Behavioral safety program: Creating a
new corporate culture. International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 12(1),
193-198.
Boynton, L. A. (2006). What we value: A Delphi study to identify key values that guide
ethical decision-making in public relations. Public Relations Review, 32(4), 325330. doi: 10/1016/j.pubrev.2006.09.001
Brightman, H., & Schneider, H. (1994). Statistics for business problem solving (2nd ed.).
Cincinnati, OH: South-Western.
Brooks, K. W. (1979). Delphi technique: Expanding applications. North Central
Association Quarterly, 53(3), 377-385.
Brooks, L. (1997). Structuration theory and new technology: Analysing organizationally
situated computer-aided design. Information Systems Journal, 7, 133-151.

167
Brown, K., Prussia, G., & Willis, P. (2003). Mental models of safety: Do managers and
employees see eye to eye? Journal of Safety Research, 34(2), 143-156.
doi:10.1016/S0022-4375(03)00011-2
Brown, R. L., & Holmes, H. (1986). The use of a factor-analytic procedure for assessing
the validity of an employee safety climate model. Accident Analysis and
Prevention, 18(6), 455-470.
Brown, T. J., & Dacin, P. A. (1997). The company and the product: Corporate
associations and consumer product responses. Journal of Marketing, 61(1), 6884.
Burns, T. & Stalker, G. M. (1961). The Management of Innovation. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Cabrera, D. D., & Diaz, R. I. (1997). Safety climate and attitude as evaluation measures
of organizational safety. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 29, 643-650.
Cabrera, D. D., & Isla, R. (1998). The role of safety climate in a safety management
system. In A. Hale & M. Baram (Eds.), Safety Management: The Challenge of
Change (pp. 93-106). Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science, Ltd.
Cadieux, J., Roy, M., & Desmarais, L. (2006). A preliminary validation of a new measure
of occupational health and safety. Journal of Safety Research, 37(4), 413-419.
doi: 10.1016/j.jsr.2006.04.008
Carder, B., & Ragan, P. W. (2003). A survey-based system for safety measurement and
improvement. Journal of Safety Research, 34(2), 157-165. doi: 10.1016/S00224375(03)00007-0

168
Caroll, J. S. (1998). Safety culture as an ongoing process: Culture surveys as
opportunities for inquiry and change. Work and Stress, 12, 272-284.
doi:10.1080/02678379808256866
Cartensen, O., Nielsen, K. J., & Rasmussen, K. (2006). The prevention of occupational
injuries in two industrial plants using an incident reporting scheme. Journal of
Safety Research, 37, 479-486.
Cascio, W. (2000). Managing a virtual workplace. The Academy of Management
Executive, 14(3), 81-90.
Chen, P. Y., Ho, M., Huang, Y., & Smith, G. S. (2006). The relationship between safety
climate and injury rates across industries: the need to adjust for injury hazards.
Accident Analysis and Prevention, 38(3), 556-562.
Chen, P. Y., Huang, Y., Krauss, A. D., & Rogers, D. A. (2004). Quality of execution of
corporate safety policies and employee safety outcomes: Assessing the
moderating role of supervisor safety support and the mediating role of employee
safety control. Journal of Business and Psychology, 18, 483-506.
Cheyne, A. J. T., & Cox, S. J. (2000). Assessing safety culture in off-shore environments.
Safety Science, 34, 111-129.
Cheyne, A. J. T., Cox, S., Oliver, A., & Tomas, J. M. (1998). Modeling safety climate in
the prediction of safety activity. Work & Stress, 12(3), 255-271.
doi:10.1080/02678379808256865
Chhokar, J. S., Reber, R. A., & Wallin, J. A. (1990). Improving safety performance with
goal setting and feedback. Human Performance, 3, 51-61.

169
Cho, H., & Pucik, V. (2002). Relationship between innovativeness, quality, growth,
profitability, and market value. Strategic Management Journal, 26, 555-575.
Choudry, R. M., Fang, D., & Mohamed, S. (2007). The nature of safety culture: A survey
of the state-of-the-art. Safety Science, 45(10), 993-1012. doi:
10.1016/j.ssci.2006.09.003
Clarke S. (1998). Safety culture on the UK railway network. Work & Stress, 12(3), 285292.
Clarke, S. (1999). Perceptions of organizational safety: Implication for the development
of a safety culture. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20(2), 185-199.
Clarke, S. (2000). Safety culture: Underspecified and overrated? International Journal
of Management Reviews, 2(1), 65-90. doi:10.1111/1468-2370.00031
Clarke, S. (2006). The relationship between safety climate and safety performance: A
meta-analytic review. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 11(4), 315327. doi: 10.1037/1076-8998.11.4.315
Clarke, S. W., & Geller, E. S. (1999). Safety self-management; a key behavior-based
process for injury prevention. Professional Safety, 44(7), 29-33.
Clay, J. M., Mills, J. E., Werner, W. & Wong-Ellison, C. (2001). Employer liability for
telecommuting employees. Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration
Quarterly, 42(4), 48-59.
Cohen, A. (1977). Factors in successful occupational safety programs. Journal of Safety
Research, 9(4), 168-178.
Cohen, L. (2007). Translating research into practice. Journal of Safety Research, 38,
135.

170
Colaizzi, P. F. (1978). Psychological research as the phenomenologist views it. In R.
Vaile & M. King (Eds.), Existential phenomenological alternatives for
psychology (pp.48-71). New York: Oxford University Press.
Conchie, S. M. & Donald, I. J. (2008). The functions and development of safety specific
trust and distrust. Safety Science, 46, 92-103.
Cooper, M. D. (2000). Towards a model of safety culture. Safety Science, 36(2), 111-136.
doi:10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00035-7
Cooper, M. D., & Phillips, R. A. (2004). Exploratory analysis of the safety climate and
safety behavior relationship. Journal of Safety Research, 35, 497-512.
Cooper, M. D., Makin, P. J., Phillips, R. A., & Sutherland, V. J. (1994). Reducing
accidents using goal setting and feedback: a field study. Journal of Occupational
and Organizational Psychology, 67, 219-240.
Cooper, R. C. (1996). Telecommuting: The good, the bad and the particulars.
SuperVision, 57(2), 10-19.
Couper, M. R. (1984). The Delphi technique: Characteristics and sequence model.
Advances in Nursing Science, 7(1), 72-77.
Covin, J. G., & Slevin, D. P. (1986). The development and testing of an organizationallevel entrepreneurship scale. In R. Ronstadt, et al. (Eds.), Frontiers of
entrepreneurship research 1986. Wellesley, MA: Center for Entrepreneurial
Studies at Babson College.
Cox, S., & Cox, T. (1991). The structure of employee attitudes to safety: A European
example. Work & Stress, 5(2), 93-106.

171
Cox, S., & Flin, R. (1998). Safety culture: Philosopher’s stone or man of straw. Work &
Stress, 12(3), 189-201. doi:10.1080/02678379808256861
Cox, S. Jones, B. & Rycraft, H. (2004). Behavioral approaches to safety management
within UK reactor plants. Safety Science, 42, 825.
Creswell, J. W. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five
traditions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Creswell, J. W. (2003). Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method
approaches (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Crisp, J., Pelletier, D., Duffield, C., Adams, A., & Nagy, S. (1997). The Delphi method?
Nursing Research, 46(2), 116-118.
Croom, S. R. (2000). The impact of web-based procurement on management of
operating resource supply. The Journal of Supply Chain Management, 36(1), 413.
Cwalina, A. (2006). National cultural factors associated with occupational safety. In S.
Fullerton & D. Moore (Eds.), Global Business Trends: Contemporary Readings
(pp. 140-147). Ypsilanti, MI: Academy of Business Administration.
Dajani, J. S., Sincoff, M. Z., & Talley, W. K. (1979). Stability and agreement criteria for
termination of Delphi studies. Technological Forecasting and Social Change,
13(1), 83-90.
Dalkey, N. (2002). A Delphi study of factors affecting the quality of life. In H. Linstone
& M. Turoff (Eds.), The Delphi method: Techniques and applications (pp. 383395). Retrieved from the New Jersey Institute of Technology, Information
Systems Department website: http://www.is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook.

172
Dalkey, N., & Helmer, O. (1963). An experimental application of the Delphi method to
the use of experts. Management Science, 9, 458-467.
Daniels, A. C. (1994). Bringing out the best in people
people.. New York: McGraw-Hill.
McGraw
de Villiers, M. R., de Villiers, P. J. T., & Kent, A. P. ((2005).
2005). The Delphi technique in
health sciences education research. Medical Teacher, 27(7), 639--643. doi:
10.1080/13611260500069947
Deal, T. E., & Kennedy, A. A. (1982). Corporate cultures: The rites and rituals of
corporate life.. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Deale, A. J. (2004). An evaluation of a safety culture assessment model
model.. Unpublished
master’s thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, RSA.
Dedobbeleer, N., & Beland, F. (1991). A safety climate measure for construction sites.
sites
Journal of Safety Research, 22
22(2), 97-103. doi:10.1016/0022-4375(91)90017
4375(91)90017-P
DeJoy, D. M. (1994). Managing safety in the workplace: An attribution theory analysis
and model. Journal of Safety Research, 25
25(2), 3-17.
DeJoy, D. M. (2005). Behavior change versus culture change: Divergent approaches to
managing workplace safety. Safety Science, 43, 105-129. doi:
10.1016/j.ssci.2005.02.001
DeJoy, D. M., Gershon, R. M., & Schaffer, B. S. (2004). Safety climate: assessing
management and organizational influences on safety. Professional Safety, 49(7),
49
50-57.
Delbecq, A. L., Van de Ven, A. H., & Gustafson, D. H. (1975). Group techniques for
program
gram planning: a guide to nominal group and Delphi processes. Glenview,
IL: Scott, Foresman
Foresman.

173
Della-Giustina, D. E., & Della-Giustina, J. L. (1992). Trends from the 1960s: Union
demands for safe and healthful workplaces. Professional Safety, 37(4), 29-32.
Denison, D. R. (1996). What is the difference between organizational culture and
organizational climate? A native’s point of view on a decade of paradigm wars.
Academy of Management Review, 21, 619-654.
DePasquale, J. P., & Geller, E. S. (1999). Critical success factors for behavior-based
safety: A study of twenty industry-wide applications. Journal of Safety Research,
30, 237-249.
DeSanctis, G., & Poole, M. S. (1994). Capturing the complexity in advanced technology
use: Adaptive structuration theory. Organization Science, 5(2), 121-147.
Diaz, R. I., & Cabrera, D. D. (1997). Safety climate and attitude as evaluation measures
of organizational safety. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 29(5), 643-650.
Dobrian, J. (1999). Long distance workers suit long distance companies. HR Focus,
76(12), 11-13.
Dong-Chul Seo. (2005). An explicative model of unsafe work behavior. Safety Science,
43-3, 187.
Dovich. R. A. (1988). Nonparametrics: An alternative to the F test – Wilcoxon rank sum
test. Quality, 27(1), 52-53.
Dressel, J. L., Consoli, A. J., Kim, B. S. K., & Atkinson, D. R. (2007). Successful and
unsuccessful multicultural supervisory behaviors: A Delphi poll. Journal of
Multicultural Counseling and Development, 35(1), 51-64.
Drumwright, M. E. (1994). Socially responsible organizational buying: Environmental
concern as a non-economic buying criterion. Journal of Marketing, 58(3), 1-19.

174
du Plessis, E., & Human, S. P. (2007). The art of the Delphi technique: Highlighting its
scientific merit. Health SA Gesondheid, 12(4), 13-24.
Duenas, G., & Schmidt, D. E. (2002). Incentives to encourage worker-friendly
organizations. Public Personnel Management, 31(3). 293-304.
Duffield, C. (1993). The Delphi technique: A comparison of results obtained using two
expert panels. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 30(3), 227-237.
DuPont: The autobiography of an American enterprise (1952). New York: Scribner’s.
Eastman, C. (1911). The three essentials for accident prevention. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 38(1), 98-107.
Erffmeyer, R. C., Erffmeyer, E. S., & Lane, I. M. (1986). The Delphi technique: an
empirical evaluation of the optimal number of rounds. Group and Organizational
Studies, 11(1-2), 120-128.
Erickson, J. A. (1997). The relationship between corporate culture and safety
performance. Professional Safety, 42(5), 29-33.
Esty, D. C. (1994). The challenge of going green. Harvard Business Review, 72(4), 3750.
Evans, A. (1993). Working at home: A new career dimension. International Journal of
Career Management, 5(), 16-23.
Fairweather, N. B. (1999). Surveillance in employment: the case of teleworking. Journal
of Business Ethics, 22(1), 39-49.
Fang, D., Chen, Y., & Wong, L. (2006). Safety climate in construction industry: A case
study in Hong Kong. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,
132(6), 573-584. doi: 10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(2006)132:6(573)

175
Farrington-Darby, T., Pickup, L.. & Wilson, J. R. (2005). Safety culture in railway
maintenance. Safety Science, 43, 39-60.
Fernandez-Muniz, B., Montes-Peon, J. M., & Vazquez-Ordas, C. J. (2007). Safety
culture: Analysis of the causal relationships between its key dimensions. Journal
of Safety Research, 38(6), 627-641. doi: 10.1016/j.jsr.2007.09.001
Fitch, H. G., Hayea, R. S., & Pine, R. C. (1982). Reducing accident rates with
organizational behavior modification. Academy of Management Journal, 25(2),
407-416.
Fitch, H. G., Hermann, J., & Hopkins, B. L. (1976). Safe and unsafe behavior and its
modification. Journal of Occupational Medicine, 18(9), 618-622.
Flin, R., & O’Dea, A. (2001). Site managers and safety leadership in offshore oil and gas
industry. Safety Science, 37, 39-57.
Flin, R., Burns, C., Yule, S., & Robertson, E. M. (2006). Measuring safety climate in
health care. Quality Safety Health Care, 15, 109-115.
Follows, S. B., & Jobber, D. (2000). Environmentally responsible purchase behavior: a
test of a consumer model. European Journal of Marketing, 34(5/6), 723-738.
Fombrun, C. J., & Shanley, M. (1990). What’s in a name? Reputation building and
corporate strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 33(2), 233-258.
Fry, L. W. (1976). The maligned F. W. Taylor: a reply to his critics. Academy of
Management Review, 1, 124-129.
Fusfeld, A. R., & Foster, R. N. (1971). The Delphi technique: survey and comment.
Business Horizons, 14(6), 63-74.

176
Fussfeld, N., & Zohar, D. (1981). Modifying earplug wearing behavior by behavior
modification techniques: an empirical evaluation. Journal of Organizational
Behavior Management, 3, 41-51.
Gainey, T.W., Hill, J. A., & Kelley, D. E. (1999). Telecommuting’s impact on corporate
culture and individual workers: examining the effect of employee isolation. S. A.
M. Advanced Management Journal, 64(4), 4-10.
Gambatese, J. A., Behm, M., & Rajendran, S. (2008). Design’s role in construction
accident causality and prevention: perspectives from an expert panel. Safety
Science, 46, 675-691.
Gardner, M. (2006, December 4). ‘Extreme’ jobs on the rise: workers who choose 80hour workweeks and no vacations put life balance at risk, experts warn. Christian
Science Monitor, p.14.
Geller, E. S. (1994). Ten principles for achieving a total safety culture. Professional
Safety, 39(9), 18-24.
Geller, E. S. (1995). Safety coaching. Professional Safety, 40(7), 16-22.
Geller, E. S. (2000). Behavioral safety analysis: a necessary precursor to corrective
action. Professional Safety, 45(3), 29-32.
Geller, E. S. (2001). The psychology of safety handbook, Boca Raton, FL: Lewis.
Geller, E. S. (2006). From good to great in safety. Professional Safety, 51(6), 35-40.
Geller, E. S., Roberts, D. S., & Gilmore, M. R. (1996). Predicting propensity to actively
care for occupational safety. Journal of Safety Research, 27, 1-8.
Gibson, V. (2003). Flexible working needs flexible space? Towards an alternative
workplace strategy. Journal of Property Investment & Finance, 21(1), 12-22.

177
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
Gifford, D. (1997). The value of going green. Harvard Business Review, 75(5),
75
11-12.
Gillen, M., Baltz, D., Gassel, M., Kirsch, L., & Vaccaro, D. (2002). Perceived safety
climate, job demands, and coworker support among union and nonunion injured
construction workers. Journal of Safety Research, 33(1), 33-51. doi:
10.1016/S0022-4375(02)00002
4375(02)00002-6
Glendon, A. I., & Litherland, D. K. (2001). Safety climate factors, group differences and
safety behavior in road construction. Safety Science, 39, 157-188.
188.
Glendon, A. I., & Stanton, N. A. (2000). Perspectives on safety culture. Safety Science,
34, 193-214. doi:10.1016/S0925
doi:10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00013-8
Goodman,
odman, C. M. (1987). The Delphi technique: A critique. Journal of Advanced
Nursing, 12, 729--734.
Green, A., & Price, I. (2000). Whither FM? A Delphi study of the profession and the
industry. Facilities, 18
18(7-8), 281-292.
Greenwood, R. G., & Wren, D. A. (1998). Management innovators:
nnovators: The people and
ideas that have shaped
haped modern business. New York: Oxford University Press.
Griffin, M. A. & Neal, A. (2003). Safety climate and safety at work. In J. Barling & M.
R. Frone (Eds.) The psychology of workplace safety, (pp. 15-34),
34), Washington DC:
American Psychological Association.
Griffin, M. A., & Neal, A. (2002). Safety climate and safety behavior. Australian
Journal of Management, 27
27(1), 67-75.

178
Grote, G., & Kunzler, C. (2000). Diagnosis of safety cculture
ulture in safety management audits.
Safety Science, 34
34, 131-150.
Grove, S. J., Fisk, R. P., Pickett, G. M., & Kangun, N. (1996). Going green in the service
sector: Social responsibility issues, implications, and implementation. European
Journal of Marketing,
eting, 30
30(5), 56-66.
Guimaraes, T., & Igbaria, M., (1999). Exploring differences in employee turnover
intentions and its determinants among telecommuters and non
non-telecommuters.
telecommuters.
Journal of Management Information Systems, 16
16(1), 147-164.
Guldenmund, F. W. (2000). The nature of safety culture: A review of theory and
research. Safety Science, 34
34(1), 215-257. doi:10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00014
7535(00)00014-X
Gyekye, S. A. & Salminen, S. (2009). Educational climate and organizational safety
climate: does educational attainment influence workers perceptions of workplace
safety? Safety Science, 47
47(1), 20-28.
Hale, A. (2000). Editorial:
ditorial: Culture’s confusions. Safety Science, 34, 1-14.
14.
Hale, A. R., and Hovden, J. (1998). Management and culture: The
he third age of safety. A
review of approaches to organizational aspects of safety, health, and environment.
In A. M. Feyer & A. Willi
Williamson (Eds.), Occupational Injury; Risk,
Risk Prevention,
and Intervention (pp. 129
129-165). New York: CRC.
Hall, A., & Johnson, S. (2005). The prediction of safe lifting behavior: An application of
the theory of planned behavior. Journal of Safety Research. 36-1,
1, 63.
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a
reflection of its top manager. The Academy of Management Review, 9(2),
9
193206.

179
Hasson, F., Keeney, S., & McKenna, H. (2000). Research guidelines for the Delphi
survey technique. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32(4), 1008-1015.
Hayes, B. E., Perander, J., Smecko, T., & Trask, J. (1998). Measuring perceptions of
workplace safety: Development and validation of the work safety scale. Journal
of Safety Research, 29(3), 145-161. doi:10.1016/S0022-4375(98)00011-5
Health and Safety Executive (1997). Successful health and safety management.
Successful Health and Safety Management. London: HSE books. Retrieved on
September 30, 2008 from www.hsebooks.com/books/product/bookmark.
asp?pub=0717612767.
Healy, M. L. (2000). Telecommuting. Occupational health considerations for employee
health and safety. Journal of the American Association of Occupational Health
Nurses, 48(6), 305-313.
Heinrich, H. W. (1931). Industrial accident prevention. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Heinrich, H. W. (1941). Industrial accident prevention (2nd ed.). New York: McGrawHill..
Heinrich, H. W., Petersen, D., & Roos, N. (1980). Industrial Accident Prevention: A
Safety Management Approach. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hilton, T. F., Thompson, R. C., & Witt, L. A. (1998). Where the safety rubber meets the
shop floor: A confirmatory model of management influence on workplace safety.
Journal of Safety Research, 29, 15-24.
Hodson, S. J., & Spigener, J. B. (1997). Are unions in danger of losing their leadership
position in safety? Professional Safety, 42(12), 37-39.

180
Hofmann, D. A., & Morgeson, F. P. (1999). Safety-related behavior as a social exchange:
The role of perceived organizational support and leader-member exchange.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 286-296.
Hofmann, D. A., & Stetzer, A. (1998). The role of safety climate and communication in
accident interpretation: implications for learning from negative events. Academy
of Management Journal, 41(6), 644-657.
Hofmann, D. A., Jacobs, R., & Landy, F. (1995). High reliability process industries:
Individual, micro, and macro organizational influences on safety performance.
Journal of Safety Research, 26, 131-149.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related
values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Hofstede, G. (1998). Attitudes, values and organizational culture: disentangling the
concepts. Organizational Studies, 19(3), 447-460.
Hofstede, G (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions,
and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hopkins A. (2006). Studying organizational cultures and their effects on safety. Safety
Science, 44, 875-889.
HSC (Health and Safety Commission). 1993). Organizing for safety. ACSN Study
Group on Human Factors Third Report. London: HMSO
HSE (Health and Safety Executive). (1997). Successful health and safety management.
Successful Health and Safety Management. London: HSE books. Retrieved on
September 30, 2008 from www.hsebooks.com/books/product/bookmark.
asp?pub=0717612767.

181
HSE (Health and Safety Executive). (2000). Statistics of workplace fatalities and injuries
in Great Britain: International comparisons 2000. Health & Safety Executive,
United Kingdom.
Huang, Y., Leamon, T. B., Courtney, T. K., DeArmond, S., Chen, P. Y., & Blair, M. F.
(2009). Financial decision makers’ views on safety. Professional Safety, 54(4),
36-42.
Hussain, S. S. (1999). The ethics of going green: The corporate social responsibility
debate. Business Strategy and the Environment, 8, 203-210.
Hutt, M. D., Mokwa, M. P., & Shapiro, S. J. (1986). The politics of marketing:
Analyzing the parallel political marketplace. Journal of Marketing, 50(1), 40-51.
Ifinedo, P. (2006). Key information systems management issues in Estonia for the 2000s
and a comparative analysis. Journal of Global Information Technology
Management, 9(2), 22-44.
ILO. (2011). International Labor Organization, LABORSTA Internet: 8a (yearly).
Retrieved from http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest
Iñaki, H. S., Landin, G. A., & Fa, M. C. (2006). A Delphi study on motivation for ISO
9000 and EFQM. International Journal of Quality and Reliability Management,
23(7), 807-827. doi: 10.1108/02656710610679824
Jairath, N., & Weinstein, J. (1994). The Delphi methodology (part one): A useful
administrative approach. Canadian Journal of Nursing Leadership, 7(3), 29-42.
Jaworski, B. J., & Kohli, A. K. (1993). Market orientation: Antecedents and
consequences. Journal of Marketing, 57(3), 53-70

182
Jeacle, I. (2004). Emporium of glamour and sanctum of scientific management: the early
twentieth century department store. Management Decision, 42, 1162-1177.
Jennings, P. D., & Zandbergen, P. A. (1985). Ecologically sustainable organization: An
institutional approach. Academy of Management Review, 20(4), 1015-1052.
Jiang, B. (2008). How to do research: advice from stellar scholars in the POM field.
Unpublished manuscript, Kellstadt Graduate School of Business, DePaul
University.
Johnson, A. (2010). A significant and disturbing trend: Deadly incident puts spotlight on
refinery safety. Safety & Health, 182(1), 38-42.
Johnson, S. (1988). Management accountability for safety performance. Professional
Safety, 33(6), 23-27.
Johnson, S. E. (2007). The predictive validity of safety climate. Journal of Safety
Research, 38, 511-521.
Jolson, M. A., & Rossow, G. L. (1971). The Delphi process in marketing decision
making. Journal of Marketing Research, 8(4), 443-448.
Jung-Erceg, P., Pandza, K., Armbruster, H., & Dreher, C. (2007). Absorptive capacity in
European manufacturing: A Delphi study. Industrial Management and Data
Systems, 107(1), 37-51. doi:10.1108/02635570710719043
Karna, J., Hansen, E., & Juslin, H. (2003). Social responsibility in environmental
marketing planning. European Journal of Marketing, 37(5/6), 848-871.
Katcher, M. L., Meister, A. N., Sorkness, C. A., Staresinic, A. G., Pierce, S. E.,
Goodman, B. M., Peterson, N. M., Hatfield, P. M., & Schirmer, J. A. (2006). Use
of the modified Delphi technique to identify and rate home injury hazard risks and

183
prevention methods for young children. Injury Prevention, 12(3), 189-194. doi:
10.1136/ip.2005.010504
Katz-Navon, T., Eitan Naveh, E., & Stern, Z. (2005). Safety climate in health care
organizations: a multidimensional approach. Academy of Management Journal,
48(6), 1075-1089.
Kaynak, E., & Cavlek, N. (2006) Measurement of tourism market potential of Croatia by
use of Delphi qualitative research technique. Journal of East-West Business,
12(4), 105-123.
Keeney, S., Hasson, F., & McKenna, H. P. (2001). A critical review of the Delphi
technique as a research methodology for nursing. International Journal of
Nursing Studies, 38(2), 195-200.
Keeney, S., Hasson, F., & McKenna, H. P. (2006). Consulting the oracle: Ten lessons
from using the Delphi technique in nursing research. Journal of Advanced
Nursing, 53(2), 205-212.
Kennedy, R., & Kirwan, B. (1998). Development of a hazard and operability-based
method for identifying safety management vulnerabilities in high risk systems.
Safety Science, 30, 249-274.
Kirkpatrick, D. (1990). Environmentalism: the new crusade. Fortune, 121(4), 44-52.
Kleiner, A. (1991). What does it mean to be green? Harvard Business Review, 69(4), 3847.
Komaki, J., Barwick, K. D., & Scott, L. R. (1978). A behavioral approach to occupational
safety: pinpointing and reinforcing safe performance in a food manufacturing
plant. Journal of Applied Psychology, 63, 434-445.

184
Komaki, J., Heinzmann, A. T., & Lawson, L. (1980). Effect of training and feedback:
component analysis of a behavioral safety program. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 65, 261-270.
Kotter, J. P., & Heskett, J. L. (1992). Corporate culture and performance, New York:
Free Press.
Kraus, T., Seymour, K., & Sloat, K. (1999). Long term evaluation of a behavioural-based
method for improving safety performance: a meta-analysis of 73 interrupted timeseries replications. Safety Science, 32(1), 1-18.
Laitinen, H., & Ruohomaki, I. (1996). The effects of feedback and goal setting on safety
performance at two construction sites. Safety Science, 24, 61-73.
LeCompte, M. D., & Preissle, J. (1993) Ethnography and qualitative design in
educational research (2nd ed.). San Diego, CA: Academic Press
LeCoze, J. (2008). Disasters and organizations: From lessons learnt to theorizing. Safety
Science, 46, 132-149.
Lee, T. (1998). Assessment of safety culture at a nuclear reprocessing plant. Work &
Stress, 12(3), 217-237. doi: 10.1080/02678379808256863
Lee, T., & Harrison, K. (2000). Assessing safety culture in nuclear power stations.
Safety Science, 34(1), 61-97. doi:10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00007-2
Leedy, P. D., & Ormrod, J. E. (2005). Practical research: Planning and design (8th ed.).
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Legendre, P. (2005). Species associations: The Kendall coefficient of concordance
revisited. Journal of Agricultural, Biological, and Environmental Statistics, 10(2),
226-245.

185
Levi, W. C. (1985). Identifying the factors affecting underrepresented minority
admissions to medical schools utilizing the Delphi technique. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, FL.
Li, T. & Calantone, R. J. (1998). The impact of market knowledge competence on new
product advantage: Conceptualization and empirical evaluation. Journal of
Marketing, 62(4), 13-29.
Lin, C., & Wu, C. (2005). Managing knowledge contributed by ISO 9001:2000. The
International Journal of Quality and Reliability Management, 22, 968-985.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Lingard, H., & Rowlinson, S. (1997). Behavior-based safety management in Hong
Kong’s construction industry. Journal of Safety Research, 28, 234-256.
Linstone, H. A., & Turoff, M. (2002). The Dephi method: Techniques and applications.
Retrieved from the New Jersey Institute of Technology, Information Systems
Department website: http://www.is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook.
Loafman, B. (1996). Rescue from the safety plateau. Performance Management
Magazine, 14(3), 3-10.
Locke, E. A. (1982). The ideas of Frederick W. Taylor: An evaluation. Academy of
Management Review, 7, 14-24.
Lockwood, C. (2006). Building the green way. Harvard Business Review, 84(3), 129137.
Luo, X., & Bhattacharya, C. B. (2006). Corporate social responsibility, customer
satisfaction, and market value. Journal of Marketing, 70, 1-16.

186
Luria, G. & Rafaeli, A. (2008). Testing safety commitment in organizations through
interpretations of safety artifacts. Journal of Safety Research, 39, 519-528.
MacCarthy, B. L., & Atthirawong, W. (2003). Factors affecting location decisions in
international operations: A Delphi study. International Journal of Operations &
Production Management, 23(7/8), 794-818. doi:10.1108/01443570310481568
MacKenzie, C., & Holstrom, D. (2009). Investigating beyond the human machinery: A
closer look at accident causation in high hazard industries. Process Safety
Progress, 28(1), 84-89.
Marchand, A., & Simard, M. (1995). A multi-level analysis of organizational factors
related to the taking of safety initiatives by work groups. Safety Science, 21, 113129.
Marsden, J., Dolan, B., & Holt, L. (2003). Nurse practitioner practice and deployment:
Electronic mail Delphi study. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 43, 595-605.
Mattila, M., & Varonen, U. (2000). The safety climate and its relationship to safety
practices, safety of the work environment and occupational accidents in eight
wood processing companies. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 32(6), 761-769.
McAfee, R. B., & Winn, A. R. (1989). The use of incentives/feedback to enhance work
place safety: a critique of the literature. Journal of Safety Research, 20, 7-19.
McCormick, H. (1996). A near-miss mission. Contract Journal, 433(6575), 51.
McCune, J. (1998). Telecommuting revisited. Management Review, 87(2), 10-16.
McDonald, N., Corrigan, S., Daly, C., & Cromie, S. (2000). Safety management systems
and safety culture in aircraft maintenance organisations. Safety Science, 34(1-3),
151-176.

187
McDonald, N., & Ryan, F. (1992). Constraints on the development of a safety culture: A
preliminary analysis. The Irish Journal of Psychology, 13(2), 273-281.
McFadden, K. L., Henagen, S. C., & Gowen, C. R. (2009). The patient safety chain:
Transformational leadership effects on patient safety culture, initiatives and
outcomes. Journal of Operations Management, 27(5), 390-404.
McKenna, H. P. (1994). The Delphi technique: A worthwhile research approach for
nursing? Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19(6), 1221-1225.
Mead, D., & Moseley, L. (2001). The use of Delphi as a research approach. Nurse
Researcher, 8(4), 4-23.
Mearns K., Flin, R., Gordon, R., & Fleming, M. (1998). Measuring safety climate on
offshore installations. Work & Stress, 12(3), 238-254.
doi:10.1080/02678379808256864
Mearns, K., Whitaker, S. M., & Flin, R. (2001). Benchmarking safety climate in
hazardous environments: A longitudinal, interorganizational approach. Risk
Analysis, 21, 771-786.
Meehan, T. E. (1995). Just what do you do in safety? Professional Safety, 40(8), 34-36.
Menon, A., Bharadwaj, S. G., Adidam, P. T., & Edison, S. W. (1999). Antecedents and
consequences of market strategy making: A model and test. Journal of
Marketing, 63(2), 18-40.
Menon, A. & Menon, A. (1997). Enviropreneurial marketing strategy: The emergence of
corporate environmentalism as market strategy. Journal of Marketing, 51(1), 5167.

188
Menon, A., Menon, A., Chowdhury, J., & Jankovich, J. (1999). Evolving paradigm for
environmental sensitivity in marketing programs: A synthesis of theory and
practice. Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 7(2), 1-21.
Meyerson, D., & Martin, J. (1987). Cultural change: An integration of three different
views. Journal of Management Studies, 24(6), 623-647
Michael, J., Evans, D., Jansen, K. & Haight, J. (2005). Management commitment to
safety as organizational support: Relationships with non-safety outcomes in wood
manufacturing employees. Journal of Safety Research. 36-2, 171.
Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative date analysis, Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Milkovich, G. T., Annoni, A. J., & Mahoney, T. A. (1972). The use of Delphi procedures
in manpower forecasting. Management Science, 19(4), 381-388.
Mohamed, S. (2002). Safety climate in construction site environments. Journal of
Construction Engineering and Management, 128, 375-384.
Mohamed, S. (2003). Scorecard approach to benchmarking organizational safety culture
in construction. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 129(1),
80-88.
Moran, E. T., & Volkwein, J. F. (1992). The cultural approach to the formation of
organizational climate. Human Relations, 45(1), 19-47.
Moyer, D., Perry, T., & Smith, S. M. (2006). Creating a safer workforce: training needs
for Hispanic and foreign-born workers. Professional Safety, 51(12), 20-25.
Narver, J. C., & Slater, S. F. (1990). The effect of market orientation on business
profitability. Journal of Marketing, 54(4), 20-35.

189
Neal A., & Griffin, M. A. (2003). Safety climate and safety at work. In J. Barling & M.
R. Frone (Eds.), The psychology of workplace safety (pp. 15-34). Washington DC:
American Psychological Association.
Neal, A. & Griffin, M. A. (2006). A study of the lagged relationships among safety
climate, safety motivation, safety behavior, and accidents at the individual and
group levels. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 946-953.
Neal, A., & Griffin, M. A. (2002). Safety climate and safety behavior. Australian
Journal of Management, 27(1), 67-75.
Neal, A., Griffin, M. A., & Hart, P. M. (2000). The impact of organizational climate on
safety climate and individual behavior. Safety Science, 34, 99-109.
Neitzel, R. L., Seixas, N. S., Harris, M. J., & Camp, J. (2008). Exposure to fall hazards
and safety climate in the aircraft maintenance industry. Journal of Safety
Research, 39, 391-402.
Neter, J., Kutner, M. H., Nachtsheim, C. J., & Wasserman, W. (1996). Applied linear
statistical models (4th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Niskanen, T. (1994). Safety climate in road administration. Safety Science, 17, 237-255.
NSC (National Safety Council). (2004). Injury Facts (2004 ed.). Itasca, IL: National
Safety Council.
NSC (National Safety Council). (2007). Injury facts (2007 ed.). Itasca, IL: National
Safety Council.
O’Reilly, C. A., & Chatman, J. A. (1996). Culture as social control: Corporations, cults
and commitments. Research in organizational behavior, 18, 157-200.

190
O’Toole, M. O. (2002). The relationship between employees’ perceptions of safety and
organizational culture. Journal of Safety Research, 33, 231-243.
Ogden, J. A., Petersen, K. J., Carter, J. R., & Monczka, R. M. (2005). Supply
management strategies for the future: A Delphi study. Journal of Supply Chain
Management, 41(3). 29-43.
Olive, C., O’Connor, T. M., & Mannan, M. S. (2006). Relationship of safety culture and
process safety. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 130, 133-140.
Ono, R., & Wedemeyer, D. J. (1994). Assessing the validity of the Delphi technique.
Futures, 26(3), 289-304.
Orlikowski, W. J. (1992). The duality of technology: rethinking the concept of
technology in organizations. Organization Science, 3(3), 398-427.
OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration). (2003). Occupational Health
and Safety Strategic Plan 2003-2008. Retrieved October 30, 2008 from
http://www.osha.gov/StratPlanPublic/strategicmanagementplan-final.html.
Ostroff, C., Kinicki, A. J., & Tamkins, M. M. (2003). Organizational culture and climate.
In W. C. Borman, & I. Klimosky (Eds.), Handbook of Psychology (pp. 565-593).
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Pasukeviciute, I., & Roe, M. (2001). The politics of oil in Lithuania: Strategies after
transition. Energy Policy, 29(5), 383-397.
Peters, G. A. (1986). Safety law in historical perspective. Professional Safety, 31(10),
46-50.
Petersen, D. (1988). Safety Management: A Human Approach. Goshen, NY: Aloray.

191
Pettigrew, A. M. (1990). Organizational climate and culture: Two constructs in search of
a role. In B. Schneider (Ed.). Organizational Climate and Culture (pp. 413-433).
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Pidgeon, N. F. (1991). Safety culture and risk management in organizations. Journal of
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 22(1), 129-140.
Pidgeon, N., (1998). Safety Culture: Key theoretical issues. Work & Stress, 12(3), 202216.
Pietersen, C. (2002). Research as a learning experience. A phenomenological explication.
The Qualitative Report, 7. Retrieved February 1, 2007, from
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/ QR/QR7-2/pietersen.hmtl.
Polkinghorne, D. E. (1989). Phenomenological research methods. In R. S. Valle & S.
Halling (Eds.), Existential-phenomenological perspectives in psychology (pp. 4160). New York: Plenum.
Porter, M. E. (1979). How competitive forces shape strategy. Harvard Business Review,
57(2), 120-134.
Porter, M. E., & van der Linde, C. (1995). Green and competitive. Harvard Business
Review, 73(5), 120-134.
Powell, C. (2003). The Delphi technique: Myths and realities. Journal of Advanced
Nursing, 41(4), (376-382).
Pulliam, D. (2006, July 5). House steps up telework requirements at several agencies.
GOVEXEC.COM Daily Briefing. Retrieved on November 8, 2006 from
http:www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1105/111005p.2.htm.

192
Ray, P. K., & Sahu, S. (1990). Productivity management in India: A Delphi study.
International Journal of Production and Operations Management, 10(5),
10
25-51.
Reason, J. (1998). Achieving a safe culture: Theory and practice. Work & Stress, 12(3),
293-306. doi:10.1080/02678379808256868
10.1080/02678379808256868
Reber, R. A., & Wallin, J. A. (1984). The effects of training, goal setting, and knowledge
of results on safe behavior: A component analysis. Academy of Management
Journal, 27, 544-560.
560.
Rechenthin D. (2004). Project safety as a sustainable competitive advantage. Journal of
Safety Research.. 35(3), 297. doi:10.1016/j.jsr.2004.03.012
Reichers,
ers, A. E., & Schneider, B. (1990). Climate and culture: an evolution of constructs.
In B. Schneider (Ed.), Organizational Climate & Culture (pp. 5-39).
39). San
Francisco, CA:: Jossey
Jossey-Bass.
Reid, N. (1988). The Delphi technique: its contribution to the evaluat
evaluation
ion of professional
practice. In R. Ellis (Ed.), Professional competence and quality assurance
a
in the
caring professions
rofessions (pp. 230-261). London: Croom Helm.
Reigle, R. F. (2001). Measuring organic and mechanistic cultures. Engineering
Management Journal, 13(4), 3-8.
Reigle, R. F. (2003). Organizational cultural assessment.. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, UMI--3079377. University of Alabama – Huntsville.
Reinsch, N. L. (1999). Selected communication variables and telecommuting
participation decisions: data from telecommuting workers. Journal of Business
Communications, 36
36(3), 247-260.
Rice, F. (1993). Who scores best on the environment. Fortune, 128(2),
(2), 114-118.
114

193
Rousseau, D. (1990). Quantitative assessment of organizational culture: The case for
multiple measures. In B. Schneider (Ed.), Organizational climate and culture (pp.
153-192). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Rowe, G., & Wright, G. (1999). The Delphi technique as a forecasting tool: issues and
analysis. International Journal of Forecasting, 15(4), 353-375.
doi:10.1016/S0169-2070(99)00018-7.
Rowe, G., & Wright, G. (2001). Expert opinions in forecasting. In S. Armstrong (Ed.),
Principles of forecasting: A handbook for researchers and practitioners (pp. 125144). Boston, MA: Klewer
Rowe, G., Wright, G., & Bolger, F. (1991). Delphi: A reevaluation of research and
theory. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 39(3), 235-251.
Rundmo, T. (1994). Associations between organizational factors and safety and
contingency measures on offshore petroleum platforms. Scandinavian Journal of
Work Environmental Health, 20, 122-127.
Rundmo, T. (2000). Safety climate, attitudes, and risk perception in Norsk Hydro. Safety
Science, 34, 47-59.
Saari, J. & Nasanen, M. (1989). The effect of positive feedback on industrial
housekeeping and accidents: a long-term study at a shipyard. International
Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 4, 201-211.
Safety. (2007). In Britannica Student Encyclopedia. Retrieved from Encyclopedia
Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-207621.

194
Saizarbitoria, I. H. (2006). How quality management models influence company results:
Conclusions of an empirical study based on the Delphi method. Total Quality
Management, 17(6), 775-794. doi: 10.1080/09593960600597768.
Saizarbitoria, I. H., Landin, G. A., & Fa, M. C. (2006). The impact of quality
management in European companies’ performance. European Business Review,
18(2), 114-131. doi:10.1108/09555340610651839.
Sasson, J. R., Austin, J., & Alvero, A. M. (2007). Behavioral observations: Effects on
safe performance. Professional Safety, 52(4), 26-31.
Scheibe, M., Skutsch, M., & Schofer, J. (2002). Experiments in Delphi methodology. In
H. Linstone & M. Turoff (Eds.), The Delphi method: techniques and applications
(pp. 383-395). Retrieved from the New Jersey Institute of Technology,
Information Systems Department website:
http://www.is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook.
Schein, E. H. (1990). Organizational culture. American Psychologist, 45(2), 109-119.
doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.45.2.109
Schein, E. H. (2000). Sense and nonsense about culture and climate. In N. Askanasay,
C. Wilderom & M. Peterson (Eds.), Handbook of organizational culture and
climate (pp. xxiii-xxx). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Schein, E. H. (2009). The corporate culture survival guide. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schein, E. H. (2010). Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schlegelmich, B. B., Bohlen, G. M., & Diamantopoulos, A. (1996). The link between
green purchasing decisions and measures of environmental consciousness.
European Journal of Marketing, 30(5). 35-55.

195
Schmidt, R. C. (1997). Managing Delphi surveys using nonparametric statistical
techniques. Decision Sciences, 28(3), 763-774.
Schmidt, R., Lyytinen, K., Keil, M., & Cule, P. (2001). Identifying software risks: An
international Delphi study. Journal of Management Information Systems, (17)4,
5-36.
Shrivastava, P. (1995). Environmental technologies and competitive advantage. Strategic
Management Journal, 16, 183-200.
Silva, S., Lima, M. L., & Baptista, C. (2004). OSCI: An organizational and safety
climate inventory. Safety Science, 42, 205-220. doi:10.1016/S09257535(03)00043-2
Silverman, D. (2005). Doing qualitative research (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
Slevin, D. P., & Covin, J. G. (1990). Juggling entrepreneurial style and organizational
structure: How to get your act together. Sloan Management Review, 31(2), 4353.
Smith, G. S., Chen, P. Y., Ho, M., & Huang, Y. (2006). The relationship between safety
climate and injury rates across industries: the need to adjust for injury hazards.
Accident Analysis and Prevention, 38(3), 556-562. doi:
10.1016/j.aap.2005.11.013
Smith, S. (2007). Behavior-based safety: Myth or magic. Occupational Hazards, 69(10),
45-48.
Sorensen, J. N. (2002). Safety culture: a survey of the state-of-the-art. Reliability
Engineering and System Safety, 76, 189-204.

196
Staples, (2001). A study of remote workers and their differences from non-remote
workers. Journal of End User Computing, 13(2), 3-14.
Sulzer-Azaroff, B. & de Santamaria, M. C. (1980). Industrial safety hazard reduction
through performance feedback. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 13(2),
287-295.
Szostak, A. (1998). Fleet financial tests work/life. HR Focus, 75(11), 13-15.
Takano, K., Kojima, M., Hasegawa, N., & Hirose, A. (2001). Interrelationships between
organizational factors and major safety indicators: a preliminary field study. In
B. Wilpert & N. Itoigawa (Eds.), Safety culture in nuclear power operations (pp
189-205), London: Taylor and Francis.
Taylor, F. W. (1947). Scientific Management. New York: Harper.
Thompson, R. C., Hilton, T. F., & Witt, L. A. (1998). Where the rubber meets the shop
floor: a confirmatory model of management influence on workplace safety.
Journal of Safety Research, 29, 15-24.
Turnberg, W. & Daniell, W. (2008). Evaluation of a health care safety climate tool.
Journal of Safety Research, 39, 563-568.
U.S. Department of Labor. (2004). The Occupational Health and Safety Act. Public Law
91-596 84 STAT. 1590 91st Congress, S.2193. Retrieved from
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb
/owadisp.show_document?p_Table=OSHACT&p_id=2743.
U.S. Department of Labor. (2000). Home-based worksites, OSHA Instruction CPL 20.125. Retrieved from

197
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_Table
=DIRECTIVES&p_id=2254.
U.S. Department of Labor. (2005). Work at home summary, USDL 05-1768. Retrieved
from http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/homey.pdf.
Van de Ven, A. H., & Delbecq, A. L. (1974). The effectiveness of nominal, Delphi, and
interacting group decision making processes. The Academy of Management
Journal, 17, 605-621.
VanDelinder, J. (2005). Taylorism, managerial control strategies and the ballets of
Ballanchine and Stravinsky. The American Behavioral Scientist, 48, 1439-1452.
Varadarjan, P. R., & Clark, T. (1994). Determining the scope of corporate, business and
marketing strategy. Journal of Business Research, 31(2), 93-105.
Vecchio-Sadus, A. M. & Griffiths, S. (2004). Marketing strategies for enhancing safety
culture. Safety Science, 42, 601-619.
Vincoli, J. W. (1991). Total quality management and the safety and health professional.
Professional Safety, 36(6), 27-32.
Vinodkumar, M. N. & Bhasi, M. (2009). Safety climate factors and its relationship with
accidents and personal attributes in the chemical industry. Safety Science, 47,
659-667.
Wahlstrom, B. (2001). Assessing the influence of organizational factors on nuclear
safety. In B. Wilpert & N. Itoigawa (Eds.), Safety culture in nuclear power
operations (pp. 177-188). London: Taylor & Francis.

198
Wallace, J. C., Popp, E., & Mondore, S. (2006). Safety climate as a mediator between
foundation climates and occupational accidents: a group-level investigation.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 681-688.
Walsham, G. (2002). Cross-cultural software production and use: a structurational
analysis. MIS Quarterly, 26(4), 359-380.
Wells, R. P. (1994). The challenge of going green. Harvard Business Review, 72(4), 3750.
Williams, P. L., & Webb, C. (1994). The Delphi technique: A methodological discussion.
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19(1), 180-186.
Williamson, A. M., Feyer, A., Cairns, D., & Biancotti, D. (1997). The development of a
measure of safety climate: the role of safety perceptions and attitudes. Safety
Science, 25, 15-27.
Wills, A. R., Biggs, H. C., & Watson, B. (2005). Analysis of a safety climate measure
for occupational vehicle drivers and implications for safer workplaces. Australian
Journal of Rehabilitation Counseling, 11(1), 8-21.
Wills, A., Watson, B., & Biggs, H. (2009). An exploratory investigation into safety
climate and work-related driving. Work, 32, 81-94
Wirth, O. & Sigurdsson, S. O. (2008). When workplace safety depends on behavior
change: topics for behavioral research. Journal of Safety Research, 39, 589-598.
Woudenberg, F. (1991). An evaluation of Delphi. Technological Forecasting and Social
Change, 40, 131-150.
Wren, D. A. (2005). The history of management thought (5th ed.). New York: Wiley.

199
Yeh, C. R., Cheng, T., & Hou, S. (2010, August). Professional competencies of
recruitment consultants in Taiwan’s temporary staffing agencies. Paper presented
at the meeting of the Academy of Management, Montreal, Canada.
Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied
implications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65(1), 96-102. doi: 10.1037/00219010.65.1.96
Zohar, D. (2000). A group-level model of safety climate: Testing the effect of group
climate on microaccidents in manufacturing jobs. Journal of Applied Psychology,
85(4), 587-596. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.85.4.587
Zohar, D. (2002a). The effects of leadership dimensions, safety climate, and assigned
priorities on minor injuries in work groups. Journal of Organizational Behavior,
23(1), 75-90.
Zohar, D. (2002b). Modifying supervisory practices to improve subunit safety: A
leadership-based intervention model. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(1), 156163. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.87.1.156
Zohar, D. (2003). Safety climate: conceptual and measurement issues. In J. C. Quick &
L. E. Tetrick (Eds), Handbook of occupational health psychology (pp. 123-142).
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Zohar, D. & Luria, G. (2005). A multi-level model of safety climate: cross-level
relationships between organization and group-level climates. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 90(4), 616-628.

